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NIGERIA: The Effect of Fiscal Taxation and the Separation of Ownership and 
Control. 
This research investigates the tax policies of the Nigerian government and the separation of 
ownership and control and the possibility that they impact on the economic performance of 
the international oil companies operating in Nigeria. 
The key areas of the research include a literature review which concentrates on both 
shareholder and stakeholder theories in corporate governance and on the separation of 
ownership and control. The literature review is also on government control mechanisms, 
including state ownership of corporations and taxation. Another key part of this research is 
the investigation of the relationship between types of contract between host government 
and the operating companies, and the companies' economic performance in relation to 
contract type. 
The second part of this research examines the relationship between the variables 
representing fiscal taxation and those representing economic performance. Given that there 
are essentially two types of contracts operating in Nigeria's oil and gas exploitation 
business, that is, Joint Venture (JV) and Production Sharing Contract (PSC), these two 
formed the basis of the research. For the purposes of measuring economic performance, the 
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unit cost of production and gross margin per barrel were chosen as the variables for 
measuring the impact of the separation of ownership and control and the impact of fiscal 
taxation on the economic performance of the operating companies. 
Data obtained from secondary sources served as the basis for the quantitative analysis 
employed in this research, and the results obtained were statistically tested before any 
interpretation and recommendations were suggested. Interviews were also conducted for 
the qualitative aspect of this study in order to obtain information on the factors that 
influenced Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production fiscal policy formulation in the 
past. 
This research provided the opportunity to arrive at certain conclusions which, even if they 
sometimes appeared obvious, were never previously empirically substantiated, and the 
corroboration of some existing theories as being applicable to the Nigerian situation. They 
also provided a basis for suggesting the inappropriateness of some existing concepts or 
theories in their application to Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and producing companies. 
For example, the results suggest that the existence of separation of ownership and control 
does not guarantee optimization of economic performance (or maximization of wealth) for 
the production sharing contract type in oil companies operating in Nigeria, even if they do 
elsewhere. Fiscal taxation was also suggested as critical to economic performance but 
possibly not the only variable impacting on the economics of petroleum exploitation in 
Nigeria. This research provided other possible areas for further research in both fields of 
corporate governance and fiscal taxation. 
111 
LIST OF CONTENTS 
TTTLE PAGE ..................................................................... 
i 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................ 
ii 
.............................................. iii LIST OF CONTENTS .............. 
iii 
LIST OF MAPS .................................................................... x 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................. xi 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................... xii 
LIST OF APPENDICES........ xiii 
PREFACE .......................................................................... X1V 
DEFINITIONS ..................................................................... xvi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................ xvii 
DEDICATION ............. xviii 
1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ............................................. 
1 
1.1: Background to the Study ..................................................... 
1 
1.2: Structure of the Thesis ........................................................ 
2 
1.3: Overview of the Petroleum industry ....................................... 
2 
1.3.1: What is Petroletun? ........................................................................... 
2 
1.3.2: How is Petroleum Formed? ............................................................... 
3 
1.3.3: Occurrence .................................................................... 
4 
1.3.4: Uses of Petroleum Oil and Gas ............................................ 4 
1.3.5: Structure of the Petroleum Industry ...................................... 5 
1.3.6: The Upstream Sector ....................................................... 7 
1.3.7: Oil and Gas Reserves and Production Figures .......................... 7 
1.3.8: Oil and Gas Business and Economics ................................... 13 
IV 
1.4: Conclusion ........................................................................ 
14 
CHAPTER 2: DESCRIPTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM 
INDUSTRY IN NIGERIA ....................................... 
15 
2.1: Historical Overview ............................................................. 
15 
2.2: Economic Overview ............................................................. 
15 
2.3: Structure of Government Supervision of the Oil Industry ................ 
16 
2.4: Legislation Governing Oil and Gas Exploration & Production........... . 17 
....................................... 2.5: License and 
License Tvves.......... .... . 
17 
2.6: Fiscal Regime .................................................................... 
18 
2.7: Marginal Fields for Indigenous Participation & Entrepreneurship...... 19 
2.8: Conclusion ........................................................................ 
22 
CHAPTER 3: DESCRIPTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM.. 23 
3.1: Historical Overview .............................................................. 
23 
3.2: Government Supervisory and Management Structure ....................... 24 
3.3: UK Oil and Gas Legislation ..................................................... 
26 
3.4: Joint Operating Agreements ..................................................... 
28 
3.5: UK Oil and Gas Fiscal Regimes ................................................ 
29 
3.6: The UK Continental Shelf Taxation ............................................ 
30 
3.7: Conclusion ........................................................................ 32 
V 
CHAPTER 4: REGULATORY LEGISLATION AND FISCAL TAXATION 
MECHANISM IN NIGERIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ... 33 
4.1: Exploration and Production .................................................... 
33 
4.2: Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) ..................................... 
34 
4.3: Other Legislation on Oil and Gas Operation in Nigeria ................... 
35 
4.4: Nigeria's Oil and Gas Petroleum Profit Taxation (PPT) ................... 
36 
4.5: Memorandum of Understanding in Nigeria .................................. 
39 
4.6: UK Oil and Gas Regulatory Legislation .................................... 
44 
4.7: UK Oil and Gas Taxation / Fiscal Regime ................................... 
45 
4.8: Key Issues in UK Petroleum Revenue Tax ................................. 
50 
4.9: UK Corporation Tax and Ring Fenced Activity ........................... 
51 
4.10: Other Key Provisions Affecting Computation of Corporation Tax... 55 
4.11: Conclusion ..................................................................... 56 
CHAPTER 5: LITERATURE REVIEW I ....................................... 
57 
FISCAL TAXATION AS INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
5.1: Background ..................................................................... .57 
5.2: Fiscal Taxation -A Form of Government Control ........................ 59 
5.3: Government Control Objectives and National Resource Taxation..... . 59 
5.4: Fiscal Policy Defined ......................................................... 
61 
5.5: Government Control and Fiscal Policy .........:........................... 62 
5.6: Tax Incentive As Part of Fiscal Policy ..................................... 66 
5.7: Principal Characteristics of a Tax System ................................. 70 
5.8: National Tax Income Maximization ........................................ 72 
5.9: Corporation Tax ............................................................... 72 
vi 
5.10: Corporate Taxes and Financial Risks ........................................ 74 
5.11: The Disincentive of Taxation ................................................. 75 
5.12: The Development of Government Control of Petroleum 
Resources through Fiscal Taxation in Nigeria and the UK .............. 76 
5.13: The Petroleum Industry - Government Control Relationship............ 80 
5.14: Control and Economic Profitability .......................................... 
81 
5.15: The Development of Nigeria and UK Oil and Gas Policies ............... 
83 
5.16: Critical Issues in Petroleum Fiscal Taxation ................................. 
87 
5.17: Conclusion ........................................................................ 
92 
CHAPTER 6: LITERATURE REVIEW II 
PERSPECTIVES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SEPARATION 
OF OWNWESHIP AND CONTROL ............................................ 93 
6.1: The Shareholders Perspective ................................................ 
93 
6.2: The Stakeholders Perspective ................................................ 102 
6.3: Separation of Ownership and Control and Corporate Performance .... 109 
6.4: State Owned Petroleum Corporations ...................................... 
126 
6.4.1: The Birth ...................................................................... 126 
6.4.2: Why State Owned or National Oil Companies? ................................ 127 
6.4.3: State Owned Oil Companies and Corporate Governance .............. 128 
CHAPTER7: METHODOLOGY ............................................... 130 
7.1: Identification of Data ........................................................ 133 
7.2: Data Analysis and Reporting ............................................... 136 
vii 
7.3: Interview Excerpts on Oil and Gas Fiscal Taxation 
Policy Formulation in Nigeria ............................................ 
137 
7.4: Hypotheses Development .................................................. 
162 
7.5: Proposition of Hypotheses and Model Correction ...................... 163 
7.6: Statistical Methodology .................................................... 
164 
CHAPTER 8: DATA ANALYSIS ............................................ 
172 
8.1: Separation of Ownership and Control .................................... 
172 
8.1.1: Data Set and Software ................................................... 
173 
8.1.2: Analysis ................................................................... 173 
8.1.3: Descriptive Statistics 
.................................................... 
174 
8.1.4: Regression Modelling, Assessment and Analysis I ................. 179 
8.1.5: Interpretation .............................................................. 189 
8.2: Data Analysis on Fiscal Taxation ........................................ 
193 
8.2.1 Data Set .................................................................... 19 3 
8.2.2: Analysis ................................................................... 194 
8.2.3: Descriptive Statistics ................................................... 
196 
8.2.4: Financial Regression Modelling, Assessment & Analysis II...... 200 
8.2.5: Interpretation ............................................................. 
203 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION ................................................ 206 
9.1: Conclusion on the Aspect of Separation of Ownership 
and Control .................................................................. 206 
9.1.1: Areas of Further Research ............................................... 210 
9.2: Conclusion on Aspect of Fiscal Taxation ............................... 211 
viii 
9.2.1: Areas of Further Research ............................................. 
214 
9.3: Overall Conclusion ........................................................ 
215 
REFERENCES ................................................................. 
217 
APPENDICES ................................................................. 
222 
ix 
LIST OF MAPS 
1. Map of Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries in Africa ....................... xix 
2. Map of Nigeria Showing the Thirty Six States ................................. xx 
3. Map of Petroleum Producing Regions of the Niger Delta in Nigeria ....... xxi 
4. Map of Nigeria's Petroleum Producing Blocks/Fields Showing 
the International Oil Companies Operating the Fields ........................ xxii 
5. Map of the United Kingdom Showing the North Sea ........................ xxiii 
X 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. World Crude Oil Proved Reserves ............................................. 
9 
Table 2. World Natural Gas Proved ...................................................... 
10 
Table 3. World's Largest Producers and Consumers of Crude Oil ................... 
Il 
Table 4. World's Largest Producers and Consumers of Natural Gas ............... 
12 
Table 5. Allocated Marginal Fields to Indigenous Operators in Nigeria ............. 
20 
Table 6. Nigeria's Petroleum Contribution to GDP In Relation to Other Sectors. -84 
Table 7. Summary of Researches on Relationship Between the Separation of 
Ownership and Control and Economic Performance (1968-1991) ....... 
113 
Table 8. Sample of Changes in Percentage Equity Holding in Nigeria's 
Oil Companies 
.................................................................... 
167 
Table 9. International Oil Companies Operating in Nigeria ........................... 168 
Table 10. Data Set for Regression Analysis ............................................. 
175 
Table 11. Summary Descriptive Statistics of Sample Companies A, B and C....... 176 
Table 12 Correlation Matrix: Log COST, Log GMPB, Log PROD, 
CT and TIME .................................................................... 
187 
Table 13. Nigeria's Oil and Gas Revenue, Tax Yield and 
Companies Profit Profile ................................................... 
197 
Table 14. Summary Descriptive Statistics of Nigeria's Production, Oil Price, Revenue, 
Cost, Government Take, Petroleum Profit Tax and Profit After Tax... 198 
Table 15. Comparison of Government Take and Profit After Tax 
As Percent of Oil Revenue in Nigeria ........................................ 199 
Table 16. Correlation Matrix: Log COST, Log GTIR, Log PROD 
and TIME ....................................................................... 201 
xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Production-Cost Graph for Company A ............................... 
178 
Figure 2: Production-Cost Graph for Company B ............................... 
178 
Figure 3: Production-Cost Graph for Company C ............................... 
178 
Figure 4: Long Run Total Cost (LRTC) Curve ................................... 
179 
Figures: Log of Cost-Log of Production Curve for Company A .............. 
182 
Figure 6: Log of Cost-Log of Production Curve for Company B .............. 
182 
Figure 7: Log of Cost-Log of Production Curve for Company C ............... 182 
Figure 8: Graph of Government Take as Percentage of Revenue 
in Nigeria (1988-2002) ...................................................... 
199 
Figure 9: Graph of Profit After Tax as Percentage of Revenue 
in Nigeria (1988-2002) ...................................................... 
199 
Figure 10: Graph of Crude Oil Prices (1970-2002) .................................. 205 
xii 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES ........................... 222 
APPENDIX 2: OPEC MEMBER STATES AND MAJOR NON-OPEC 
PRODUCING COUNTRIES 
........................................... 
223 
APPENDIX 3: 100 % STATE OWNED OIL COMPANIES ........................ 
224 
APPENDIX 4: MAJOR NIGERIAN OIL & GAS PRODUCING JOINT VENTURES 
(2003) ...................................................................... 
225 
APPENDIX 5: MAJOR NIGERIAN PRODUCING OIL FIELDS RESERVE LEVEL 
(2003) ...................................................................... 226 
APPENDIX 6: CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF LEGISLATIONS AND 
FISCAL REGIME AFFECTING PETROLEUM OPERATIONS 
IN NIGERIA ............................................................. 227 
APPENDIX 7: MAJOR DATES IN THE HISTORY OF NIGERIA'S OIL 
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND PRODUCING INDUSTRY ... 228 
APPENDIX 8: USA GDP DEFLATOR PERCENTAGE CHANGE 
(1988-2002) 
............................................................... 229 
APPENDIX 9: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS THAT AFFECTED WORLD 
CRUDE OIL PRICES (1973 - 2002) .................................. 230 
X111 
PREFACE 
It is now 44 years since Nigeria became independent from British colonial rule in 
1960. Just about the time when the struggle for independence would end, commercial 
exploitation of petroleum crude oil commenced at Oloibiri, Rivers State in 1958. The 
entire country was licensed to SHELL `Darcy as the sole international oil company to 
explore and produce crude oil. 
Since independence, the oil and gas exploration and producing petroleum industry 
(upstream sector) has evolved. The highlights include a number of licensing rounds, 
Nigeria's membership of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
the evolution of phases in Joint Venture (JV) partnerships, the signing of the first 
Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) with Ashland Oil Company, USA in 1973, the 
licensing of marginal fields to indigenous companies and the discovery of oil and gas 
reservoirs offshore. 
Just as was typical of most developing economies after independence, the control of 
natural resources and the maximization of revenue generation therefrom were key 
objectives in the formulation of Nigeria's fiscal policies governing the operations of 
the international oil companies in the country. 
As a result of the 1971-73 oil revolution which marked the phenomenal increase in 
crude oil price and the founding of OPEC (with the attendant market share control and 
price fixing policies), OPEC member states were locked in complex contract 
xiv 
formulation and negotiation with international oil companies. It is believed that some 
oil and gas fiscal regimes hinder investment, despite the intentions of the host 
countries to employ these very contracts to attract international oil companies and 
thereby develop their national economies through the exploitation of natural resources, 
like petroleum crude oil and gas. 
This research investigates the relationship between the contract types, fiscal taxation 
(through which the government seeks to control its economic interests) and the 
economic returns to the operating oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The data 
employed in this empirical study are secondary data and were sourced from the 
operating companies; the Nigerian Inland Revenue Service unpublished data, and 
published data from various public sources. 
Data analysis conducted is quantitative using statistical multiple regression. The 
research results contribute additional knowledge to the already existing body of 
knowledge in highlighting the relationship between contract type (signifying the 
control level) and economic performance, as well as the significance of crude oil 
prices and fiscal taxation levels to the economic performance of the operating 
companies in Nigeria. This study also highlights the likely areas of further research 
particularly with reference to other OPEC countries and other production sharing 
contracts in OPEC and non-OPEC countries. 
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DEFINITIONS 
For the purposes of this research, some of the key terms are defined below: 
Fiscal Taxation - This refers to the taxes levied by the government of Nigeria as a 
means of controlling its economic interests, and with a view to maximizing revenue 
generation. It comprises Royalty and Petroleum Profit Tax, both of which are 
sometimes referred to as `Government Take'. 
Separation of Ownership and Control - This is to be understood in the context of 
Corporate Governance and as a factor upon which control of management by majority 
shareholders is predicated in corporate organisations and defined as the extent of 
equity holding by other owners as separate from the equity held by the company's 
management. 
Economic Performance is defined through profitability related variables - cost per 
barrel of production and gross margin, which are used to mirror the extent of the 
impact of fiscal taxation on the economic returns available to the operating companies. 
A barrel is a measure for quantity of liquids and it is equivalent to 159 litres. It is the 
usual measure for stating quantities of crude oil. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Study 
This research began with the knowledge that certain contract types in business are better 
suited to certain economies while other contract types are not. Earlier in the life of 
Nigeria's oil and gas industry, government tended to believe in the need to control the 
operations of the international oil companies engaged in petroleum exploitation. What is 
not clear is the desirability or appropriateness of the chosen contract type in terms of the 
economic advantages they provide for both government and the oil companies. 
While Nigeria's membership of the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries continues to 
generate debate, the economic implication of its membership, positive or not, is yet to be 
substantiated using empirical data. Similarly, the adoption of the Production Sharing 
Contract (PSC) as against the Joint Venture (JV) has not been shown to serve the economic 
well being of the country in any empirical study. 
Furthermore, there has not been any study on the impact of the use of fiscal taxation as an 
instrument for the realisation of the country's revenue generation without the creation of a 
largely one-sided return on investment (in favour of the host government), with much 
reduced returns to the operators. These issues informed the need to carry out an empirical 
study that verified or dismissed these ideas and other existing theories in this field of study. 
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1.2. Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured with a view to providing a clear understanding of the petroleum 
industry and the peculiarities of the Nigerian upstream petroleum sector. 
The structure also includes a comparison of the UK's petroleum industry's upstream sector 
with Nigeria's. The reasons for this comparison are that: 
a. Nigeria was the UK's former colony, with the entire legislative process of 
commercial law and business practices predicated on the UK Common Laws. 
b. Nigeria's flag ship crude oil, the Bonny Light, has similar specific gravity to the 
UK's `Brent' both of which attract similar spot market prices. 
c. Nigeria's daily crude production of two million barrels per day is similar to the 
UK's. 
This thesis is predicated on a quantitative analysis of data obtained from secondary sources 
on Nigeria's crude oil and gas production, costs, revenue and taxes paid over a ten year 
period for the part of the study concerned with corporate governance and over a thirty year 
period for the section on fiscal taxation. 
Essentially, the method of analysis is quantitative and deductive, with the use of both 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis. 
1.3. Overview of the Petroleum Industry 
1.3.1 What is Petroleum? 
Petroleum is derived from two Greek words `petro' and `oleum' both of which mean rock 
and oil respectively. The word petroleum therefore refers to the oil that is found in rocks. 
Oil and natural gas, together with coal, are referred to as fossil fuels. Petroleum oil and gas 
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were formed millions of years ago and are finite resources, meaning that one day, if 
additional deposits are not found, already discovered reserves will be totally used up 
because they are irreplaceable. 
Prior to its discovery, Egyptians and Sumerians used materials similar to oil (such as pitch) 
in coating their canoes (as waterproofing) and as mortar in building houses as well as in 
cementing blades to handles in the early civilisation about 2000 BC. 
Petroleum is a naturally occurring resource, which exists in the three phases of gas, liquid 
and solid states. When in the gaseous state, it is called natural gas. The liquid and solid 
states of petroleum resource are called crude oil and tar sand respectively. 
In all its forms, petroleum is an organic and complex compound. They belong to a group 
of chemical compounds called hydrocarbons. Hydrocarbons have the inclusion of hydrogen 
and carbon as the main elements in their chemical composition. Apart from the presence of 
hydrogen and carbon, petroleum oil, gas and tar sand also contain such elements like 
sulphur, oxygen and nitrogen. 
1.3.2 How Is Petroleum Formed? 
According to the organic theory of the origin of petroleum, it is believed that with the aid 
of weathering agents like wind, water, mud-slides, glacier movements, plants and animals 
get carried away together with rock sediments which occur when both igneous and 
metamorphic rocks get weathered, and are deposited in places where sedimentation occurs. 
The decomposition of such organic materials, like plants and animals, under extreme 
temperature and pressure of the subsurface formation and in the presence of metallic 
13 
catalysts, is said to result in the formation of oil and gas; with the oil arising from animals 
and the gas from plants. 
There are however some other schools of thought on the origin of petroleum oil and gas. 
For example, some believe that it is not possible to have had that much mass of 
microscopic organisms resulting in or giving rise to the volume of oil and gas that we 
presently have as world petroleum reserves. They believe both are just naturally occurring 
like we have water in the seas and oceans. 
1.3.3 Occurrence 
About the year 1280AD, oil was first noticed in the form of a fountain around Baku in 
Russia by the great explorer Marco Polo. Petroleum hydrocarbons are found trapped in 
reservoirs in sedimentary rocks (rocks formed via the sequential deposition of sediments in 
sub-surface geological formations in different parts of the world. Petroleum oil and gas 
have been found in both terrestrial and marine environments while tar sand occurs 
essentially on land. Oil was first drilled by Colonel Drake in 1859 in the American state of 
Pennsylvania. 
1.3.4 Uses of Petroleum Oil and Gas 
Essentially, petroleum oil was used for medicinal purposes before the nineteenth century in 
addition to being used as pitch for waterproofing. Early in 1800s, Samuel Kier converted 
petroleum oil into lamp oil by distillation. This gave rise to the growing importance of 
refined petroleum as we know it today. With advancement in technology, petroleum oil 
was refined initially to produce lighting oil (kerosene), and later gasoline and automotive 
gas-oil with the invention of combustion and diesel engines. Thereafter, further refining by 
14 
catalytic cracking, polymerisation of olefins and development of plastics gave both 
petroleum oil and gas wider applications in households and industries. 
Present day uses of crude oil and natural gas are as summarised below: 
- Transportation fuels (gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene, automotive gas oil) 
- Natural gas for electricity power generation and heating 
- Petrochemical derivatives: plastics, industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
cosmetics etc. 
1.3.5 The Structure of the Petroleum Industry 
The petroleum industry is divided into two sectors: 
(i). The Upstream Sector 
This comprises all technical and commercial activities relating to the finding 
(exploration) and winning/mining (production/producing) of petroleum hydrocarbon oil or 
gas. 
Such activities include: 
- Geological and geophysical surveys 
- Drilling 
- Field development 
- Production 
- Related services (e. g. well logging, well completion, well servicing, data 
acquisition etc. ) 
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(ii). The Downstream Sector 
This sector involves all technical and commercial activities relating to the following: 
- Refining and petrochemicals manufacturing 
- Supply and distribution 
- Marketing of refined products 
The very first oil and gas company incorporated was the Standard Oil Company of New 
York. It was established by J. D. Rockefeller -a Baptist Deacon and Sunday school teacher. 
(Yagin D. 1998). Because of the predatory activities of Standard oil which stifled 
competition and tended to create a monopoly, it was dissolved by a judicial judgement 
which divided Standard Oil into the following oil companies in America. 
(i) Standard Oil (Exxon Oil Inc. ) 
(ii) Mobil Oil Inc. 
(iii) Texas Oil Co. (Texaco) 
(iv) Gulf Oil (later merged with Chevron) 
(v) Amoco 
(vi) Continental Oil Co. (Conoco) 
Most of these oil companies are vertically integrated such that their operations include both 
the upstream and the downstream sector. In terms of corporate organisational structure, 
there is a clear distinction between the management structure and organisation of the two 
sectors and they depict the operational peculiarities of each sector. However, both sectors 
usually have a single board of directors to which the chief operating officers of the two 
sectors report. Also, at the corporate/executive levels, some of the functions like finance, 
planning, legal and corporate affairs are controlled from the corporate head quarters. For 
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the purpose of this study, investigations are restricted to the exploration and production 
(upstream) sector of the petroleum industry. 
1.3.6 The Upstream Sector (Brief Review of Activities) 
Petroleum oil and gas when formed occur in the sub-surface formations which are known 
as reservoirs. It is the places where they are likely to occur or be found that both geologists 
and geophysicists are engaged in exploring. Together they use scientific knowledge and 
technology to determine where such oil and gas are trapped. When an area is decided as a 
possible hydrocarbon bearing formation, further search methods are deployed for 
confirmation. Two such methods are a geological study of fossils and rock formation and a 
geophysical seismic survey. Both give rise to a three- dimensional picture of the sub- 
surface which is needed to determine if there is the occurrence of oil/gas in that location 
and where in particular. 
Drilling is the only sure way to ascertain if there is oil/gas. Drilling is expensive, costing 
millions of dollars, yet oil/gas may not be found after drilling. The cost also depends on the 
depth to be drilled and the environment. A place like the North Sea is one of the most 
expensive places to carry out drilling operation because of the turbulence of the sea. When 
oil/gas is found, other wells are drilled and production facilities put in place to exploit the 
reservoir. The major equipment used for production is the production platform whose type 
and design varies depending on whether it is onshore or offshore production. 
1.3.7 Oil and Gas Reserves and Production Figures 
Tables 1 to 4 listed below are intended to answer some of the questions that readily agitate 
our minds with relation to the oil and gas business. Such questions may also minimise the 
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importance of the kind of investigation which this research study sets out to undertake if 
left unanswered. 
It is expected that tables 1-4 below will provide the answers to such questions as: 
- What quantities of oil and gas are left? 
- Which countries have more oil and gas than others? 
- What is the future of UK and Nigeria oil and gas? 
- Which countries actually consume oil and gas most? 
- In terms of energy supply to what extent is oil and gas replaceable? 
- What is the country of origin of the major oil companies? 
- Which countries have national oil companies? 
- To what extent can the world be threatened by OPEC supply cuts? 
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Table 1: World Crude Oil Proved Reserves 
Countrv At end 1982 At end 1992 At end 2001 At end 2002 % R/P* 
Thousand Thousand Thousand Thousand of Total Ratio 
Million Bbls Million Bbls Million Bbls Million Bbls 2ý 002) 
Saudi Arab ia 165.3 260.3 261.8 261.8 25 86 
Iraq 41 100 112.5 112.5 10.7 >100 
UAE 32.4 98.1 97.8 97.8 9.3 >100 
Kuwait 67.2 96.5 96.5 96.5 9.2 >100 
Iran 55.3 92.9 89.7 89.7 8.6 74 
Venezuela 21.5 62.7 77.7 77.8 7.4 74 
Russia N/A 48.5 48.5 60 5.7 22 
USA 35 32 30 30.4 2.9 10.8 
Libya 21.5 22.8 29.5 29.5 2.8 59 
Nigeria 16.8 17.9 24 24 2.3 32.8 
China 19.5 24 24 18.3 1.7 14.8 
Qatar 3.4 3.7 15.2 15.2 1.5 5.8 
Mexico 48.3 51.3 26.9 12.6 1.2 10 
Norway 6.8 8.8 9.4 10.3 1.0 8.7 
UK 13.9 4.1 4.9 4.7 0.5 5.4 
Others 128.8 83.1 101.9 106.6 10.2 
TOTAL 676.7 1006.7 1050.3 1047.7 100 
Total OEC D 116.7 108.9 84.5 72 6.9 
Total OPEC 443.3 769.9 818.8 819 78.2 
* The R/P ratio is the reserve/production ratio. It measures the length of time in years it 
takes to exhaust the current reserve level at the current yearly production level. 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2003. 
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Table 2: World Natural Gas Proved Reserves 
CounLzy At end 1982 At end 1992 At end 2001 At end 2002 % R/P* 
Trillion Cubic Trillion Cubic Trillion Cubic Trillion Cubic of Total Ratio 
Metre (tcm) Metre (tcm) Metre (tcm) Metre (tcm) (2002) 
Russia N/A 47.40 47.57 47.57 30.5 81.2 
Iran 13.67 19.80 2.3 2.3 14.8 >100 
Qatar 1.76 6.43 14.4 14.4 9.2 >100 
Saudi Arabia 3.43 5.18 6.22 6.36 4.1 >100 
UAE 0.81 5.79 6.01 6.01 3.9 >100 
USA 5.78 4.73 5.02 5.19 3.3 9.6 
Algeria 3.15 3.62 4.52 4.52 2.9 56.3 
Venezuela 1.53 3.58 4.18 4.19 2.7 >100 
Nigeria 0.92 3.40 3.51 3.51 2.3 >100 
Iraq 0.82 3.10 3.11 3.11 2.0 >100 
Indonesia 0.84 1.82 2.62 2.62 1.7 37 
Australia 0.50 0.52 2.55 2.55 1.6 74 
Malaysia 0.96 1.92 2.12 2.12 1.4 42 
Norway 1.64 2.00 1.25 2.19 1.4 34 
UK 0.72 0.54 0.73 0.70 0.4 7 
Others 49.37 28.51 28.83 27.74 17.8 
TOTAL 85.90 138.34 155.64 155.78 100 
Total OECD 15.81 15.80 14.87 15.38 9.9 
Total OPEC 26.93 52.70 67.57 67.72 43.5 
Based on year 2002 figures, Nigeria has the tenth and ninth largest crude oil and gas 
reserves respectively in the world. The United Kingdom's crude oil and gas reserves are the 
fifteenth largest in the world for both. These positions make the two countries significant in 
the dynamics of oil and gas exploitation. 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2003. 
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Table 3: World Largest Producers and Consumers of Crude Oil 
Production Consumption 
Country Oil Prod. % Country Consumption % 
`000 BPD) of Total `000 BPD) of Total 
Saudi Arabia 8680 11.8 USA 19708 25.4 
Russia 7911 10.7 China 5362 7.0 
USA 7320 9.9 Japan 5337 6.9 
Mexico 3585 5.0 Germany 2709 3.6 
China 3382 4.8 Russia 2469 3.5 
Iran 3366 4.7 South Korea 2288 3.0 
Norway 3330 4.4 India 2090 2.8 
Venezuela 2942 4.3 Canada 1988 2.6 
Canada 2880 3.8 France 1967 2.6 
UK 2463 3.3 Italy 1943 2.5 
UAE 2270 3.0 Brazil 1849 2.4 
Iraq 2030 2.8 Mexico 1791 2.3 
Nigeria 2013 2.7 UK 1675 2.2 
Kuwait 1871 2.6 Spain 1520 2.1 
Brazil 1500 2.1 52696 70 
Algeria 1659 2.0 
Libya 1376 1.8 
Indonesia 1278 1.7 
59856 81.0 
Others 14076 19.0 Others 23051 30 
TOTAL 73935 100 TOTAL 75747 100 
Of which: Of which: 
OPEC 28240 38.4 OPEC 485 0.64 
OECD 21516 28.4 OECD 47457 62 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2003. 
From the available figures above, eighteen countries produce 81 % of total daily world 
crude oil. Of these, Nigeria is the 13th largest producer with 2.8% of total production, 
while the UK is the 10th largest producer, producing 3.3% of the world total. 
Fourteen countries consume 70% of total world crude oil daily production. While Nigeria's 
consumption is not included amongst the top consumers, the UK is the 13th largest 
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consumer of crude oil in the world, consuming 2.2% of world total, with the USA easily 
topping the list with over 25%. 
Most of the largest producers are not part of the largest consumers. This indicates a low 
level of industrialisation among the largest producers. This forms the basis of the 
significant importance of petroleum revenue to these developing oil producing economies 
like Nigeria. The prevailing scenario is that they do not have any significant revenue from 
other sources like high technology or industrial products and services 
Table 4: World Largest Producers and Consumers of Natural Gas (2003) 
Count Production Countrv Consumption 
Billion cubic metre % Billion cubic metre % 
bcm of Total (bcm) of Total 
Russia 554.9 22 USA 667.5 26.3 
USA 547.7 21.7 Russia 388.4 15.3 
Canada 183.5 7.3 UK 94.5 3.7 
UK 103.1 4.1 Germany 82.6 3.3 
Algeria 80.4 3.2 Canada 80.7 3.2 
Indonesia 70.6 2.8 Japan 77.4 3.1 
Norway 65.4 2.6 Ukraine 69.8 2.8 
Iran 64.5 2.5 Iran 67.9 2.7 
Netherlands 59.9 2.4 Italy 63.9 2.5 
Saudi Arabia 56.4 2.2 Saudi Arabia 56.4 2.2 
Uzbekistan 53.8 2.1 Uzbekistan 52.4 2.1 
Malaysia 50.3 2.0 France 42.8 1.7 
Turkmenistan 49.9 2.0 Mexico 42.1 1.7 
UAE 46.0 1.8 Netherlands 39.3 1.6 
Argentina 34.8 1.4 1825.7 72 
Mexico 34.8 1.4 
Qatar 29.3 1.2 
2085.3 83 
Others 442.3 17 Others 709.8 28 
TOTAL 2527.6 100 TOTAL 2535.5 100 
Total OECD 1090.8 43.2 Total OECD 1372.7 54.1 
Total OPEC 347.2 13.7 Total OPEC 280 11 
Source: BP statistical review of world energy 2003 
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Despite Nigeria's large gas deposits, exploitation is very low unlike in the UK. The key 
reason is that gas exploitation depends largely on the availability of local end uses/ 
applications which are more pronounced with industrialisation. 
The UK is the third largest consumer and the fourth largest producer of natural gas. Both 
situations are due to its level of industrialisation and its availability or reserve level. 
13.8 Oil and Gas Business and Economics 
The economic importance of oil and gas is great if we consider how the products from oil 
and gas affect our daily lives. Similarly, fluctuations in oil prices affect virtually every 
other business and globally too. About 65% of the world's energy consumption is derived 
from oil and natural gas with around 30,000 different products also derived from oil/gas. 
Without oil/gas it appears that the economies of the industrialised world would grind to a 
standstill. 
In the same vein, the economies of most oil and gas producing and exporting countries 
would certainly collapse without the oil/gas revenue. This realisation is what makes oil and 
gas the very life blood of the world economy, which is why the politics of it are more 
complex than the product itself or its economics. The ability of the British Royal Naval 
warship to change from coal to fuel oil fired engines helped to win the Second World War 
for the UK and the Allied forces. The invasions of the Suez Canal and the Gulf Wars are 
some of the events that explain the importance of oil and oil gas for the global economy. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is important to note that oil and gas are irreplaceable naturally occurring 
resources, whose application for the human race has grown significantly over the years. 
Also, the petroleum industry can be regarded as one of the highly integrated and structured 
industries, with just about ten major multinational players. 
Tables 1 to 4 provide insights into the levels of reserves available, the position of both 
Nigeria and the UK relative to the global outlook and the future of both countries in terms 
of production years left if no additional reserves are added. Nigeria is quite significant in 
terms of oil production, though her gas reserves are significant but largely untapped, while 
the UK is a major player in both oil and gas. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DESCRIPTION AND STUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN 
NIGERIA 
2.1 Historical Overview 
Petroleum oil was first discovered in Nigeria in commercial quantities at Oloibiri, River 
State in the eastern part of Nigeria in 1958. Since then, Nigeria has been an exporter of oil 
with Shell as the first oil and gas exploration and producing company in the country. To 
date, Shell is still a major player and is responsible for 50% of Nigeria's current production 
of 2 million barrels per day. Before independence in 1960, Nigeria was a West African 
British colony. Nigeria's population is estimated at 127 million (1991)*. English is the 
official business language. After over twenty years of military dictatorship, the country 
returned to democratic rule in 1999. About 90% of its total oil and gas production is 
landward with current emphasis on increasing seaward/offshore exploration and 
production. 
2.2 Economic Overview* 
The national currency is the Naira (N) which exchanges for the GBP at £1.00: N240. The 
country had a GDP of $46.2 billion in 2000, a current account surplus of $0.5 billion, but 
total external debt of $30 billion. 
* Source: 2003 World Bank Country Report. 
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The United Kingdom is Nigeria's biggest trading partner. As a result of low gas reserve 
addition in the North Sea, importation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from Nigeria is 
being contemplated. Nigeria's economy is largely dependent on crude oil and gas revenue 
with over 90% of foreign exchange earnings from petroleum exports. 
The new democratic government is undertaking economic reforms which include the 
privatisation of government parastatals, exchange rate management and phasing out of the 
petroleum products subsidy. Debt rescheduling for debts owed to bilateral creditors (Paris 
Club) is also part of the economic reforms embarked upon by the government. 
2.3 Structure of Government Supervision of the Oil Industry 
Government regulates the petroleum industry through an organisational structure similar to 
that of UK. The main difference as we will see later is that the government holds equity 
(shares) in the companies which engage in the exploration and production of oil and gas in 
addition to holding and exercising supervisory roles and having the entire hydrocarbon 
resource in the country vested in the government. 
Regulation of the industry is exercised through the Directorate of Petroleum Resources 
(DPR) which is a division in the Ministry of Petroleum Resources. Also, supervision of the 
activities of oil and gas exploration and producing companies (upstream sector) is 
exercised through the national oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). NNPC is 100% government owned. The government's equity participation in all 
Joint Venture QV) operations in Nigeria is managed through the National Petroleum 
Investment Management Services (NAPIMS) as a separate business unit of the NNPC. 
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2.4 Legislation Governing Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
The industry is regulated by a number of decrees and legislation. The key legislation is 
stated in chapter 4. A major highlight of the legislation is that which gives the NNPC a 
majority interest (between 55 - 60%) in all JVs with foreign international oil companies. 
NNPC holds 49% in the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) company. Joint 
Operating Agreements (JOAs) are the instruments used to express the equity structure, 
management structure and accounting procedure for the operations of the joint venture 
company. All issues relating to the environment are vested in the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency (FEPA). 
2.5 Licence and Licence Types 
For every round of licence bidding, the government issues licences for blocks on which 
licence holders carry out exploration (using an Oil Prospecting Licence-OPL) and 
consequently production (using an Oil Mining Licence-OML) upon successful exploration. 
Licences are granted upon payment of an application fee and meeting the criteria for award. 
Thereafter, the government appends its signature which attracts a fee called the Signature 
Bonus. Annual licence fees are paid as OPL or OML rentals by licence holders. 
Licences are of two types: 
(i) Joint Venture (JV) Licence (OPL/OML) - This is the licence given to a 
corporate entity having more than one shareholder. For every JV in Nigeria, 
the government through the NNPC is a shareholder. Such JVs are governed by 
JOAs which the Department of Petroleum Resources issues on behalf of the 
government. 
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(ii) Production Sharing Contract (PSC) Licence -A PSC is another type of licence 
for oil and gas exploration and production used to exploit the hydrocarbon 
resources in Nigeria and most OPEC countries. Under a PSC licence, the 
government has no equity in the company but shares in the volume of oil or gas 
won (produced) by the licence holder. The government's share of production 
volume after deduction of exploration and production cost (expressed in terms 
of the value of oil volume) escalates as production volume increases. The oil 
companies provide all the funding for the operations (100%) under a PSC 
licence. 
2.6 Fiscal Regime 
(i) The government is paid a royalty for all oil and gas produced and sold. The 
rate depends on whether the licence is for landward (onshore) or seaward 
(offshore) block or operation. It also depends on the water depth of the block 
from which the production licence is held by the company. 
(ii) Tax Regime 
- JV licences in which the government has equity participation pay 87.5% of 
operating profit (after royalty, tax deductibles and tax credits) 
- PSC Licences are taxed at 57.5% of the operating profit after royalty and 
cost oil deductions. 
(iii) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
The government signs an MOU with every JV or PSC Company. The MOU 
is an instrument with which the government agrees with the companies with 
respect to incentives that will encourage higher investment capital spending 
for the exploration and development of the country's petroleum resources. It 
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also contains details of qualifications for tax credits and deductibles. Each 
MOU is peculiar to each company and confidential. 
2.7 Marginal Fields for Indigenous Participation and Entrepreneurship 
Nigeria has numerous fields regarded as marginal because of marginal economic returns on 
investment from the operation (development) of such fields. According to Nigeria's Oil and 
Gas Monthly (2002), twenty four marginal fields were offered by the government to 
investors in December 2001/March 2002. The fields were discovered, evaluated and held 
as part of the reservoir assets of the international oil and gas operating companies. They 
were however not developed because they fail to meet the economic yardsticks of their 
various concession holders. 
The government's intention to involve indigenous participation (promotion of local content, 
development of indigenous oil companies) in the upstream sector drives the re- licensing of 
such fields to locals as highlighted in the Nigeria's Oil and Gas Monthly (2002). All 
existing holders and operators of OPLs and OMLs were not allowed to participate in the 
round of bidding for marginal fields. 
The field specific bid which follows the initial pre-qualification (first round bid) will be 
evaluated by Nigeria's Department of Petroleum Resources and the original lease holder 
(NNPC/JV Operator) whereby the details of farm-out terms were negotiated. The 
Petroleum Amendment Decree No 23,1996 amended the first schedule to the Petroleum 
Act 1969 concerning the assignment of interests in oil mining leases. The new paragraph 
16A permits holders of OMLs, to farm-out any field it considers marginal and lying within 
its licensed area/concession. 
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Guidelines for Farming out and Operations of Marginal Fields* 
Apart from the provision of the Petroleum Amendment Decree 23,1996, the government of 
Nigeria also promulgated guidelines for the marginal fields. Both of these legislations 
constitute a type of government control on the operations, albeit the economic performance 
of the operating companies who were the original license holders. The guidelines also 
stipulate the share holding composition, which is a form of corporate governance directive. 
Government controls are sometimes in terms of fiscal taxation. Some fiscal regimes 
outlined in Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), Joint Operating Agreements (JOA), 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) etc have implications for taxation, investment 
policy, operational efficiency, profitability, corporate governance and overall corporate 
performance of the companies that the government seeks to control. 
In addition to onshore production (90% of total production of oil and gas), several 
deepwater discoveries in the Gulf of Benin and Biafra are expected to add to the country's 
reserves and ensure a bright production future. The recent allocation of Nigeria's marginal 
fields is as listed in Table 5. 
Table 5: Year 2003: Listing of Allocated Marginal Fields to Indigenous Operators* 
Company/Operator Field % Share 
I. Platform Petroleum Asuokpu/Umutu 100 
2. Bayelsa Oil Co. Atala 100 
3. Excell E&P Services Eremor 100 
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Company/Operator Field % Share 
5. Millenium Oil & Gas Oza 100 
6. Network E&P Qua Ibo 100 
7. Universal Energy. Res Stub Creek 100 
8. Frontier Oil Uquo 100 
9. Brittania-U Ajapa 100 
10. Sogenal Akepo 100 
11. EurafricEnergy Dawes Island 100 
12. Movido E&P Ekeh 100 
13. Del-Sigma Petroleum KE 100 
14. Bicta Energy Ogedeh 100 
15. Goland Pet. Dev. Co. Oriri 100 
16. Chorus Energy Amoji/Matsogo/Igbolo 100 
17. Pillar Oil Umusati/Igbuku 100 
18. Prime Energy Assaramatoru 51 
Suffolk Petroleum 64 49 
19. Walter Smith Pet. Ibigwe 70 
Moris Pet. 66 30 
20. Associated Oil &Gas Tom Shot Bank 51 
Geo-Energy 44 49 
21. Sahara Energy Tsekelewu 51 
Africa Oil & Gas 66 49 
22. Guarrantee Petroleum Ororo 55 
Owena 66 45 
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23. Energia Obodugwa/Obodeti 55 
Unipetrol Pet. Dev. 66 45 
24. Mid Western Oil & Gas Umusadege 70 
Suntrast 44 30 
* Source: The Nigeria Guardian, 2003 
2.8 Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter, it is obvious that the Nigerian government controls the industry 
through its acquisition of equity and joint ventures as well as the adoption of two types of 
contracts governed by various legislation. 
The fiscal regime comprises fiscal taxation policies regulated by the Department of 
Petroleum Resource and the NNPC using both the MOU and the JOA as instruments. The 
policy of the government to transfer some of the fields previously owned by the 
international oil companies to indigenous operators also constitutes a form of control of the 
industry. In the same way, varied tax rates for various contract types are visible policies 
that could affect the economics of the operating companies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTION AND STUCTURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
IN THE UK 
3.1 Historical Overview* 
Petroleum oil and gas were explored and produced, though in non-commercial quantities, 
on the UK mainland for centuries before the first discovery of commercial quantities 
(proved reserve) in 1918 in Nottinghamshire. In 1973, the first major onshore oil field was 
discovered in Wytch Farm, Dorset and it remains Western Europe's largest onshore oil 
field. The first significant offshore petroleum discovery was in 1965 in the West Sole Field, 
while the North Sea Fields developments commenced in the mid-1960s. As at the end of 
2000, there were 109 oil fields and 87 gas and condensate fields in production off-shore, in 
the UK continental shelf. 
By the end of 1999, the cumulative production of hydrocarbon oil and gas from UK fields 
stood at 2,445 million tonnes of oil and 14.10 billion cubic metres of gas. In 2002, UK's 
production was 9 billion barrels of oil and 103.1 billion cubic metres of gas. 
Most of the fields in the UK and its continental shelf are regarded as mature. This refers to 
a field that has been in production for a considerable length of time and having cumulative 
production of above 50% of its estimated reserve volume. Despite the maturity of this 
petroleum province, there is still considerable activity in both mature and frontier areas. 
Frontier areas are geological formations (locations) showing promising preliminary 
exploratory data that are indicative of the presence and accumulation of hydrocarbons. 
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The UK has the largest oil and gas industry in the European Union. The industry represents 
about 4% of GDP in 2000 and 2% of total capital investment. Both multinational 
corporations and independents privately own all the UK oil and gas companies, unlike the 
government-investor joint ventures in Nigeria. 
The future of the industry in the UK is not in doubt as the government sets the right 
economic climate to maximise the level of exploration and development so that new 
discoveries can replace those fields currently being depleted, even though petroleum oil 
and gas is an irreplaceable natural resource. The Brown Book (2001) for current reserve 
figures gives the following statistics. Out of the total 109 oil fields and 87 gas fields, there 
are only 28 producing oil fields (26%) and 11 producing gas fields (13%). The others are 
not being produced for various economic and non-economic reasons. 
3.2 Government Supervisory and Management Structure 
The UK government supervises and controls the UK petroleum industry through the Oil 
and Gas Directorate of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). The DTI employs 
various legislative instruments, like the Petroleum Act 1998, to regulate, co-ordinate and 
manage petroleum resources in the UK on behalf of the Crown in whom ownership is 
vested. 
In addition to the DTI, there are some other non-profit industry organisations set up either 
by the government or by the industry operators (and recognised by government) with which 
the industry is managed. They include: 
* Source: The Brown Book 2003, by Department of Trade and Industry, UK. 
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(i) UKOOA: United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association 
(ii) OGITF: Oil and Gas Industry Task Force (Replaced by PILOT) 
(iii) PILOT: An initiative established in 2000 to achieve cost effectiveness 
in UK oil and gas exploitation in the North Sea continental shelf. 
(iv) LOGIC: Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competitiveness - for 
promotion of best practice throughout the supply chain. 
(v) ITF: Industry Technology Facilitator - improving the facilitation 
and flow of new technology to market. 
(vi) NTOG National Training Organisation Groups focusing on training 
activity and maximising commitment to skills. 
(vii) LIFT: Licence Initiative for Trading -a new website designed to 
promote licence trading. 
(viii) DEAL Digital Energy Atlas and Library - an interactive map 
providing an index for UK continental shelf data. 
PILOT, which replaced OGITF has the following as members: 
(i) Minister for Energy and Competitiveness in Europe (Chairman) 
(ii) Representatives from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the 
Department of Health and Safety Executive (HSE), the Department of 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), the Treasury, and the 
Scottish Executive 
(iii) Representatives from all sections of the industry (including operators, 
contractors, suppliers and trade unions). 
In all, there are twenty-three key government and industry members. PILOT's objectives 
include: 
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(a) Lead the industry stakeholders 
(b) Develop strategies for reducing the cost base of UK oil and gas operations 
against the backdrop of the mature nature of the North Sea and specific 
conditions in other UK continental shelf areas 
(c) Examine and prioritise initiatives aimed at improving the competitiveness of 
the UK continental shelf as an oil and gas development province and the 
supply industry for domestic and overseas market 
(d) Watch over sustainable development, decommissioning, fiscal matters and 
exports. 
(e) Employ work groups to focus on its designated action areas e. g. new 
business, regulation and licensing and economic advisory group. 
In the UK, the petroleum downstream sector representing oil refining, petroleum products 
marketing and distribution has its own independent trade organisation known as the UK 
Petroleum Industry Association (UKPIA). 
3.3 UK Oil and Gas Legislation 
In the UK, there has been various legislation by acts of parliament with which the oil and 
gas industry is regulated. The current legislation which has repealed or amended previous 
acts is the Petroleum Act 1998 with chapter 17 relating to the upstream sector. 
(i) LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LICENCES 
The Petroleum Act 1988 consolidated the previous primary legislation (including the 
Petroleum (Production) Act 1934 which vested ownership of oil and gas within Great 
Britain and its territorial sea in the Crown and gave the government rights to grant licences 
to explore for and exploit hydrocarbon resources and those on the UK continental shelf). 
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The UK continental shelf has been defined under the Continental Shelf Act 1964 following 
the conclusion of boundary agreements with neighbouring countries. The other regulations 
in force are the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Amendment Regulations 1992, 
1995 and 1996 for offshore licences; and the Petroleum (Production) (Landward Areas) 
Regulations 1995 for onshore licences. 
The terms of licences vary according to whether they cover seaward or landward 
production. The terms also vary with particular Licensing Rounds and are dependent on 
the extent of exploration and development that has already taken place in the acreage on 
offer. Applications for licences are assessed on the basis of the same criteria for respective 
licensing rounds. 
(ii) LICENCE TYPES 
(a) Seaward Licences: These are of two types. 
Exploration Licences - These are exclusive permits to holders to conduct non-intrusive 
surveys, such as seismic or gravity and magnetic data acquisition over any part of the UK 
continental shelf that is not held under a production licence. Such wells drilled for 
exploration must not exceed 350 metres except with the Secretary of State's approval. 
Production Licences - These grant exclusive rights to holders to search and bore for 
petroleum in the area of the licence covering a specified block or blocks. They are usually 
issued in periodic `Licensing Rounds' when the Secretary of State For Trade and Industry 
invites applications in respect of a number of specified blocks or other areas. Application 
fees are charged and successful applicants make an initial rental payment for the first term 
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of the licence followed by annual rentals on an escalating scale. There are other specific 
conditions attached to a successful application. 
(b) Landward Licenses 
The landward regimes apply in Great Britain to all territory above low water mark and 
within `bay closing lines' as defined in regulations; a separate regime is operated in 
Northern Ireland. The Petroleum (Production) (Landward Areas) Regulations 1995 
introduced a single licence, the Petroleum Exploration and Development Licence (PEDL) 
as the principal landward licence over the previous acts. 
(c) Multi Block Licenses 
A single licence that covers more than one block which may not necessarily be adjacent to 
one another. Further rationalisation of multi-block licences are allowable, e. g. a licensee 
may wish to relinquish particular blocks contained in its multi-block licence later in the life 
of the licence. 
3.4 Joint Operating Agreements (JOA) 
These refer to a set of policies affecting the way and manner in which the holders and 
operators or parties to the company holding production licences will run and manage the 
licensed blocks in relation to the interests of government without active (share holding) 
participants of government. 
Where JOAs occur, the following areas are covered: 
- Management Structure 
- Financial and Accounting Procedure 
- Equity Structure 
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- Board of Directors' Composition 
- Technical Agreements 
- Training 
The DTI provides guidance notes which prescribe the procedures that should be followed 
by companies seeking approvals for proposed JOAs as provided for in the model clauses in 
licences. 
3.5 UK Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime 
The economics, financial performance and efficiency of the oil and gas industry is always 
affected by the type of fiscal regime the country operates. 
While the fiscal regime (taxes, royalty payable by holders of exploration and production 
licences) is dictated by government, there are many other factors which affect the 
economics of the upstream oil industry's investment. Such factors fall outside the control 
of government, e. g. geological prospectivity, reservoir system, crude oil and natural gas 
prices, field development costs. However, it is known that the UK continental shelf is a 
high cost area by international standards and this affects the way government formulates its 
fiscal policy. 
For example, government is putting up stricter consents policy for gas fired power stations. 
This is causing a depression in demand for new gas, i. e. (low demand growth projection) 
against the background of natural gas accounting for 38-40% of UKCS production. 
The UKOOA, for example, also expects particular amendments to fiscal regimes as earlier 
formulated and employed by government before the UK continental shelf became mature 
fields compared to now. Similarly, the nearly 70% marginal tax rate is regarded by 
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UKOOA members as a discouragement for new incremental developments in these mature 
fields. They argue for a lower rate to stimulate incremental investment in the mature fields. 
3.6 The UK continental shelf taxation 
- The tax regime is designed to secure an appropriate share of profits for the 
country as well as provide a stable, attractive and economical investment 
climate for the industry 
- The system is under continuous updating as factors affecting the industry 
and world economics change. 
The main features of the current tax regime are: 
(a) Royalty: A royalty is paid for every production licence. The royalty rate is 
12% of the landed value of the petroleum won (produced) and sold less an 
allowance for the cost of bringing the petroleum ashore and treating it. 
Royalty is not payable for any field approved after March 31,1982. Since 
January 1,2003 the royalty payment was abolished for all fields in the UK. 
(b) Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT): This tax which was introduced by the Oil 
Taxation Act 1975, and is a tax on profits related to separate geological and 
technically determined fields, is charged on the difference between income 
and expenditure with allowances designed to ensure that it bites only on the 
large, most profitable fields. A significant reform to PRT was introduced in 
the 1993 Finance Act to encourage further investment by allowing the oil 
companies to keep more of their income. The rate of PRT charged on 
existing fields was reduced from 75% to 50% with effect from July 1,1993 
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and PRT was abolished on fields approved after March 15,1993. 
(c) Corporation Tax (CT) : This tax is charged on the profits of oil and gas 
companies in much the same as any other industry. In the case of new 
fields, this is now the only tax on profits. The main rate of CT is 
currently at 30%, one of the lowest company tax rates in the world. 
Both royalty and PRT are deductible in computing profits for CT 
purposes, and profits from upstream oil and gas activities are ring- 
fenced so that they cannot be reduced for CT purposes by any losses or 
reliefs arising from any other activity, including downstream oil and gas 
operations. 
The tax regime which applies to any particular oil field therefore depends on the date on 
which it received development consent. Current marginal rates of tax vary between 30% 
and 69.4% depending on the age of the field in question and its taxable position (though it 
should be noted that many smaller less profitable fields may pay no PRT even though they 
are in principle within the PRT provision). The rates are enumerated as follows: 
- 69.4% if liable to Royalty, PRT and CT (approved before 1 April, 1982 and in a PRT 
paying position) 
- 38.8% if liable to Royalty and CT (approved before April 1,1982 and shielded from 
paying PRT by allowances or other reliefs) 
- 65.0% if liable to PRT and CT (approved between April 1,1982 and March 15,1993 and 
in a PRT paying position) 
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- 30.0% if liable only to CT (approved between April 1,1982 and March 15,1993 and 
shielded from paying PRT by allowances or other reliefs or approved after March 15,1993) 
Other aspects of the UK oil and gas industry that should be mentioned are: 
(a) Guidelines for Work Programs 
- This is required by the DTI from the oil and gas companies and it is 
expected to provide comprehensive details of what exploratory and 
producing activities the company expects to carry out within a specific time 
frame and the amount of money to be spent. 
- Variations to work programs are allowed by DTI 
(b) Environmental Legislation 
- Environmental legislation affecting/regulating the industry are synchronized 
with the European Commission laws on the environment. 
3.7 Conclusion 
it is obvious that the government employs legislative provisions to control its interests and 
the activities of the operating companies, while engaging in the establishment of focus 
groups to enhance the development of the industry. The abolition of the royalty is a 
remarkable incentive for investment in the industry and for boosting the economics of 
operations in the UK continental shelf. The level of organisational structure exhibited in the 
UK is obviously more pronounced and intended to provide adequate administrative support 
to accelerated development of the industry. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REGULATORY AND FISCAL TAXATION MECHANISMS 
IN NIGERIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
4.1 Exploration and Production 
Hydrocarbon oil and gas were first discovered in Nigeria in 1956 and the first oil exported 
in 1958. Since then the petroleum sector has remained in focus and is the bedrock of the 
country's economy, thereby requiring the application of strict and changing legislative 
control. 
Regulatory acts, edicts and decrees have been and remain key instruments of government 
control of key mineral resources, as is the case in every country. Starting from 1958 to the 
present, governments in Nigeria (whether democratic or military) have consistently 
promulgated decrees, and passed laws by Acts of Parliament or National Assembly to 
control the operations of oil companies in the country. 
According to Oremade (1986), there are at least thirty pieces of legislation with 
amendments (since 1958) that the government has employed to control oil companies' 
operations. (See Appendix 6). 
For the purposes of this research, our emphasis will be on the legislation having a direct 
impact on the economic performance (i. e. financial profitability) of the oil companies. Here 
an assumption is made that the major reason for, or objective of, the oil companies 
operating in either UK or Nigeria is profit optimization. 
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A selection of such legislation will therefore include those affecting: 
- Revenue determination and pricing policy 
- Royalty and rent payments 
- Revenue taxation 
- Exchange control and repatriation of profit 
- Contractual agreements and choice of share holding structure. 
4.2 Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) 
The FIRS is the constitutional body, a division of the Federal Ministry of Finance, which is 
charged with the administration and enforcement of all legislation pertaining to 
computation, ascertainment and collection of petroleum profit tax. Initially, the body was 
referred to as the Federal Board of Inland Revenue (Petroleum Division). Its major 
legislative instruments in carrying out the functions are: 
* Petroleum Profit Taxation Act (PPTA), 1959 incorporating the following amendments: 
1. Income Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 65) 1966 
2. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 1) 1967 
3. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 22) 1970 
4. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 15) 1973 
5. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 55) 1977 
6. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree (No. 4) 1979 
7. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) No. 2 Decree (No-24) 1979 
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8. Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) No. 3 Decree (No-95) 1979 
9. Exemption of Petroleum Operations from Companies Income Tax Act, 
10. Companies Income Tax Act 1979 (CITA) Cap 60 1990. 
4.3 Other Legislation on Oil and Gas Operations in Nigeria 
1. Mineral Oil Acts of 1958 
2. Oil Pipeline Acts of 1958,1965: These make provision for licences to be granted for the 
establishment and maintenance of pipelines incidental and supplemental to oil fields and oil 
mining and for the purpose ancillary to such pipelines. The act provides for the right and 
obligations of the holder of a licence, payment of compensation for economic crops and 
property damaged, payment of survey fees and other miscellaneous matters. 
3.1979 Constitution, section 40 (3) provides that the entire property of mineral oils and 
natural gas in, under or upon the territorial waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of 
Nigeria shall be vested in the government of Nigeria. 
4. Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969 and 1973 (as amended): Under 
this act, the entire ownership and control of oil and gas in place within any land in Nigeria, 
under its territorial waters and continental shelf is vested in the state of Nigeria. The 
regulation relates to Oil Exploration License (OEL), Oil Prospecting License (OPL) and 
Oil Mining Leases (OML). 
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The OEL is a non-exclusive license with a regulation size of 5,000 sq. miles (12,959) sq. 
km. The OPL confirms the right of surface and sub-surface exploration for petroleum in an 
area of 100 sq. miles (2,590) sq. km and for an initial period of three years with an option 
for renewal for two years. The holder of an OPL is entitled to apply for an OML. The OML 
grants exclusive right to explore, win, produce transport and carry away petroleum from the 
leased area. The size of an OML is 500 sq. miles (1,295 sq. km). 
5. Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 9,1979: It forbade operating companies to flare 
associated gas after 1984. 
6. Associated Gas Re-Injection Regulations1984 and Decree No. 7 of 1985: On realization 
of a limited local market for gas, the 1979 act was substituted with 1984 Regulation which 
permitted flaring but only with the permission of government through the issuance of a 
certificate to do so in order not to jeopardize oil production. The 1985 decree introduced a 
penalty for gas flaring. 
4.4 Nigeria's Oil and Gas Petroleum Profit Taxation (PPT) 
The tax system for oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria is guided by the 
Petroleum Profit Tax Act of 1959 as amended at various times. The basic provisions are as 
summarized below: 
Imposition of Tax and Ascertainment of Chargeable Profit 
The PPTA provides for tax to be imposed upon assessment, i. e. charged and made payable 
on the profit from the operation of an oil and gas exploration and producing company on a 
yearly basis. Revenue is determined as the sum of the posted price and the volume of oil 
and gas exported from the country, i. e. the sale of chargeable oil and gas. 
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The revenue on which the chargeable tax is calculated according to section 9 (1) (a) is the 
exported volume multiplied by the posted price/ freight-on-board (f. o. b. ) where posted 
price is the price published by operating companies and quoted for third parties. When the 
cost of extraction of that oil/gas, cost of treatment, transportation and storage are deducted 
from revenue, the balance is the gross profit which attracts imposition of tax. Gross profit, 
less Section 10 allowable deductions, gives rise to adjusted profit. Adjusted profit, less 
Section 14 allowable deductions, gives rise to assessable profit. Assessable profit, less 
Section 15 allowable deductions, gives rise to chargeable profit. According to section 16, 
subsections 1(a), (b) and (c) the tax rates applicable to chargeable profit for the previous 
accounting years are: 
(i) 60.78% with effect from October 1,1974 
(ii) 65.75% with effect from December 1,1974 
(iii) 85% with effect from April 1,1975 
All of these were legislated through Decree No. 55 of 1977 and took effect retrospectively. 
A summary of the computation is given on the page 38. 
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Summary of Nigeria's Petroleum Profit Tax Computations 
REVENUE (Posted Price) 
. 
Less Production costs etc. 
GROSS PROFIT 
I Less Section 10 Deductions 
ADJUSTED PROFIT 
I Less Section 14 Deductions 
ASSESSABLE PROFIT 
J. Less Section 15 Deductions 
CHARGEABLE PROFIT 
J, PPT Rate 85% 
ASSESSABLE TAX 
I Less Section 17 Deductions 
CHARGEABLE TAX 
Assessment and Payment of Tax 
Self-assessment of estimated tax is required in advance but not more than two months after 
the commencement of each accounting period of the operating company. The Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) reserves the right to prescribe additional chargeable tax if 
the self-assessed tax is deemed to be in error. Chargeable petroleum profit tax is payable in 
twelve equal monthly instalments together with a final instalment. The final monthly 
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instalment is the amount of assessed chargeable tax for that accounting year, less the total 
amount thereof already paid. 
The 13`s month: where the total tax paid is higher than or lower than the assessed 
chargeable tax, the difference becomes payable to or by the company in the thirteenth 
instalment. Between 1971 and 1973, payments of tax instalment were as follows: 
1971 - 50% instalment payment as above, 50% in six consecutive monthly instalments; 
1972 - 25% instalment payment as above and 75% monthly instalment. 
In order to avoid double taxation, sections 52 and 53 make provision for avoidance of 
double taxation. The amount of tax paid to a foreign country on a portion of the profit (e. g. 
dividend) for which chargeable tax is being calculated in Nigeria is allowed as a tax credit, 
which is deductible from the chargeable tax. The amount must however not exceed the 
foreign taxes payable. 
4.5 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
Preamble: 
The MOU is a document of agreement between the Federal Government of Nigeria and 
individual Joint Venture operating companies in the country. The purpose of the MOU is to 
enumerate various incentives that the country has agreed with the individual companies 
with regards to making their operations profitable under varying conditions. The MOU is a 
document of incentives for enhancing crude oil and gas reserve addition by encouraging 
investments in Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production activities. The MOU 
signed with individual companies are peculiar to each and differ from company to company. 
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The Incentives: 
Guaranteed Margin: The MOU provides for a minimum margin of $2.30/bbl after tax to the 
company for their equity share of the volume of oil/gas produced and sold and $1.15/bbl 
for Nigeria's share of equity oil/gas. This is referred to as guaranteed notional margin. 
The condition precedent is that the technical cost of operation must be less than or equal to 
notional fiscal technical cost of $2.50/bbl. 
Guaranteed Margin and Capital Investment: The guaranteed margin is further increased 
with increased capital investment. For any particular year where the capital investment 
costs are equal to or exceed $1.50/bbl on average, the minimum guaranteed notional 
margin increases to $2.5/bbl after tax for the company's share of oil/gas produced and 
$1.50/bbl for Nigeria's share. In such cases the notional technical cost shall be increased to 
$3.50/bbl. 
Government Take: This is the sum of all that the government receives financially from 
each company's operations yearly and it comprises of 
(a) royalty 
(b) petroleum profit tax 
The actual value of government take may change depending on the incentives for which 
the company qualifies. When this happens the new sum of royalty and tax is called the 
Revised Government Take (RGT). 
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Revised Government Take (RGT) 
Ordinarily, Government Take is based on royalty and petroleum profit tax which are 
themselves calculated based on the posted price of crude oil i. e. the f. o. b price of crude. 
The MOU however provides for the calculation of revenue based on Offset Price and 
Realizable Price. Both of these prices are interrelated using particular formulae as stated 
below. Realizable Price (RP) is c. i. f price of the crude type sold less the NBV (Net Back 
Value). NBV is the sum of freight, ocean loss, insurance, processing cost applicable to each 
primary market and shall not be more than Average Product (Crude Oil) Price for the 
month and for the stream of agreed crude oil type yield plus or minus 40¢/bbl. 
Offset Price is Bx Realizable Price 
where B is given as: 
B=K[(1-Roy) xTR+Roy] 
where K is a factor of 1.0042 whose value depends on the minimum guaranteed margin 
(M), Roy is the Royalty rate and TR is the applicable tax rate. 
The calculation for K is: 
K= 1.1364(1 -M+0.15 FC) 
RP 
where RP is realizable price and FC is fiscal technical cost. For example, when M is 
$2.30/bbl and RP is < $23 per bbl. 
K =1.1364 [1 - $2.30 + 0.15 x $2.50] 
-------------------------- = 1.0042 
RP 
The application of a self-adjusting K factor is to restore the desired guaranteed notional 
margin as promised by the government such that, not minding the market price of oil the 
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company's operations will generate this minimum after tax margin. Now the revised 
government take (RGT) may be written as: 
RGT = OP - (TR x TC) - OT 
where: 
OP = Offset Price 
Roy = Royalty Rate 
TC = Sum of deductions under sections 10,14 and 15 of PPT Act of 1959 
OT = Tax offsets under section 17 of PPT Act of 1959 and as amended. 
A company's liability for a particular year, in terms of government take is the lower of the 
government take calculated based on the posted price/fob price and the revised government 
take based on the offset pricing formulae. 
Additional Tax Credits 
Where a company's technical cost exceeds the $3.50/bbl limit for the accounting year due 
to capital investment, the company shall be entitled to a tax offset against its tax liability 
for that year to the tune of. 
10% x (LIBOR + 1%) x (0.8TC) x Equity 
where LIBOR is the London Inter Bank Fixing Offer Rate and TC is sum of deductions 
under sections 10,14 and 15 of PPT Act of 1959 
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Reserve Addition Bonus 
The MOUs provide an incentive for successful exploration activities which adds 
substantially to Nigeria's hydrocarbon reserve; to the extent that such addition exceeds the 
total production for that year, the company shall qualify for a reserve addition bonus in the 
form of an offset against its petroleum profit tax for that year. Reserve addition bonus is 
calculated using the addition/production ratio (R), the incremental reserve/production ratio 
(Ra) and the applicable bonus rate. 
R= Total Reserve @ Year End - Total Reserve @ Beginning of Year 
Total Production for the Year 
Ra=R- 1.0 
E. g. ifR=1.5, then Ra=1.5-1 
= 0.5 
For 1st Ra = 0.25 applicable bonus rate is $0.10 (X 1) 
2rd Ra up to another 0.25 bonus rate is $0.25 (X2) 
3'd Ra up to another 0.25 bonus rate is $0.40 (X3) 
4th Ra up to another 0.25 bonus rate is $0.50 (X4) 
Total Reserve Addition Bonus = {Ral x X1 + Rat x X2 + Ra3 x X3 
+ Ra4 x X4} Px Equity 
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4.6 UK Oil and Gas Regulatory Legislation 
1. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934: This Act established national ownership for the UK 
on all petroleum oil and gas existing in the country and empowered the government to 
manage and regulate it. 
2. Continental Shelf Act 1964: Together with the Geneva Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (1958) this act established the sovereign right of countries to undertake exploration and 
production of the natural resources of their continental shelves to a distance of 200 miles 
from shore. This act divides the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) into quadrants and blocks 
and enabled the first offshore Licensing Round in 1964. Each quadrant is 10 of longitude by 
10 of latitude and is divided into 30 blocks. Onshore license areas are based on the 
Ordinance Survey 10km by 10km grid. 
3. Petroleum and Submarine Pipeline Act 1975: This act established the British National 
Oil Company (BNOC). In 1982 BNOC's shares were transferred to Britoil plc, and the 
shares sold to the public in 1982 and 1985. 
4. Petroleum Act 1998: This consolidates the three earlier pieces of legislation. 
5. Oil Exploration Licence (OEL): Initially held for three years, this licence allows 
exploration activity in the granted block for three years and can be extended for another 
three years. 
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6. Production Licence: This is an oil mining licence which allows the owner to explore, win 
and transport and sell oil and gas from the block for which it is awarded. Depending on the 
terms and conditions, it can be held for an initial six years after which the licensees are 
required to relinquish 50% of the licensed area. The licence also has a second term of 12 
years extendable by a further 18 years subject to approval both 5 and 6 above relate to 
offshore fields. 
7. Petroleum Production (Landward Areas) Regulations Act 1995: This act covers the 
major processes involved in the petroleum exploration and development licence (PEDL) 
for inward blocks and has the same terms and conditions as the offshore production licence. 
8. The Supplementary Seismic Survey Licence (SSSL): This allows the holder to extend a 
seismic survey into unlicensed acreages. 
4.7 UK Oil and Gas Taxation / Fiscal Regime 
The fiscal regime for UK petroleum (upstream sector) industry has remained unchanged 
since 1983 apart from the review of 1998. Government revenue from UKCS oil and gas 
production is made up of payments of royalty, petroleum revenue tax (PRT) and 
corporation tax (CT). The royalty is a charge on the value of oil and gas won. It does not 
apply where development consent was given after 1 April 1982 except for onshore fields 
and fields in the southern basin. The royalty is chargeable for those fields if development 
consent was given before July 1,1988. 
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PRT is a tax with rules especially reflecting the particular nature of the oil industry and is 
essentially a windfall tax on the revenue from winning oil and gas in the UK or UKCS. It is 
only applicable, however, to fields which were given development consent before March 
1993 
Corporation tax is the main tax on business profits in the UK, but there are additional 
constraining rules for UKCS income. Some other tax developments include: 
- 1997/1998 North Sea Fiscal Review: no change was effected in the fiscal regime. 
- Finance Act 1999: oil licences are qualifying assets for the purposes of rollover 
relief, so that the tax can be deferred if proceeds are reinvested. 
Other details of the tax/fiscal regime form the body of our next discussion under royalty, 
petroleum revenue tax and corporation tax. 
Royalty Payments 
In computing both petroleum revenue tax and corporation tax, the royalty is a deductible 
item. It is therefore payable on field production and at the prescribed rates. In the UK, the 
royalty payment is not applicable to all fields as is the case in some countries. This could 
be a major difference with what obtains in Nigeria where the royalty is payable on all oil 
fields production. The royalty payment is calculated on 12'/z% of the landed value of oil 
and gas produced less the cost of processing and transportation to storage. 
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Abolition of royalty payments 
Payment of royalty was abolished for all new fields, that is, for all fields whose approval 
for development or production license was first given after April 1,1982 for UKCS and if 
the licence was given after July 1,1988 for Southern Basin or onshore fields. From January 
1,2003, the royalty was abolished for all fields in the UKCS a move seen in the industry as 
a welcome incentive for attracting investment capital. 
Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT 
In the UK, not all production fields are assessable for petroleum revenue tax. PRT is 
payable on all fields with licences before March 16,1993. These are referred to as taxable 
fields and there are only 75 such fields still in production in the UKCS. Since 1993 the 
PRT rate has been 50% and applicable twice yearly in July and December. PRT forms part 
of the overall corporation tax payable by those fields qualifying to pay PRT i. e. for them 
PRT is deductible from corporation tax. 
Where a field records a loss for a particular year, PRT is charged to the corporation tax for 
that year. Hence PRT paying fields do not become effectively PRT paying until their 
investment payback is achieved. 
Typical PRT Computation 
PRT is based on the value of the share of production to the joint venture participant i. e. 
where the share of gross profit after payback is reached. The following is a summary of the 
computation format, while an example calculation follow on page 49. 
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££ 
Gross profit/ (loss) x 
Add 
Tariff receipts (less allowance) x 
Asset disposal receipts x 
Royalty and licence debit/ (credit) x 
x 
Less 
Provisional expenditure allowance net of reversals x 
Share of joint field expenditure x 
Participant's own field expenditure x 
Uplift X 
Exploration and appraisal expenditure x 
Cross-field allowance x 
Research expenditure x 
Losses from abandoned wells x 
Total (x) 
Assessable profit/ (allowable loss) a 
Loss relief (x) 
Oil allowance (x) 
Taxable profitl (loss) 
Tax at 50 %( subject to safeguard) x 
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Example PRT Computation 
E1000 £`000 
Gross profit/ (loss) 95000 
Add 
Tariff receipts (less allowance) 3000 
Asset disposal receipts 8500 
Royalty & license debit/ (credit) 2540 
14040 109040 
Less 
Provisional expenditure allowance net of reversals 7500 
Share of joint field expenditure 5500 
Participants' own field expenditure 42500 
Uplift 3750 
Exploration & appraisal expenditure 25000 
Cross-field allowance 4500 
Research expenditure 1500 
Losses from abandoned wells 2750 
Total (93000) 
Assessable profit/ (allowable loss) 16040 
Loss relief (1150) 
Oil allowance (1750) 
Taxable profit/ (loss) 13140 
Tax at 50 % (subject to safeguard) 6570 
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4.8 Key Issues (Provisions) in UK Petroleum Revenue Tax 
1. Provision of uplift: This is a supplementary allowance of 35% on certain capital 
expenditure incurred on bringing a field into production apart from main capital 
expenditure. 
2. Field Operations Loss Relief: This is a tax relief for losses as carry forward. 
3. Exemption from PRT until payback is reached. 
4. Cross field allowance: This allows a participant to offset up to 10% of development 
costs in a new field from the profits of another taxable or PRT paying field. 
5. Oil Allowance: This is a relief created to reduce the effective PRT rate payable on 
qualifying fields. It is the cash value of the equivalent of 500,000 tonnes of oil per 
field per year. The aggregate oil allowance for 10 years is 10 million tonnes. 
However in using this allowance, the participator cannot use it to create a tax loss 
though it is possible to carry it forward. 
6. Safeguard Rule: This is a provision for the less profitable marginal fields. It is not a 
deduction from PRT payable but usually calculated on its own formulation. 
Where the safeguard figure calculated is less than the PRT, the safeguard amount is 
paid as PRT payable for the period. The safeguard is calculated from adjusted profit 
which in itself is calculated as the sum of assessable profit, non-field expenditure 
claimed back, expenditure qualifying for uplift (i. e. capital expenditure on assets 
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used to bring oil to production which enjoy 35% allowance for deduction from 
gross profit for PRT calculations). 
If adjusted profit is < 30% of capital expense then PRT =0 
If adjusted profit is > 30% of capital expense then PRT <_ 80% of the difference 
between adjusted profit minus 30% of capital expense. This is what is referred to as 
a Safeguard and Tapering Provision. 
7. Payment of PRT: Payment is assessed twice yearly, January to June and July to 
December. Payment is also made on account and on six monthly instalments for 
each half year period. Payments are self-assessed (provisional PRT) and each 
instalment is calculated as one-eighth of the total payment for the chargeable period 
in view. Payment is due, that is, it commences two months after the end of the 
chargeable period. Expenditure is deducted on a `claimed' basis and where not 
allowed when assessed by the Inland Revenue, any balance becomes payable or 
refundable. 
4.9 UK Corporation Tax and Ring-Fenced Activity 
In the UK, oil companies pay corporation tax just like other companies. In addition, where 
such an oil company has other lines of business e. g. petroleum products marketing, the oil 
and gas extraction business is treated as separate. This is what is referred to as `ring 
fencing'. 
Under the ring fence rule, there is provision for set-off of losses of operations within the 
ring fence i. e. from oil and gas operation from non-ring-fenced income. It is, however, not 
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allowed to offset losses from non-ring fenced business with ring-fence income. Losses, 
subject to the ring-fence rule may be carried forward and deducted from future profit or 
carried back to the previous year's profit. For companies having overseas operations, such 
oil and gas operations are outside the ring fence. For fields that are PRT paying, PRT is 
deductible in arriving at the taxable income for corporation tax purposes. 
However, corporation tax is not assessable on a field basis but on the entire company 
chargeable profit, hence its provisions affect both PRT paying and non-PRT paying fields. 
Starting from April 1,1999 the tax rate is 30%. There is also the provision for small profit 
making fields whereby the tax rate is either 20% or 10% depending on the size of profit. 
Illustration of Corporation Tax Computation for Ring-Fence Activity 
££ 
Profit /Loss per accounts z 
Add: 
Pricing adjustment (if any) x 
Book depreciation x 
Disallowable expenditure (e. g. entertainment) x 
Capital costs expensed x 
Provisions for future costs x 
Payable under loan relationships x 
X 
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Less: 
PRT and royalty x 
Capital gains x 
Interest received x 
Capital allowances x 
Receivable under loan relationships x 
Trading losses of other periods x 
Taxable ring-fence trading income 
Capital gains 
Interest (other businesses) 
Taxable profits (subject to group relief) 
See example calculation below. 
Example Corporation Tax Computation for Ring-fenced Activity 
£'000 
Profit /Loss per accounts 
Add: 
Pricing adjustment (if any) 500 
Book depreciation 40,000 
Disallowable expenditure (e. g. entertainment) 150 
(%) 
X 
X 
(X) 
£'000 
750,000 
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Capital costs expensed 38,500 
Provisions for future costs 50,000 
Payable under loan relationships 65.000 
194,150 
555,850 
Less: 
PRT and royalty 129,950 
Capital gains 10,000 
Interest received 8,500 
Capital allowances 17,850 
Receivable under loan relationships 4,500 
Trading losses of other periods 0 
(170,800) 
Taxable ring-fence trading income 385,050 
Capital gains 12,500 
Interest (other businesses) (42,950) 
Taxable profits (subject to group relief) 354,600 
Corporation Tax at 30% (Assume no group relief) 106.380 
Profit After Tax 248.220 
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4.10 Other Key Provisions Affecting the Computation of Corporate Tax 
1. Mineral Extraction Allowances (MEA): This is a provision according to which the 
costs of acquiring mineral assets e. g. the original licence premium, be relieved by 
10% while pre-trading expenditure on mineral exploration and access be relieved by 
25%. 
2. Scientific Research Allowance (SRA): This includes the costs of seismic work and 
exploration in the UK or on the UKCS if incurred before the commencement date 
of commercial production in that field. A 100% write-off as incurred is allowed 
except for claw back of the SRA when the asset representing the research 
equipment is disposed off. 
3. Abandonment Allowance: This is a provision for capital costs when a field is 
abandoned. Though to date very few fields (and small fields) have been abandoned 
in the UK, and most of them are production equipments linked to other fields i. e. 
shared facilities. The first major installation for abandonment is expected to be the 
Phillips operated Maureen platform. There is a 100% allowance under the capital 
allowance provision that is applicable for abandonment if a company decides to use it 
against the ring fenced profits. The deduction must however be made within two years 
after the expenditure is incurred. A qualifying expenditure must relate to the demolition 
of an oil installation or to the costs associated with preparing these facilities for re-use. 
Whenever a loss results from abandonment it can be set off against the profits of the 
trade in the last three years. Also abandonment costs incurred after three years of 
closure of the field activities, are 100% allowable as capital allowance from its final 
trading account. 
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4. Date of Commencement of Trade and Capital Allowance: This is an important date in 
that it is regarded as when a calculation of corporation tax liability begins. This date is 
when a company begins commercial production from a particular field. Revenue 
expenditure incurred from the last seven years before the commencement date qualifies for 
corporation tax relief while the qualifying expenditure within that period also triggers 
capital allowances. 
4.11 Conclusion 
The mechanics of fiscal taxation show that not only does the UK government tax oil and 
gas exploitation from the revenue yield but ensures that its profits are ring-fenced from the 
companies' other operations. This provides a maximization of tax revenue from petroleum 
exploitation, and avoids any possibility of profit dilution by the results of other operations. 
In the case of Nigeria, only the profits are taxed without any ring-fencing. The complexity 
of field accounting and therefore field taxation in the UK may be rather difficult for the 
Nigerian supervisory agencies to administer for the likely reasons of inefficient tax 
administration. The system of computing the petroleum profit tax in Nigeria is also 
noticeably complex and may encourage tax evasion if the supervisors themselves are 
unable to exhibit sufficient mastery. 
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CHAPTER 5 
LITERATURE REVIEW I: FISCAL TAXATION AS AN INSTRUMENT 
OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 
5.1 Background 
Since ancient days, the issues surrounding ownership, access to, permission to extract and 
payment of rents for extraction of natural resources have always been important to both 
owners of such resources and those interested in extracting them, the entrepreneurs or 
investors. Today, these same issues are as important as in those days. Indeed, they tend to 
be more important now than in the past given that society has grown to become less 
independent of such naturally occurring resources like the one in question in this study- the 
hydrocarbon resource of petroleum oil and gas. 
State sovereignty and right over natural resources in countries endowed with them have 
always moved the country to control the exploitation using various instruments of control. 
Similarly, investors who are interested in the business of extracting mineral resources also 
seek the resource in order to add to their assets and improve on their profit levels. In 
particular, the need to acquire more oil and gas resources (in terms of adding reservoir 
assets to their balance sheet) drives most of the oil companies to the ends of the world in 
search of these all important resources. 
Given the irreplaceability of most naturally occurring mineral resources, particularly oil 
and gas, and the need to secure their judicious exploitation as well as revenue accruable to 
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nation states, most governments of oil and gas producing nations enter into different 
contractual agreements with petroleum companies. 
Also, it is known that for various reasons, which this study tries to elucidate in this 
literature review, the choice of contractual agreement affects the operations of the 
exploration and producing companies involved. The various laws and regulations, the 
evolution of the agreements and the choice of corporate structure, all affect the operations 
and therefore the economics of the companies formed or licensed to explore and produce 
the hydrocarbon resources. 
Fiscal taxation as a form of government control mechanism often leads to distortions. Such 
distortionary impacts of government fiscal policies lead to `excess burden' which is a loss 
of welfare for either individuals or corporate organizations. This study examines the 
incidence of petroleum taxation on the oil companies, not necessarily to determine its 
efficiency as it can be argued that taxes which generate excess burden are not in themselves 
bad, as they can be employed to achieve other purposes. e. g. fairness or equalization in the 
distribution of wealth. There may not be a flawless single, feasible way or indicator to fully 
capture the magnitude of government's fiscal policy impact on the economy, but there is 
always the need to investigate its impact on sectors of the economy. 
This study is part of the evaluative duties of citizens and organizations (including academia) 
in order to measure the appropriateness and / or the extent of government control (using 
fiscal taxation) in determining the economic activities within a particular sector in the 
country. Without this type of investigative research, knowledge of the impact of such 
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government fiscal policies (taxation of petroleum resources) on the operating companies 
will not be definitive but only left to guessing. 
5.2 Fiscal Taxation -A Form of Government Control 
The review of literature in this chapter is intended to highlight the historical developments 
of the factors affecting oil and gas exploration and producing business in Nigeria. The 
review ranges from 1960, the year of Nigeria's independence from the UK, to the current 
available literature in academia and commercial / industrial archives. 
Given the recognition of corporate governance as an important tool in measuring the 
effectiveness of corporate organizations in meeting the objectives of various stakeholders, 
we also examined the literature on the role of corporate governance in the economic 
performance of the oil companies operating in Nigeria from the perspective of the 
separation of ownership and control. This literature is reviewed in chapter 5, and covers the 
wider context of existing perspectives in corporate governance - ownership structure and 
economic performance in particular. 
5.3 Government Control Objectives and Natural Resources Taxation 
Why do governments all over try to control national natural resources? According to the 
studies on Mexico (Katz, 1972) and Ecuador (Tanzi, 1969), there are very many reasons, 
which have been shown to be responsible for this tendency. 
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These include: 
1. Natural resources are regarded as belonging to the entire country, so central control 
prevents sectional claims to ownership. 
2. Natural resources are sometimes non-renewable, so they require efficient management 
that will maximise their exploitation and utilisation. 
3. In some countries, such resources are the sole sources of national revenue. 
4. For security and strategic reasons of supply. 
Whatever the reasons, a key objective is to retain control of what generates a substantial 
part of the gross national product or a significant part of national tax income. 
To achieve this, a number of regulations and policies are passed into law, which make for 
the charging of rents for the exploitation of these resources and the imposition of tax for 
their operations. Similarly, governments offer incentives that will boost investments in the 
resource exploitation. 
As we will see later, these incentives and rent generation schemes constitute what we refer 
to as fiscal regimes/policies that govern the exploration and production of natural resources, 
like hydrocarbon oil and gas. If government control can result in income generation, then 
of course such actions of the state will be tantamount to an economic activity. As such we 
can then safely expect the actions to affect the economic performance of companies 
operating in the country. 
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5.4 Fiscal Policy Defined 
Going by definition, fiscal policy is the government's attempt to influence aggregate 
demand in the economy through regulation of public expenditure as well as stimulation of 
revenue through taxes. It is the framework of taxes and expenditure that can generate or 
lead to a deficit, surplus or balanced budget. 
In this study of fiscal taxation as a form of government control mechanism, the 
consideration is not in terms of its effects on the equilibrium national income. Neither is it 
in terms of the inflationary/expansionary or deflationary influence of tax rates and level of 
money supply on the economies of Nigeria or the public sector. Also, it is not about Public 
Sector Net Debt, Public Sector Net Borrowing, or the sustainability of fiscal policy. Rather, 
it is to consider the impact of fiscal taxes, or rather government's tax take, on the economic 
performance of the oil companies operating in Nigeria. 
If according to Hardwick et al (1999), in their definition of fiscal policy, government 
attempts to influence aggregate demand through regulation of public expenditure and rates 
of taxation, then we will be looking at tax rates in the oil and gas exploration and producing 
industry and how they have affected the companies' economic performance over time. 
Ricardo (1817) summarized the effects of taxation in terms of lessening the power to 
accumulate because all taxes either fall on capital or revenue. If they fall on capital, taxes 
diminish the fund available for the productive industry of the country and if on revenue, 
they reduce accumulation or force contributors to save the amount of tax by diminishing 
their unproductive consumption of luxuries to the tune of the tax. 
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These summed up, the investigation has to do with the effect of taxation on investment 
returns and therefore, on economic performance. Whenever the government decides to 
raise revenue through taxation, it affects every aspect of the economy either directly or 
indirectly. This is what classical economists recognized and Milward (1998) epitomized in 
the classical theory of Adam Smith (1776) proposed four canons of taxation: 
i. Equity - fairness with respect to individuals' contribution in proportion to abilities 
ii. Certainty - clear knowledge of payment in terms of timing 
iii. Convenience - of payment in terms of timing 
iv. Efficiency - minimization of the cost of collection as a proportion of total revenue 
realisable and of distortionary efforts on the behaviour of tax payers. 
For the governments of different nations, experience differs in relation to the four canons 
above, e. g. the efficiency of tax collection may be an issue with a developing nation like 
Nigeria while this is not the case with the United Kingdom. Poor efficiency of tax 
collection may negate or minimize the very reason for the imposition of tax and may also 
be an incentive to push up certain tax rates in order to generate a target level of revenue 
through tax. 
5.5 Government Control and Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal policy is arguably a controversial tool in the management of macroeconomics. 
Though potent when viewed from the perspective of finance and economics, it could be 
politically and socially sensitive. It has both advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
its effect is positive during depressions/recessions, while it could also lead to inflation 
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during a deficit. For the purpose of this study, emphasis will be on taxes and their impact 
on economic performance. 
Generally, the imposition of tax reduces private consumption and savings. When after-tax 
income is reduced, the disposable income is then split between consumption and savings. 
When consumption is reduced, aggregate demand also falls, and if savings are reduced, 
then interest rates may rise causing investment to fall. The desirability of these events 
depends on the prevailing economic conditions. (Taxes of different sorts tend to affect 
consumption and savings differently). 
Usually, favourable tax regimes are required to stimulate investments in risky ventures. 
Where such incentives are absent, there is a disincentive for investment in high-risk 
projects. However, when losses can be offset against high-risk and unsuccessful 
investments, it is unlikely that the aggregate amount invested in the economy will reduce. 
To stimulate investments, the provision of tax incentives such as tax credits, capital 
allowances etc. reduce tax liabilities and increase business profitability. With this, there is 
the likelihood of larger amounts of net profits being available for reinvestment and 
stimulation of the macro-economy. According to Wolf (1966) taxes do not stimulate the 
economy, though the extent to which they depress it is not exactly known. During a 
depression, when consumption is low, if taxes are imposed on savings, there is a 
disincentive to save which stimulates the economy given that it is expenditure that actually 
stimulates the economy. 
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The effect of fiscal policy on the macro economy no doubt affects business organisations 
either in terms of the net effect of taxes and expenditure resulting in a deficit (and as such a 
stimulant to the economy) or resulting in a surplus (due to raising taxes/cutting 
expenditure). Business economic performance is usually tied to the level of success or 
failure of capital projects particularly in industries with high project costs. This is in turn 
associated with the impact of taxation on investment projects. The value of capital projects, 
however, may be distorted by the prevailing tax system, and for most countries the tax 
system is neutral and may be characterised by: 
a. a system that allows free depreciation and with no interest deductible 
b. a system where true economic depreciation in line with economic wear and tear is 
allowed for the purposes of taxation and accompanied with interest element deductions. 
Where it happens that the fiscal policy deviates from such a definition of tax neutrality, e. g. 
the denial of interest element deduction for tax purposes even while depreciation is 
economic, or when tax rebates on losses are not immediate, then there is no tax neutrality. 
In the UK, immediate tax rebates are allowed only if: 
a. other incomes arise within the same accounting year 
b. there is income from the immediate preceding year from which to offset the losses. 
The UK tax system cannot therefore be said to be neutral as implied above. 
Where there is deviation from tax neutrality, it is obvious that the company will carry 
taxable losses for the foreseeable future and this will affect economic performance, more so, 
as the present value of the tax rebate and tax liabilities for the project(s) will be lowered, as 
they can only become effective at a future date. 
According to (Hodgkinson, 1989), where interest is tax deductible, projects financed by 
debt become more attractive than equity-financed projects when the company's operations 
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are in a tax-paying position. Gilles et al (1987) lists the objectives of fiscal policy as the 
promotion of economic growth, the reduction of income disparities between households 
and regions, the promotion of economic stability and economic efficiency, and the 
increasing of host-country returns from natural resource endowments. 
Government behaviour or the `public choice' approach (Mueller, 1989) is part of public 
finance and has been subjected to economic analysis. For both developed and developing 
economies, there is little question that there is scepticism in the minds of analysts with 
respect to the post-war view that government always act in the best interest of its citizens, 
as posited by Russell and Nicholson (1981). Similarly, as it is reasonable from the works 
of Adam Smith and the English classical economists that `government is best that governs 
least' so we see disparities in the extent of the government's direct investment in 
enterprises, particularly in such sectors considered to be strategic, e. g. government control 
and/or involvement in the petroleum industry of developed and developing economies, like 
that of the UK and Nigeria respectively. Such government behaviour is a kind of control. 
In taxation, as in other areas of fiscal policy studies, views will be divergent as usual, e. g. 
acceptance of the need for, or the appropriateness of state ownership of, companies in the 
private sector and the trade-off between growth and equity structure. Should there be no 
definitive conclusion from this study, the discoveries from this research are expected to 
stimulate further research on the impact of fiscal taxation (as part of the government 
control mechanism) on economic performance of oil and gas exploration and producing 
companies operating in a developing economy, (Bird and Oldman 1990). 
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5.6 Tax Incentives as Part of Fiscal Policy 
Tax schemes or regimes have often been used by countries of both developed and 
developing economies to either promote national revenue generation or foreign / local 
investments, where they act as incentives. 
There is also the political economic aspect of incentive policy. A country's tax structure 
inevitably reflects more than its economic structure. It involves its political set up and a 
balance of prevailing political and economic forces as well as national administration 
capacity to enforce such tax system. According to Bird and Oldman (1990), such fiscal 
incentives fall into four types though all are forms of subsidy which governments of mixed 
economies use to induce foreign capital inflows for their economic growth or the 
development of particular industries. The four categories are: 
(a) Where the subsidy is independent of the level of investment, but conditional on a 
maximum level of profit, e. g. a tax holiday. 
(b) Where the subsidy is dependent on the level of investment and on a minimum level of 
profit, e. g. accelerated depreciation allowance, tax credit, investment allowances and 
development rebates. This allows a further percentage / portion of the asset's cost as tax 
deductibles from taxable income on top of the depreciation provision already deducted on 
either the straight line or reducing balance method. 
(c) Where the subsidy is independent of the level of investment and the minimum level of 
profit, e. g. import duty exemption on capital goods for the company's operations and / or 
on raw materials. 
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(d) Where the subsidy is dependent on the level of investment, and not on a minimum 
profit level, e. g. an investment grant, whereby a portion of the company's investment cost 
is paid by the government, (Shah and Toye, 1978). 
In practice, Heller and Kauffman, (1963) noticed that one of each of the four subsidy types 
is not an alternative for the other. Rather, many countries (for example, 10 out of the 28 
surveyed in their study) operated more than one of the four types simultaneously, or one 
type after another in the life of the investment or the company. 
Summary of Fiscal Incentive Types and Implications for Profits and Public Finance 
(A) J> 
(1) Sxf (K°) Tax holiday 
Tax deductible 
Loan interest 
(2) S=f (K*) Tax credit 
Investment allowance 
Accelerated depreciation 
(B) J° <J * 
Import duty exemption 
Investment grant 
Notes: S is the amount of public subsidy; K" is the cost of acquiring investment goods; J* is 
the level of corporate profits at which tax becomes payable;. /" is pre-tax profits. 
Such subsidies affect profitability depending on when the exact benefit (timing) is, vis-ä- 
vis the present value of alternative forms of subsidy. 
Further work by Heller and Kauffman (1963) summarizes the existing literature on fiscal 
incentives in 28 developing countries including Nigeria. No less than eighteen of the 
twenty-eight were former British colonies. 
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The most popular subsidy type is (a) above i. e the tax holiday, with 93% of the countries 
(including Nigeria) offering one type of tax holiday or another. 16% of the countries 
employed accelerated investment depreciation ((b) above) so this was the second most 
widely used next to (a). The import duty exemption was preferred next by 36% of the 
countries, while the investment grant type of incentive was preferred by only one country, 
Fiji 
The impacts of the incentives were assessed based on the percentage share of investment in 
Gross National Product (GNP) before and after the incentives were introduced. Given that 
other factors could cause the investment share of GNP to change, this method needs no 
further examination. 
Another approach in investigating the economic impact of incentives is through the use of 
questionnaires, which are known to have inherent biases that can invalidate the outcome of 
the study. As in the previous approach, the survey/questionnaire method assumes that 
investment behaviour is the only variable with which we can measure the impact of fiscal 
incentives. More so, the method does not distinguish between categories of investment and 
investors or between capital intensive and labour intensive enterprises. Worse still, 
respondents will always wish for more fiscal incentives thereby blurring the time impact of 
existing incentives in their responses. This bias in investors may be offset by the 
overstatement of the actual impact of such incentives, such that an impression of low 
impact is not given thereby prompting the government to cancel the incentives altogether, 
if considered to be of low effect. This approach was used in the following studies about the 
impact of fiscal incentives on the countries' economies. 
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Mexico (Ross and Christensen 1959) 
Jamaica (Chen -Young, 1967) 
Pakistan (Aghar and Sharif, 1974) 
Brazil (Gooman, 1972) 
Nigeria (Olaoku, 1976) 
A more realistic/statistical and quantitative method of measuring the effectiveness of fiscal 
incentives is the examination of the published financial results of firms whose operations 
have enjoyed fiscal incentives as against those that did not, or of the same company using 
the financial results before and after the introduction of incentives. The findings of the 
studies mentioned above are: 
1. That these countries' tax bases are themselves so little that tax incentives (subsidies) 
have little effect on the economy. And even where the tax base is significant, the countries 
have little success in collecting taxes. 
2. That the developing countries apply fiscal incentives to attract investment capital from 
multinational companies and therefore create competition among them which further 
reduces their revenues, thereby making nonsense of the impact of the incentives on their 
economies. 
3. That the incentives are as a result of internal political pressure on governments by the 
multinationals and their capitalist supporters in various governments of the developing 
countries. 
Whatever the argument is about, the methods highlighted above and the impact on the 
national economies, fiscal incentives do one thing: they improve the rate of return of 
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investment projects and therefore the companies' economic performance in countries 
where there are subsidies. 
This is one of the spurs for this research: to find out whether and how fiscal incentives or 
their absence / reduction through fiscal taxation determine the level of profitability for the 
oil companies operating in Nigeria. 
5.7 Principal Characteristics of a Tax System 
According to Smith (1776) in his classic publication `The Wealth of Nations', four major 
characteristics are desirable in a wholesome tax system. These are as follows: 
(a) The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government, in 
proportion to their respective abilities; that is in proportion to the revenue which they 
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state. 
(b) The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. 
(c) Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, most convenient for the 
contributor to pay. 
(d) Every tax ought to be contrived as both to take out, and keep out of the pockets of the 
people, as little as possible over and above what it brings in to the public treasury of the 
state. A tax may either take out or keep out of the pockets of the people a great deal more 
than it brings into the public treasury, and in four ways: 
i. by the number of officers who levy it 
ii. by obstructing the industry of the people 
iii. by penalties incurred in attempting to evade the tax 
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iv. by subjecting the people to frequent visits and examinations of the tax-gatherer 
These are referred to as the `Canons of Taxation' in classical literature. 
According to Lymer et al (2003), in modern tax literature, the canons are restated as: 
i. Equity: a tax should be seen as fair in its impact on all and levied according to people's 
ability to pay. 
ii. Certainty: taxes should not be arbitrary, i. e. tax payers should know their tax liability 
(including the simplicity of understanding), and when and where to pay. 
iii. Convenience: it should be easy for the tax payer to pay up. 
iv. Efficiency: the tax system should not have an impact on the allocation of resources 
and it should be cheap to run. 
Another addition to these is that a tax system should be flexible in order to cope with 
changing economic situations, without requiring significant changes. It is not usual to have 
all of these characteristics included in every tax system. Where they occur, it is unlikely 
that they have equal weight in their impacts on the economy. For example, for an efficient 
tax system, it is expected that it does not distort the economic decisions made by 
individuals or companies, although governments sometimes change a tax system for 
behavioural change purposes, in what is regarded as a `corrective tax'. 
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5.8 National Tax Income Maximization 
It is usual to have objectives for tax policies whenever they exist. It could be to stimulate 
the generation of the provision of certain goods and services, or to minimize the production 
of some other goods and services. When tax rates fall, it could generate consumption of 
particular goods and services and reduce consumption of some other goods and services. 
Similarly, governments may set an objective for tax policies such that foreign investment is 
attracted or national tax income is maximized. The list of such objectives is on-going. 
With regards to multinational corporations whose activities span several countries, foreign 
sourced corporate income is affected by the tax policies of both home and foreign countries. 
Given that national corporate income can be safely defined as the aggregate of domestic 
income before tax (both tax and retained profit still belong to entities - government and 
company, within the borders of the country), and foreign sourced or repatriated income 
after foreign taxes are paid, the level of tax in foreign countries therefore affects the portion 
of repatriated after tax income and therefore, the national tax income. 
For countries with tax policies that avoid double taxation, e. g. the UK and the USA, the 
return on investment in foreign countries will take into account the impact of such foreign 
tax rates, and compare them to the home country's rates and returns on investment, before 
deciding on the allocation of capital to foreign investment, i. e. where to invest. 
5.9 Corporation Tax 
Most countries impose tax on corporations or companies for a number of reasons, the most 
important of which are the following: 
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(a) Corporation tax is regarded as a benefit tax, which companies pay, for enjoying the 
use of public utilities and services that contribute to the attainment or improvement 
of their profits. 
(b) It is a withholding tax, which serves as a backstop to the personal tax. 
(c) The corporate tax captures the rents earned by the owners of fixed factors i. e. non- 
reproductive factors like entrepreneurship, natural resources, land etc. 
(d) To raise revenue for the government. 
Giving the rationale for withholding tax on corporate retentions, Mintz (1995), explained 
that the tax base can be summed up as: 
Y=R -C- Dep -I- Div 
where: 
Y= Taxable income 
R= Revenue 
C= Cost of operations 
Dep = Depreciation 
I= Interest element 
Div = Dividend payment 
Because dividends are not allowable deductions, the corporate tax base then becomes: 
Y=R-C -Dep- I 
73 
In (c) above, when government taxes rent, even if the government does not own the 
land/property, the tax is a charge for the use of the land/property and it is referred to as 
royalty payment for the use of the land. This was first highlighted by George (1879) and 
later expounded in the optimal tax literature by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) 
5.10 Corporate Taxes and Financing Risks 
Corporate taxes may affect financing decisions as investment may be funded by debt where 
the interest element is tax deductible or non-deductible. To say the least, any investment is 
risky. Because of the likely impact of taxation, investors or corporations usually project the 
after-tax returns on investment. Given that these returns cannot be guaranteed, there is an 
element of risk involved. The way investors view projected returns is usually affected by 
taxes or tax regimes in the countries of operation. It is therefore usual to access the degree 
or level of risk associated with taxes. 
Similar works were carried out by Mintz (1982), Gordon (1985) and Gordon and Wilson 
(1991) in which they surveyed a series of countries and their tax policies in relation to 
companies' investment capital inflow. It was discovered that countries with more 
favourable tax regimes had higher levels of capital inflow. Investors weigh a number of 
risk elements (with the risk premium associated) and the tax regimes of different countries 
as this affects their after-tax rate of returns, e. g. how does a particular government treat 
losses when incurred in operations? If the income tax provides for full recovery, i. e. full- 
loss-offset or not, this affects the after tax returns for similar operations in another country 
compared. 
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5.11 The Disincentive of Taxation 
Whenever tax is imposed or tax rates increased, the effect could be on consumption 
patterns as the consumption of one set of commodities or services is substituted for another 
set, as a result of lower disposable income. Similarly, there is the effect of creating a shift 
from aggregate disposable income to government revenue from taxation. This situation 
could result in a tax disincentive, whereby there is a disincentive to work or earn higher 
income, particularly with progressive income tax system. 
It is known that there are difficulties in integrating tax efficiency and tax equity, 
particularly as they affect income tax policies. According to James and Nobes, (2000), the 
main difficulty is the trade-off which often exists between tax efficiency and tax incentives 
on the one hand and equity on the other hand. They concluded that society may consider a 
highly progressive income tax to be equitable, but that such a tax system might damage the 
incentive to work. The problem therefore, is to find the tax rates that give the best trade-off 
between incentives and equity. The failure of a tax system to achieve this could result in a 
tax disincentive. 
With respect to the taxation of enterprise or companies, similar difficulties are experienced 
too. According to Perman et al (1996), the imposition of a tax or subsidy on a non- 
renewable natural resource like oil and gas, affects the resource extraction cost. The 
imposition of a revenue or profit tax is said to be equivalent to an increase in the resource 
extraction cost, while an incentive like a revenue subsidy scheme is equivalent to a 
decrease in the resource extraction cost. It is also believed that a decrease in extraction 
costs could lower the market price of the resource, when left to free market forces, and 
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possibly shorten the time to completely exhaust the stock or reserve of the natural resource. 
In the case of oil and gas exploration and production, incentives will likely increase 
extraction investment capital commitment by the international oil companies, and the host 
country's production capacity. This would in effect, enable the production capacity of an 
OPEC member state like Nigeria to secure an additional production quota, given that 
production quotas are based on reserves. The resultant effect therefore, is that such reserves 
are depleted or exhausted faster according to Perman et al, (1996). Conversely, if taxes are 
imposed or tax rates increased, production costs are likely to increase thereby reducing the 
economic performance of the companies. Such tax policies tend to reduce investment 
capital commitment by the international oil companies and hence lead to an eventual 
reduction in the depletion rate of oil and gas reserves. This is therefore a clear case of the 
disincentive effect of imposition of higher tax rates. 
For most developing countries, including OPEC member states, there is a preference for the 
imposition of high tax rates in order to generate higher revenue. However, the reduction of 
capital investment tends to reduce the rate at which new reserves are added, and which in 
turn reduces the allocated production quotas, and leads to a reduction in oil and gas 
volumes available in the market. This forces the price of oil and gas to increase, a situation 
preferred by OPEC member states. 
5.12 The Development of Government Control of Petroleum Resources 
in Nigeria and the UK through Fiscal Taxation 
The involvement of international oil companies in the exploration and production of 
hydrocarbon resources in different parts of the world have always characterized the history 
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of petroleum resources exploitation. On the part of the international oil companies, there 
are usually uncertainties about the commercial availability of the resource that will justify 
their investment as well as uncertainty about the host country's government's political and 
economic stability. 
In the North Sea, the history of the oil industry suggests that both the governments and the 
international oil companies were going through a learning process, with the UK and 
Norwegian governments learning the microcconomics of the industry, and how it affects 
the macroeconomics of their countries, while the international oil companies learnt the 
differences in operating in the UK or Norway, compared to other previous areas of 
experience. 
In his book on the development of the UK and the Norwegian petroleum exploration and 
production, Oystein (1980) presented the institutional approach or traditional ways by 
which the international oil companies through the concessionary system had control of 
large areas of exploration and thereby had little government interference. For example, in 
Kuwait, the original 1934 concessions to the Kuwait Oil Company were granted for 92 
years; the D'Arcy concession in Iran was granted for 60 years; the 1925 concession granted 
in Iraq was for 75 years and that of 1933 in Saudi Arabia was for 60 years. Though 
advantageous for the international oil companies, these long periods were unsatisfactory to 
the producing countries, whether developed or developing nations. 
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In designing the concessionary period, the UK opted for 46 years, which was a balance or 
compromise duration as a shorter period was feared to lead to an irresponsible depletion 
rate of the reservoirs. Norway adopted 36 years. 
In Nigeria, 25 years is the preferred period of time for a concession. Originally, the 
international oil companies were more or less sovereign in matters of exploration, 
development and production while the host country had little in incomes from rent and 
share of profits. This was compounded by the integration of the international oil companies 
into refining and marketing, which reduced 'arm's length' sales (sales to other parties apart 
from own oneself or one's own subsidiaries) to the minimum. However, the nationalization 
of oil companies by the developing countries during the 'oil revolution' of the 1970s 
reversed the trend. On the heels of the oil revolution, the UK government together with 
Norway proposed a modification of the usual concessionary system known then as the 
'North Sea Model'. 
The North Sea model, according to Oystein (1980), was predicated on the fact that 
government could not allow a free rein for the international oil companies. Given that the 
UK was already a mature capitalist country, where government interferes with the 
economic life of the society and industry, unlike in the oil producing developing countries' 
nascent, incomplete and unstable democracies, the international oil companies were not 
given a 'free rein'. 
In the UK before the 1970s, the main relationship between the government and 
international oil companies was with respect to the supply of foreign oil to the domestic 
market, and the government had appreciable knowledge of the microeconornics of the 
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international oil and gas exploration and producing industry. The international oil 
companies have had sovereignty over the management of their affairs and had prevented 
any significant control by the host countries. This has been largely successful because of 
the peculiarities of the industry which prevented easy entry, easy understanding and control 
by the host countries. Such peculiarities include: (i) high capital intensity; (ii) high risk; (iii) 
large cash flow; (iv) a tendency towards joint ventures with the international oil companies 
as partners and operators of the venture; (v) vertical integration which increases the 
complexity of operations. 
Most host country governments, particularly the developing countries like Nigeria, lacked 
the knowledge of the industry and the competence to supervise and control them. Most 
countries therefore needed to understand the workings of the industry gradually. For 
developing countries like Nigeria, the learning process has been slow due to weak 
governments which may not be fully democratic, as well as unstable socio-political systems 
and low technological development. This contrasts with the UK, where democracy is 
developed and mature according to Seba (1998). The UK government's response to the 
large and overwhelming influence of the multinational oil companies was to restrict the 
destabilizing impact of oil operations on the macro economy, through a stiffening of 
concessionary terms with respect to increases in taxation, introduction of state participation, 
strict labour, safety and environmental laws. All of these have been aimed at controlling the 
overwhelming influence of the international oil companies. 
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5.13 The Petroleum Industry-Government Control Relationship 
With the above background, both the international oil companies and host country have 
found themselves in bargaining, negotiating relationships where neither can do without 
the other. On the one hand, the government of the host country as landowners, or 
custodians of natural resources, must provide a legal and economic framework in 
relation to their country's peculiarities, e. g. a political system must be provided as well 
as the ability to control the resource, while the international oil companies evaluate the 
political risks, security of supply and the economics. Hence two key issues arise in the 
bargaining between the host country and the international oil companies. These are: 
(a) A division or apportionment of financial gains i. e. returns on capital for the 
international oil companies, and government 'take' for the host country. 
(b) Control over the activity i. e. the ability to dispose of the available energy resource 
in the long term, through the integration of resource exploitation (exploration and 
production) with the downstream sector, is the perception of control by the companies 
as against the ability to influence micro-economics of the sector, which in turn 
influences the macro economy, a situation that is paramount for the host country, as a 
perpetration of policies that preserve socio-economic interest of the country. The 
impact of these is that future revenue from oil and gas activity in terms of quantity 
produced and apportionment of returns form the core reasons for control by both the 
host country and the international oil companies respectively. This therefore portrays 
the interrelationship between control and economic profitability. 
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5.14 Control and Economic Profitability 
For governments, there is and will always be an inter-twined relationship between wanting 
financial gains from resource exploitation and the desire to control the operators' activities 
and share the income. Control may be supervisory to ensure the security of government's 
revenue income. When operations get complex, control structures tend to become elaborate 
and the maximum potential economic gains to the government may become elusive, as 
argued by Oystein, (1980), such that control becomes a distinct aim different from income 
realisation. Government's ability to exercise absolute control is usually hindered by: 
(a) the need to accept a certain level of returns on investors' investments 
(b) the realisation of the international oil companies' competence in organising both 
exploration and production better than government itself. 
On their part, the international oil companies tend to balance their desire for profit 
maximization with the peculiarity of their environment of operation, that is, other 
considerations such as political, country and geological risks. They tend to create situations 
of long term stability and returns optimization for their business while governments seek 
revenue and control. Both parties therefore are in constant alliance because of 
interdependence. 
The security of supply due to political stability and predictability of government actions 
continues to be the basis of the attraction of the North Sea for the international oil 
companies, despite its harsh weather. 
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The thrust of the government's reasons for control is summed up in wanting to avoid over- 
heating of the macro-economy through regulation of money supply, and the protection of 
the country's balance of payment. It is also to protect the economic rent, thereby preventing 
being cheated by the international oil companies (Morgan, 1976), cited by Oystein, (1980). 
The government's control framework therefore starts with policy formulation and is then 
followed by the actual control of operations. 
On the heels of the justification for government control is the economics of the operation 
whereby the expected yield by international oil companies require adequate justification for 
their investments. For any oil field the economic profitability is determined by the 
following factors: 
(a) The reservoir field location relative to the market 
(b) The quality of the oil 
(c) The exploration and production costs 
(d) The security of supply 
(e) The recoverable reserve 
For the UKCS of the North Sea, the factors in (a), (b) and (d) are in its favour while the 
costs of exploration and production are rather unfavourable relative to some other regions 
of the world. The international oil companies tend to weigh the net effect of all factors 
which may balance out and explain why they still operate in seemingly unfavourable 
regions and under tougher fiscal regimes. The North Sea is successful despite its shallow 
waters, personal safety costs and harsh weather conditions which make drilling difficult 
limiting it to about 175 days per year. This makes exploration and production risky and 
expensive particularly in terms of costly equipment and idle time caused by weather related 
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delays. The weather also affects transportation by tankers, while enviromnental 
considerations make pipelines more expensive, particularly because of trenching 
requirements. 
In Nigeria, such factors as the security of supply may be more important due to political 
risks. Other factors affecting the economics of oil and gas exploration and production 
include the field size, water depth and the distance of the field from shore 
5.15 The Development of Nigerian and UK Oil Policies 
The North Sea oil policy was based on the existing oil and gas resources management 
framework of the concessionary model and the state model. According to the concessionary 
model, the international oil companies were granted control to explore for and exploit 
reserves over a large area. There are two forms: 
a. Concessions allocated to international oil companies by auction. 
b. Concessions allocated administratively, that is, through an administrative agent of 
government like a state oil company. 
The second version has been very prevalent in Nigeria where the operations are organised 
through the state-owned oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC). 
In the UK, both versions were discarded because the concessionary model by auction was 
believed to give too little power to the host country over allocation or distribution of the 
licences; while the concession by administrative means was considered to give too much 
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dominance to the international oil companies, given the terms and large areas of concession. 
Hence the North Sea model was developed. 
The North Sea model is a modification of the concessionary model by administrative 
means. The government introduced more stringent terms and conditions and reduced the 
acre-size of each concession. Since then, this has been the basis of both governments' 
concessions to international oil companies, though with all kinds of modifications to suit 
the need of the moment. 
In all of the above, unlike in Nigeria where the desire has always been largely financial or 
economic gains, given its dependence on oil revenue (see Table 6), the concern of the UK 
government has been to control the influence of the oil companies on the economy, reduce 
exploitation by the companies and maximize revenue. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Petroleum GDP 40.4 43.6 38.9 27 28.3 39.5 
Primary Sector 31.7 30.8 33.7 39 35.6 28.6 
Secondary Sector 6.2 5.5 5.8 6.2 5.7 4.8 
Tertiary Sector 21.7 20.1 21.6 27.7 30.4 27.2 
Nig. Bonny Light API 37 
($/Bbl) 17.2 20.8 19.8 12.9 17.6 28 
UK Brent API 38 ($/Bbl) 17.5 20.45 19.12 12.72 17.7 28.31 
Source: IMF Country Report, Aug. 2001 
The UK government's desire in developing its oil policy was more to hold control both in 
terms of revenue and socio-political considerations of the impact of oil. After the oil crisis 
of 1972, the UK reviewed its motives and strategies with respect to oil policy. In dealing 
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with the tax issues raised by the Committee on Public Accounts Department of Energy 
Report (1974), Mackay and Mackay (1975), as cited Oystein (1980), revenue generation 
became more prominent than before and led to the introduction of a new taxation system. 
This new tax regime included a charge on revenue in order to reduce companies' operating 
profit. 
The government also took greater control by renegotiating existing licences to obtain 
majority state participation and created a wholly owned state oil company, the British 
National Oil Corporation (BNOC) in 1975, (see Dam, 1976). The new tax regime 
announced included the cancellation of artificial losses accumulated before January 1,1973; 
an introduction of a transfer price for tax computations; the introduction of 'ring fence' for 
the computation of North Sea operations losses or profit separately from other company 
business activities. BNOC re-negotiated existing licences and bought 51% at market prices 
(The Economist, 1978). The first renegotiation was concluded with Gulf/Conoco in January 
1976. This development is similar to that in Nigeria where, till now, government's 
participation averages 55-57% in the joint venture arrangements. 
For countries, state participation and special tax regimes or fiscal taxation are indicative of 
the government's aim of exercising control (and more control) as well as securing a larger 
share of economic rent or financial pins. Between 1976 and 1978, there were two rounds 
of licensing (rounds 5 and 6) with BNOC having a minimum of 51% in addition to interests 
held by the British public. The government's control measures such as tax rates, royalty 
payments, capital and oil allowances can impact on profitability. Also, a situation whereby 
goverriment does not control production (as in the UK except in 1982, as against in Nigeria 
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where, as a member of OPEC, there is a quota on production) has an impact on the 
production profile of the fields, the cash flows and the revenue. 
Generally, the longer the production life of the field, the higher the eventual recovery and 
the better the cash flow. However, it is possible to have a negative impact on the 
companies' overall economic profitability if production is restricted below field capacity by 
government action. The rate of depletion of a field is usually affected by (i) the expected 
rate of return, (ii) expected price changes or price movements over time (iii) cost variations 
as determined by the rate of production. Traditionally, the international oil companies tend 
to finance their investments through equity capital. When costs escalate, they also increase 
their borrowings particularly when their operations expand to other parts of the world and 
when profits are low. This was the trend in the 1970s and it is still noticeable today. In 
normal operations, the major risks are (a) exploration risk of not finding oil in commercial 
quantity and (b) production risks of cost escalation and delays. For locations of very high 
risk, international oil companies use higher equity capital to finance operations. Once 
oiUgas is found in commercial quantity, the development and production phase is financed 
by higher external finance which does not increase the risk particularly when interests are 
tax deductible. This tends to improve the cash flows and profit after tax. 
Given that neither government nor the oil companies control oil/gas prices, the control of 
other economic factors by government may worsen or improve economic profitability of 
the companies with fluctuating oil prices, particularly when such control measures are 
static or rather not elastic enough. It is however known that groups of producing countries, 
such as OPEC, make attempts at controlling oil prices. The Memorandum of 
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Understanding (MOU) signed by Nigeria with the international oil companies tends to 
capture the need for elasticity in government control measures with respect to oil price 
movements. 
Lastly in this review, it is important to mention state participation as a control measure by 
governments. State participation takes different forms of contractual agreements, such as 
joint ventures, service contracts, production sharing contracts etc. The choice of contract 
type may affect the economic returns for both government and the oil companies. Despite 
the above, the reasons for state participation are socio-political: 
- securing the highest possible share of revenue from oil and gas exploration, 
possibly in addition to royalties and taxes 
- more direct control of operations than may be possible through the different models 
of concession licensing 
- to secure more knowledge of the technology and operations for their nationals. 
5.16 Critical Issues in Petroleum Fiscal Taxation 
Royalty and Petroleum Taxation 
Mornmer (2002), citing Ricardo (1821), regarded royalty as a ground rent on natural 
resources. When we consider the forms of ground rents payable by tenants (in annual 
payments) in British agriculture in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is possible to 
consider that marginal farm produce paid no ground rent. This is because it was possible 
for the ground not to command the kind of ground rent the landlord is asking for as lands 
are of different quality, therefore necessitating additional investment to improve the lands 
in terms of yield. This means that no matter what, an economic rent is required even on the 
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poorest land that attracts no ground rent. In addition, competition among tenants also 
increases economic rents in the form of ground rent for landlords. However, because of 
product (resource) market competition, there is a limit to what tenants can pay for ground 
and economic rents. The implication of this is that in progressing from the exploration 
through to the production stages, the tenants watch out to ensure that long term marginal 
production costs (including the usual profit) are equal to market prices. Suppose that the 
tenancy is on a share cropping basis whereby ground rent is paid as a percentage of the 
harvest, (this was also a practice in British agriculture in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries), either in cash or kind. 
In the petroleum industry, the royalty payment is a form of ground rent. With this, royalty 
as ground rent is part of the price and should not therefore be price determined but price 
determining. Mornmer (2002) pp36 also cites the assertion of McDonald (1979), that 
'Royalty affects the margin of land use for mineral extraction and also, to a degree, the 
price of extracted minerals. This seems to contradict the earlier assertion that rent is price 
determined, not price determining, but does so only by appearance. Pure economic rent 
does not affect price, but a fixed royalty as a contractual rent does not coincide precisely 
with pure economic rent. It is the nature of the contract, not the nature of economic rent, 
which causes the rent payment to affect price according to McDonald (1979). Modem day 
versions of the Ricardian rent theory view royalty as ground rent paid as compensation for 
a wasting asset. 
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Petroleum Taxation 
Following the arbitrary slash of 'Arab Light' crude oil price from $1.94 to $1.80 per barrel 
by the US in August 1960 (a move to protect domestic oil prices in the USA), Aramco (the 
Saudi Arabia State Oil Company) and other producers moved to break the historical link 
between world oil prices and the US domestic oil price. Their move prompted the 
formation of OPEC by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela whose oil ministers 
met in Baghdad, Iraq and fori-ned OPEC. OPEC's founding resolution (OPEC Res. 1.1) 
stated that all members should I... endeavour, by all means available to them, to restore 
present prices to the levels prevailing before the reductions'. Despite the insistence of 
OPEC member states on the restoration of posted prices to the pre-August level, the 
international oil companies refused. Though posted prices remained at same level, they 
became higher than market prices, which were falling. This did not appease OPEC. In June 
1962, OPEC acted by recommending that member states should introduce taxes based on 
pre-August 1960 posted price. With this, taxation should be treated differently from 
royalties. This was intended to ensure adequate fiscal revenue that would compensate for 
the price reduction. Thereafter, the driving force behind fiscal policy enactments had been 
the consolidation and maximization of fiscal revenue for the producing states (Mommer, 
2002). 
Generally, taxation has both political and economic considerations (Dam, 1976). Both 
affect society and corporate citizens - the companies. In taxation also, legal considerations 
and connotations are involved just as governments use taxation to manage the macro- 
economy. Debates have always centred on the suitability or effectiveness of using taxation 
in managing an economy. In fiscal terms, the balancing of both taxation and monetary 
instruments may bring about the optimization of the macro-economy at any given point in 
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time. Detailed discussion on this subject is outside the scope of this research. In the study 
of petroleum taxation, the critical issues include: 
(a) Seeing petroleum taxation as a technical issue, whereby the thrust of the policy is 
centred on incentives and tax rates that will attract investors. It also recognizes the 
importance of levels of profit or production costs to investors. 
(b) Seeing petroleum taxation in socio-political perspectives, whereby taxation is used to 
control revenue from the operations to the companies and the government. 
With the second perspective, petroleum taxation will serve as a tool for control and for 
economic rationality. The possibility of the two perspectives becoming contradictory is 
always alive, which is why government control measures through taxation must not be 
Static. 
In the UK, macro-economic considerations have played significant roles in the formulation 
of its petroleum taxation policies (Oystein, 1980). For example, 
(i) Before the oil crisis of 1970-1972, allowing the companies to make high levels of 
profits was considered inimical to the balance of payment 
(ii) Before 1973, the price of oil was low and the UKCS reserves were not yet 
determined, so the UK government needed to attract the international oil companies. The 
approach was therefore technical, that is, to woo investors and allow for appreciable return 
on investment. 
(iii) In 1973, the Parliamentary Committee on Public Accounts highlighted the need to 
increase the government's share of oil revenue to levels comparable to those by OPEC 
producers. 
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(iv) In 1974-75, the government increased its revenue share by imposing higher taxes 
through taxation of revenue in addition to corporation tax. This had the impact of 
reducing the income base on which corporation tax is levied. It therefore gave 
additional revenue to the government from the profit of the international oil companies 
(in addition to corporation tax) which government considered excessive. 
In Nigeria, petroleum taxation policy has always been driven by political considerations 
more so because the country's foreign currency revenue base (since the collapse of the 
first republic in 1963) is mono-product that is, through oil and gas export sales. For 
various host governments, the choices of what issues are more important than others 
differ. However, the critical issues still centre on the following: 
(a) Revenue distribution/share between host country and international oil companies. 
(b) Price movement and cost recovery. 
(c) Financing options and their impact on profitability. 
(d) Incentives for optimal exploration and production of marginal fields. 
(e) Elasticity of government control measures, including tax rates. 
(f) The overall economics of the international oil companies' operations. 
For the companies, there is no certainty on what the tax rates will be over the life of a field 
though the ceiling on UK's PRT enables some certainty on rates of return on investment or 
corporate profit after tax, though this reduces govemment take when costs escalate (Hayllar 
et al 1981). Therefore, a uniform tax rate for all fields and types of operations (onshore or 
off shore) has not been feasible in most countries, but the key requirement has always been 
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the balancing of the two perspectives of technical and political considerations in the 
formulation of petroleum taxation policy. 
5.17 Conclusion 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that there has ben a long standing relationship 
between the intemational oil companies and various host governments and that there is 
always the need to reconcile differences in their individual objectives. While the 
governments seek to control the oil companies operations, they also have economic 
objectives. 
Governments have objectives that depend on their perceived needs at particular times. For 
example, while governments of developing economies would concentrate on maximisation 
of tax revenue, this is related to the significant contribution of petroleum tax revenue to 
their national wealth. The governments of developed economies on their part would rather 
synchronise the maximisation of tax revenue with the overall macro economy. 
The oil companies on the other hand are interested in the way government tax policy 
apportions the pins of their operations - that is, they wish to maximise their economic 
returns. This is in addition to their desire to ensure a continuous flow of petroleum explored 
and produced, which is why they strive to integrate their operations and develop outlets for 
the produced petroleum hydrocarbon. 
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CHAPTER 6 
LITERATURE REVIEW II 
PERSPECTIVES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE - THE SEPARATION OF 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
Within the overall framework of corporate governance, there are divergences on the nature 
and problems of corporate governance. Various scholars have, over a period of time, made 
contributions based on individual research outcomes and perspectives, which will be 
enumerated in this review of literature. 
According to Blair (1995), there are four perspectives in corporate governance, which tend 
to compete in providing explanations and solutions for the Anglo-American model of 
corporate governance. These perspectives are: 
1. The Principal-Agent or Finance Theory 
2. The Market Theory 
3. The Abuse of Executive Power Theory 
4. The Stakeholder Theory. 
The theories have given rise to a division of various points of views into two broad lines, 
that is: 
i. The Shareholder Perspective 
ii. The Stakeholder Perspective 
Both the Principal-Agent or Finance Theory and the Market Theory comprise the 
shareholder perspective. These first two theories assume that the primary objective of the 
firm is to maximise shareholders' wealth, while the Abuse of Executive Power Theory and 
the Stakeholder Theory both argue for a wider sense of stake-holding welfare. The 
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stakeholder perspective disagrees with the shareholder perspective and argues that the 
purpose of the firm should not be as narrow as the maximisation of the firm's wealth. It 
proposes and supports the inclusion of other entities which have not only a relationship, but 
a long-term relationship with the firm, thereby justifying the inclusion of their welfare. 
Such entities identified include staff, suppliers, communities, and customers. Proponents of 
the stakeholder perspective argue that the effective exclusion of these other entities is a 
disadvantage of the Anglo-American corporation compared to European and Japanese 
corporate governance structures. They also cast aspersions on the shareholder perspective 
as failing to encourage employee participation, and inter-corporate co-operation, both of 
which can enhance economic performance. 
6.1 The Shareholder Perspective 
Principal-Agent Model 
Shareholder perspective theorists perpetuate the principal-agent view of corporate 
governance. This view is more widespread and dates back to theories which regard firms 
as legal extensions of their owners (Mayson et al, 1994). Blair, (1995) also asserted that 
the right to own property by owners (shareholders) makes the assets of corporations 
belong to shareholders while managers and directors act as agents to shareholders for the 
maximization of the wealth of the firm. Similarly, she believes that these agents have no 
legal obligation to any other stakeholders. Principal-agent theorists tend to believe that 
corporate governance failures and problems are due to inadequate control by shareholders 
over their agent- management and that management is not penalised enough over poor 
performance. 
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At the centre of the argument is the view that the maximization of share value (a form of 
market value of a firm) is an indication of the long term worth of the company and, as such, 
the empowerment of shareholders is the solution to the attainment of the wealth or value of 
the firm. (Blair, 1995). To further appreciate the shareholders' perspective, the following 
key issues will be examined in this section of the literature review: 
i. the principal-agent relationship in the corporation 
ii the firm as a collection of contractual agreements. 
iii. market efficiency and market discipline. 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), essentially, the core of the shareholder 
perspective is the principal-agent relationship (agency theory) which regards the owner as 
the principal and the manager as the agent. Given that everyone seeks to maximise utility, 
the theory argues that managers' actions will not always be in the interest of the principals 
given that some decision making powers and authority have been delegated to the agent. To 
reduce the impact of such divergent interests, the principal introduces incentives to motivate 
as well as pay for the monitoring costs. These two related issues constitute the agency 
problem in the shareholders' perspective on corporate governance. 
The agency problem was first identified by Adam Smith (1937). He noted that directors 
managing other people's money cannot be expected to watch over it with same anxious 
vigilance as they would watch over their own. As it is generally difficult, if not impossible 
to ensure that the agent makes optimal decisions from the principals' viewpoint without 
incurring some cost, such cost constitutes a loss to both parties. This is referred to as 
'residual loss' by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Agency cost is therefore defined as the 
summation of: 
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(a) monitoring expenditure by the principal 
(b) bonding expenditure by the agent 
(c) residual loss 
where the bonding expenditure is the amount the agent expends in terms of resources in order 
to ensure that decisions do not hann the principal or that the principal gets compensated if the 
agent takes such aberrant actions. This agency problem occurs in all organisations; and at all 
levels where there is co-operative effort. To solve this problem there must be a devising of the 
most effective sets of contracts that will govern the principal-agent relationship and also 
optimise the agent's interest vis-A-vis that of the principal, i. e. a balancing of interests. 
Most literature on the agency problem has concentrated on how best to structure contracts 
between principals and agents, and the optimal package of incentives for agents such that they 
will maximise the principal's interest. in focusing on how to obtain or determine an optimal 
contract between the principal and agent, agency theory attempts to answer the question: 
which is better (i) a behaviour-oriented contract that involves such issues as salaries and 
hierarchical governance or (ii) an outcomes-oriented contract which involves issues like 
rewards, commissions, stock options, transfer of property rights and market governance? 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In resolving the issue of an optimal contract for either or both parties, a 
behaviour-oriented contract is considered optimal when the agents' behaviour is observed, 
because in this case, it is the behaviour of the agent that is purchased. However, this depends 
on the availability of complete information about the agent which may not always be 
available, the principals' choices are either to purchase information about the agent's 
behaviour or to reward the agent for output achieved through incentives. Hence the optimal 
contract according to Hart (1995) is to achieve a balance between the incentives to maximise 
output and protect the agent from risks. 
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Though there have been various theories of the finn, just as there have been different types 
of firms, theories of the firm are based on different issues, economic theories, rationalization 
etc. In the theory of the classical capitalist firm, Alchian and Demsetz ( 1972) assert that the 
classical firm has a contractual structure that has: 
(a) joint input production, 
(b) input owners which may be numerous, 
(C) a single party that is common to all the contracts of the joint inputs, 
(d) a single party (same) who has the right to renegotiate any input's contract 
independently of contracts with other input owners, 
having or holding residual claim and 
(g) who has the right to sell his central contractual residual status. 
That central agent is referred to as the firm's owner and its management. By this definition 
of the firm, it is argued and believed that efficiency in the organisation is enhanced, 
particularly of team production, where shirking among owners of jointly used inputs are 
involved. The possibility of revisions of such contracts is also believed to be capable of 
enhancing economic efficiency, which adds to the wealth of the firm. 
Viewed as an economic organisation that requires monitoring, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
posit that there are two major demands placed on the firm in order to facilitate payment of 
rewards commensurate with productivity: these are metering input productivity and 
metering rewards, where metering refers to measurement or control of output. They argue 
that changes in market rewards should fall on those responsible for changes in input. 
However, should the economic organisation meter poorly, i. e. not properly match rewards 
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with productivity, productivity is likely to be lowered and vice versa. Similarly, when 
viewed as an economic organisation with a team in production, a firm usually has the 
problem of shirking. By team production, reference is made to cooperative productive 
activity where individual cooperating inputs yield identifiable, separate products which can 
be summed up as total output. 
However, in team production and with several input resources, the product does not equal 
the surnmation of the outputs of the individuals cooperating or their marginal products, i. e. 
their marginal productivity, as argued by (Alchian and Demsetz 1972 pp. 779-780). In order 
to measure marginal productivity in team production for an economic organisation, there 
must be a way of observing and detecting shirking which is at a cost to the firm or 
production team through a monitor. Management is generally regarded as the monitor. The 
monitor is however also expected to be monitored because as an agent of the principal, 
managerial behaviour will not always maximise the wealth of the firm because of self 
interest or the managers' desire to maximise their own utility. In order to reduce shirking in 
the monitor, the principal introduces a package of incentives, e. g. giving a title to the net 
earnings of the team, net of payments for other inputs (salary). Also, specialisation in 
monitoring in addition to the title to net earnings will reduce shirking of the monitor. 
Therefore Alchian and Dernsetz argue that managing or examining the way that inputs are 
used in team production is a method of metering the marginal productivity of individual 
inputs to the team's output. They conclude that the right to be a residual claimant, to observe 
input behaviour, to be the central party common to all contract inputs, to alter the 
composition of the membership of the production team and to sell these rights defines the 
ownership of the classical or free-enterprise or capitalist firm. 
98 
Critical to the shareholder perspective is the nature and definition of firms, which considers 
corporate governance structures as a complex collection of contracts, which are outcomes of 
voluntary negotiations and bargaining for exchange of goods and services and at a cost. The 
principal-agent or finance model sees corporate governance issues as the anticipation and 
evaluation of agency costs. It believes that when ownership and control are separated, 
managers will deviate from maximising shareholders' value or the wealth of the firm. 
However, such separation will not cause inefficiency because the markets for capital, 
managerial labour and corporate control provide effective restraints on managerial 
behaviour (Keasey et al., 1997). 
It is also believed that the sale of equity by owners brings gains which in addition to the 
benefits of specialisation (professionalism) of managers, outweighs the cost of separation of 
ownership control from control or agency cost, hence ownership and control should not be 
separated. 
This perspective also believes that given the managerial labour market, executive stock 
options as incentives for increased output and the resultant reduction of divergent principal- 
agent interest, coupled with the market for corporate control through the capital markets, 
takeovers and the right of shareholders to vote on takeovers, there is significant and 
adequate restraint on managerial behaviour. Manne (1965) argues that mergers, as one of the 
three forms of gaining corporate control (the others are proxy flights and direct purchase of 
shares), favour management and small non-controlling shareholders and has the advantage 
of reducing wasteful bankruptcy proceedings and creates more efficient management of 
corporations. It also increases mobility of capital and enables efficient allocation of 
resources. He asserts further that only takeovers provide some assurance of competitive 
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efficiency among corporate managers thereby affording strong protection for the interests of 
a vast numbers of small and non-controlling shareholders. The shareholder perspective sees 
takeovers as a vital tool in the refonnation of corporate governance and that together with 
other market forces rather than the use of legislation, the problems of corporate governance 
will be resolved. 
The Market Model 
The market model forms part of the shareholder perspective of corporate governance, and 
similar to agency theory, believes in serving the shareholders' interest. However, the 
market model does not favour 'free riding' and short-termism. According to Blair (1995), 
the Anglo-American model is flawed in that there is undue emphasis on short-termism 
(short term stock market share prices, short term corporate expenditure and profit, short 
term return on investment). This is said to be fuelled by financial market pressures of fund 
managers, investment managers, and short term gains by the industry; all of which tend to 
work against the maximization of the wealth of shareholders in the long term. 
In his study of corporate governance in five countries, Charkham (1994) observed that 
there is high tension in the Anglo-American system of corporate governance which 
constitutes a weakness brought about by unsatisfactory information. He also observed that 
both boards and shareholders do not exert the required influence and control over 
management performance nor are the boards sufficiently answerable to shareholders such 
that firms' medium and long-term outlook is poor. On the other hand, the corporate 
governance structure in continental Europe and Japan has less tension being characterised 
by network. According to Charkham, though management in Anglo-American firms claims 
to behave such that the firm's wealth is maximised on a long-term basis, market pressures 
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tend to force them towards sbort-termism. He also concludes that this tendency puts them 
at a disadvantage when compared with other regions and particularly with respect to 
industries characterised by long-term gestation. 
Underlining the market model is the belief that markets, of which institutional entities are 
important and integral parts, play roles which force or compel agents or managers to 
continuously behave in manners that maximise shareholders' wealth. Other market forces 
recognised are the managerial labour market, the capital market, product market and the 
market for corporate control. 
in addition, the market model argues that maximisation of shareholders' wealth is not the 
same thing as maximised share prices in the capital market because the capital market itself 
is unduly centred on short term performance which tends to undervalue both capital 
expenditure and research & development (R&D) in order to attain stock market price 
appreciation in the short term. This argument is further reinforced by Blair (1995) who sees 
the very basis for measurement (of performance by management) as largely short term in 
outlook because they are based on quarterly results. Similarly, she argues that institutional 
fund managers cannot keep proper track of companies' performance in details other than by 
relying on the summarised quarterly, half-yearly results provided by management. Their 
judgement is therefore poor in outlook and scope. Thus share prices may result from poor 
assessment of the companies which can cause significant changes in the market value 
without corresponding significant change in the fundamentals of the company. 
With regard to the necessary corporate governance reforms required, the model argues that 
both principals and their agents should share the longer term performance vision (by 
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locking institutional investors into long-termism through the restriction of the take-over 
process and the voting rights of short term shareholders thereby maximising their mutual 
interests. 
6.2 The Stakeholder Perspective 
The stakeholder perspective regards the basic objective of corporate governance as 
&managerial freedom with accountability,. This requires giving executive management the 
freedom to manage and develop the firm's business on a longer-term basis and at the same 
time hold them responsible and accountable for all stakeholders having to do with the 
business. 
This perspective rejects the shareholder perspective of the principal-agent model, 
disagreeing that managers are agents to shareholders; rather it claims that managers are like 
trustees and in this regard, they differ from agents in two vital respects: 
(a) That as trustees, they are to sustain the company's assets which are not limited to 
shareholders' equity but include the skills of company employees, the reasonable 
expectations of input owners, like customers and suppliers, with whom there are contracts, 
and the firm's reputation within the community. That is, the focus of managers should be in 
serving the broader interest of the firm and not only the maximisation of the financial 
interest of shareholders. 
(b) That as trustees, managers should balance the conflicting interest of all stakeholders and 
those of present and future stakeholders rather than just the interests of present 
shareholders. 
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It is believed that when managers are regarded as trustees, there will be a shift from short- 
termism to long-termism in the management of firms. It is noted by the stakeholder 
perspective that the shareholder theory which defines corporate governance as a set of 
relationships between principals and their agents does not realistically describe the real life 
governance structure and processes and that, rather than adapt reality to the model, their 
model should be adapted to accept the reality. 
An example of such a description of the flaws in the shareholder theory is to liken the 
model to an authoritarian government in which the governing elite appoints its favoured 
members and on its own terms. Take-over attempts are viewed as rebellious, just like 
management rebuffs corporate take-overs by claiming to act in shareholders' interests in an 
attempt to defend their positions. Those who support the stakeholder perspective 
recommend statutory changes in corporate governance. For example, they propose changes 
to the situation whereby the shareholders alone are involved in taking major decisions, the 
publication of fuller information about corporate affairs and the fiduciary functions of non- 
executive directors. These are the major areas of reform, proposed for the shareholder 
perspective. 
The proponents of the stakeholder perspective believe that the abuse of executive power is 
related to the on-going problem of excessive pay and remuneration for executives. At the 
centre of the stakeholder model of corporate governance is the purpose and objectives of 
firms. That is, rather than the maximisation of shareholders' wealth, which is considered 
parochial, the interest of customers, staff and suppliers whose involvement with the firm 
are on a long term basis such that they have a 'stake in its long term success', should also 
be taken into account. 
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The stakeholder perspective in corporate governance, as initiated by Freeman (1984), 
defines a stakeholder as 'any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the firm's objectives. ' He argued that the terminology 'stakeholder' 
generalises the groups as against shareholders only to whom management is responsible. 
Freeman listed shareholders, customers, employees, suppliers, creditors and management 
as primary stakeholders, who are critical for the survival and success of the firm; and the 
secondary stakeholders as the media, the local community, the regulatory authorities of 
government, the judiciary and society at large. Blair (1995) argued for a rethink of the 
basics of corporate governance and included amongst stakeholders, employees and 
customers who contribute specialised skills and investments. She argued further that rather 
than just being physical assets meant to serve the interest of shareholders alone, firms are 
institutional arrangements set up to govern relationships among these stakeholders, and that 
firms are set up in order to maximise stakeholders' value. She believes that because 
employees are more eager and willing to exercise the rights and take responsibility as 
owners (which shareholders and institutional investors are unwilling to do), they qualify to 
become owners with equity shares that miffor the extent of their wealth creating 
contributions. 
In their contribution, Letza and Smallman (1998) query the appropriateness of the Anglo- 
American (unitary board structure) corporate governance structure, that is, shareholder 
theory. In their study of the privatisation of Yorkshire Water p1c, they argue that the U. K. 
accountancy profession's strong emphasis on shareholder value, and their failure to 
acknowledge the importance of wider stakeholder groups, mirrors the political paradigm 
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that prevailed in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s. During those periods, the Accounting 
Standard Board's study suggested that shareholders as the providers of risk capital are the 
primary stakeholder group and all other stakeholder groups are secondary and subservient 
to the needs of the shareholders. Letza and Smallman argue that though financial profits are 
good and important, customers as part of the stakeholder group should be involved in 
governance. They emphasised that the unitary board structure of the UK water industry (an 
example of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance structure) had failed and should be 
replaced by the dual board structure that allows representation of other stakeholders on the 
supervisory board, as presently adopted by the BBC, Cadbury and John Lewis Partnership. 
The argument of Letza and Smallman presents the moral property of the behaviour of 
corporations and managers and prescribes moral or philosophical guidelines for 
corporations and those having supervisory functions over corporations. 
Apart from the normative aspect of the stakeholder theory which is concerned with the 
morality of firms by querying if the firm has corresponding and functional interest in all 
stakeholders (apart from shareholders), there are also the descriptive-empirical and 
instrumental aspects. The descriptive-empirical aspect explains the behaviours of firms or 
their managers in terms of cooperative and competitive interests. The instrumental aspect 
establishes the link between the practice of the stakeholder corporate governance model by 
firms and the attainment of profitability, stability and growth. With this aspect, it can be 
argued that the stakeholder theory is not in conflict with the shareholder principal-agent 
theory if ethical behaviour can be employed to maximise long-term profit maximisation for 
shareholders (Keasey et al, 1997). 
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Generally, the stakeholder perspective believes that firms practising their model of 
corporate governance often develop ethical relationships with employees, suppliers and 
customers; as such, with trust built up over time, the relationships become mutually 
beneficial as the costs of social interaction and association are reduced and investments 
become more profitable. 
Two major industrial nations which practice stakeholder theory are Germany and Japan 
and, given that they are successful industrially, give some credibility to the theory. In 
Germany, firms have social obligations to both their employees and the local communities 
other than shareholders' interests alone. For the Japanese, though profit is important, 
stakeholders are linked by a network of relationships called 'Keretsu' (Charkham 1994). 
Though not without its disadvantages, the practice of interlocking shareholdings, cross- 
directorships, long-termism, protection of the interests of the public, preservation of 
employment and the consideration of all stakeholders in decision-making has assisted the 
successes recorded by the firms who approach their corporate governance from the 
stakeholder perspective. 
In concluding, the above literature on historically prevailing shareholder and stakeholder 
perspectives of corporate governance, the key issues that characterise the theories in each 
of the two perspectives are as stated below. 
Shareholder Perspective 
1. Principal-Agent or Finance Model 
- Major Contributors: Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Manne, 1965 
Alchain -and Demsetz, 1972 
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Objective of the Finn: Maximisation of shareholders' wealth. 
Problem of Corporate Governance: Agency problem. 
- Background: Separation of ownership from control. 
- Assumptions: Assumes that agency problem is caused by self interest 
managerial behaviour. 
- Rejection: Any ex-post external interventions such as legal regulations. 
- Proposition: Efficiency of markets (capital, financial etc. ) 
- Solutions: Strengthening of incentives to synchronise managerial behaviours 
with principal interest, introduction of monitoring, voluntary code. 
2. Myopic Market model 
Major contributors: Charkharn, 1994 
Purpose of the firm: Maximisation of shareholders' wealth. 
Problem of Corporate Governance: exercising short-termism, caused by 
ineffective market forces. 
Background: The rise of corporate takeovers. 
Assumption: Dis-functional markets 
Rejection: Market Governance. 
Proposition: Emphasis on long termism 
Solution: Increased involvement of shareholders, increased shareholder loyalty 
and restricting shareholder ease of exit and empowerment of long term investors. 
3 Executive Power Model 
- Purpose of Firm: Maximisation of the wealth of the firm as a whole (i. e. including 
management). 
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- Problem of corporate governance: Abuse of executive powers of management in 
serving own interests. 
- Background: Managerialism. 
- Assumption: Authoritarian governance as a requirement for performance. 
- Rejection: The principal-agent analysis. 
Proposition: Manager as trustees 
- Solutions: Statutory changes in governance. 
Stakeholder Persl2ective 
Major Contributors: Freeman, 1984; Blair, 1995 
Purpose of Firms: Maximisation of stakeholder wealth. 
Problems of Corporate governance: 
Sole involvement of shareholders 
- Failure to consider other stakeholders interest and lack of other 
stakeholders involvement. 
- Rejection: the Principal-Agent model. 
- Proposition: the social consideration in economy. 
- Solutions: development of trust based relationships, long-termism 
and firm stakeholders' cooperation. 
These perspectives and the models reviewed highlight different aspects of corporate 
governance. While the principal-agcnt model of the shareholder theory focuses on market 
governance, the perceived failure of market governance and internal monitoring partly 
explain the cause of corporate governance problems. Given the imperfection of the market 
place, the model is criticised as not being sufficient to solve these problems. The other 
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perspectives emphasise stakeholders' involvement in decision making, active shareholder 
voice and monitoring in the face of the conflicting roles of institutional shareholders and 
the ineffectiveness of corporate internal monitoring mechanisms. The various competing 
perspectives remain the basis of corporate governance with both exerting influences on 
corporate thinking and practices. 
All of the perspectives invariably indicate real life interaction among social entities though 
with varied perception of identifiable social entities whose relationship is not that entitative 
but interactive. They also provide relatively predictable outcomes with respect to corporate 
performance which are outcomes of the dynamic interaction of factor inputs, social 
interaction, negotiations and competing forces in the market place. Considering that the 
dynamism of corporate operations gives relatively predictable outcomes, such prediction is 
certainly not with full assurance. 
Emerging corporate governance perspectives are therefore required to involve multifaceted 
considerations, built on the enduring traditional perspectives such that agency problems or 
problems associated with management as trustees will be solved with positive resultant 
effects on corporate performance and the maximisation of stakeholders' wealth. 
6.3 Separation of ownership and control and corporate performance 
The modem theory of the firm represents the foundation on which rests every other notion, 
hypothesis and theory on the relationship between ownership, control and the economic or 
financial performance of firms, as provided by Berle and Means (1932). The bedrock of 
their characterisation of the modem corporation is that in the modem corporation, there is 
separation of ownership from control. This gave rise to abundant research and volumes of 
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literature on the effects and significance of ownership structure, control structure and how 
they impact on the financial and economic performance of firms. This theory however, 
contradicts the neo-classical theory of the firm, which regards the sole objective of the firm 
as profit maximisation and has no consideration for the behaviour of participants (owners 
and agents) in the firm. This neo-classical theory of the objective of the firm was presented 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), as preservation of value. 
The inability of the neo-classical theory to mirror the behavioural pattern of both principals 
and their agents assumes that their objectives and therefore their utility functions are 
common or similar. Given that human beings are naturally inclined to pursue their own 
objectives that maximise their individual interests, it is arguable that when ownership is 
diffused, control diminishes and managers may tend to pursue objectives that satisfy their 
own interest, and which are not necessarily profit maximization or preservation of value, 
and possibly detrimental to other shareholders (Short 1994). The divergence of interests 
however depends on the extent of separation of ownership and control. The resultant effect 
of this is an impact on corporate economic and financial performance. The separation of 
ownership from control (and its extent) therefore, creates or perpetuates the agency 
problem and managerial discretion. Monsen and Downs (1965) argue that the separation of 
ownership and control causes the motivation of owners to be different from that of 
managers m many cases. 
Ownership and Control of Management 
The term control is defined as the power to select and change management, and it is 
determined by the distribution of the firm's voting securities (Berle and Means, 1932). The 
nature of control of a firm is often latent, being not always actively exercised, though its 
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existence is enough to keep the behaviour of managers in check. In some cases, it is very 
active, e. g. the management and control structure ofjoint ventures in developing economies 
like Nigeria (Naiyeju, 2000). 
Typically a simple shareholding majority of 20% of voting stock is considered to be owner- 
controlled (Berle and Means, 1932). Moreover, wherever there is a representation on the 
board of directors or in the management for such owners, the control is regarded as active, 
whereas when single minority but block holding of between 5-20% exists and the rest of 
the stock is widely held, control is diffused and weakened. Such firms are management 
controlled. A more recent definition of control was provided by Fama and Jensen (1983) as 
the ability of a particular individual or group to effectively determine the decision making 
process in a firm. This does not necessarily imply involvement in the daily management 
process, but rather involvement in the fundamental decision making process including 
selection of managers and directors (Leech and Learhy, 1991). 
In the Nigerian oil industry, control by government as a majority shareholder includes 
involvement in the termination of managers in addition to their appointment in respect of 
the joint venture contract type. 
OwnershiR Structure and Performance 
For the purpose of empirical work, there is always some measure of difficulty associated 
with the above definition of control. The definition and distinction between owner 
controlled and management controlled firm's, based on shareholding or ownership 
structure, is more widespread and easier to employ. There have been departures from the 
equity based, dichotomous variable, based on percentage shareholding. For example, 
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McEachem (1975) classified owner-controlled firms into two groups, that is, making a 
distinction between outside owners that are not actively involved in management (as 
externally controlled firms) and owners who are managers (owner managed firms). 
Generally, there is no consensus on the level of ownership and control classification. This 
has affected the interpretation of research results on ownership and control separation and 
its impact on the firm (Short, 1994). The various authors on the subject of the separation of 
ownership and control and Corporate performance up to 1991 are summarised below. 
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in his contribution, Pound (1993) argues that the debate over corporate governance is 
no longer about hostile take-overs through which corporate control is achieved by 
purchasing voting rights. Rather he says, it is through the development of voting 
support from dispersed shareholders, who with their shareholdings though sometimes 
significant, but not large enough for control, could be rallied in order to aggregate 
controlling shareholding and influence or control the organisation over the long term. 
This approach he referred to as the 'political model of corporate governance'. The aim 
of large shareholding is therefore, achieved through such a political model, that is, 
pursuance of ideals and objectives that are central to those controlling voting rights. 
Apart from the divergence of opinion on ownership and control classification, as 
enumerated by Table 7, there is equally no consensus on the specificity of effect of 
ownership structure on firm value. We can start tracing literature with the 
'convergence of interest hypothesis', which predicts that an increase in firm value as 
managerial equity ownership increases as a result of the alleviation of the agency 
problem, when incentives to consume perquisites and expropriation of shareholders' 
wealth reduces with increased managerial equity (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Another is the hypothesis that large shareholding by non-management insiders 
enhances effective control (Demestz, 1986), as cited by Slovin and Sushka, (1993). 
Other views include the effectiveness of sufficient market control in inducing 
management to maximise shareholders' wealth through a reduction of the agency 
problem (even when low managerial ownership should have encouraged the agency 
problem). it is argued that market control mechanisms which can be in any of the 
following forms is sufficient enough a control: managerial labour markets, (Fama 
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1980), financial institutions, particularly the banks, (Stiglitz, 1986), capital markets, 
(Easterbrook, 1984), product market (Hart, 1983), and the market for corporate 
control (Jensen and Ruback, 1975). 
On the other hand, the 'managerial entrenchment model argues that increased insider 
ownership concentration permits managerial consumption of perquisites and 
entrenchment of incumbent management, which thereby reduces the probability of 
bidding by outside agents. This in turn reduces the value of the firm. (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Barclay and Holdemess 1989). Similarly, Stulz (1988), as cited by 
Slovin and Sushka (1993), found that firm value increases as managerial equity 
increases up to 50% and beyond this firm value starts to decline because it blocks 
take-overs or makes it more expensive. 
In their own contribution, Slovin and Sushka (1993) concluded that where there is a 
single individual large share holding, just as where there is no firm's openness to 
market for corporate control, the market frowns at such situations (firms) because 
there is no indication of an alignment of managerial and outside shareholders' 
interest. This is therefore regarded as having a negative impact on the value of the 
firm. Zingales (2000) is more circumspect in his appraisal of corporate finance theory 
and its foundation in the neo- classical theory of the firm. He suggested a review, and 
propounded the need for new foundations or new understanding of the firm, rather 
than being a nexus of contracts, which he believes is faulty, in that if it is so, then 
there should be no need for mergers as those merging companies could just easily 
write out contracts for themselves instead of merging. He concluded that stakeholders 
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(whose divergent interests may paralyse or destroy the firm after elaborating on the 
diffusion of corporate power amongst them), and the changing nature of the firm 
(from asset based to human based), that has diffused power, will force corporate 
governance to re-examine the allocation of de jure control rights when there are many 
sources of de facto control rights. All of these will no doubt affect the value of firms. 
Whereas some scholars have argued that there is no proof confirming any relationship 
between owner-controlled or management-controlled groups of firms and 
performance, Morck et al (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and others argue 
that such relationships exist. Monsen et al (1968) concluded in their study on the 
effects of the separation of ownership and control on performance of large firms, that 
owner-controlled firms provide better returns on original investment (up to 75% and 
more). This suggests a better managed capital structure and a more efficient allocation 
of resources than observed from management-controlled firms. This was corroborated 
by Leibenstein (1966). 
More recent studies highlight the significance of control exercised where ownership 
and control are separated. This is particularly so with large shareholders that is, those 
having single majority shareholding of more than 10% of stock or in more extreme 
cases 51% or more. Such large shareholders are said to be capable of addressing the 
agency problem because they have adequate control to have their interest respected 
(Shleifer and VishnY, 1996). Sheilfer and Vishny reported that such large 
shareholdings are relatively uncommon in the US due to legal restrictions (Roe, 1994), 
though equity ownership is not totally dispersed either. 
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A study by Holdernes and Sheerhan (1988 a, b), cited by Shleifer and Vishny (1996), 
reported cases with 51% single shareholders in US public firms. In their study, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1995) also reported an empirical survey of 456 of the Fortune 500 fu-ins for 
December 1980 in which the US companies recorded an average holding of 15.4% for the 
largest shareholder and 28.8% as total average holding of the largest five shareholders. 
The large shareholders are reported as essentially pension funds and other financial 
institutions (banks, insurance and investment companies). The dispersion of equity with 
minimal occurrence of large shareholders is the case in the UK study by Black and Coffee 
(1994), as cited by Shleifer and Vishny (1995). Large shareholders were noticed to be 
very rare, indicating that large shareholding occurred only minimally in the UK. 
This phenomenon of large shareholding is said to be prevalent in Germany, with 80% of 
large companies having more than 25% non-bank shareholders, as evidenced through the 
work of Gorton and Shmid (1996); and with the banks holding more than 25% equity in 
major companies as reported by Franks and Mayer (1994) and the OECD (1995). Both 
studies were cited by Shleifer and Vishny (1996). 
With all of these findings, large shareholders are viewed as playing active roles in 
corporate governance and in dictating decisions for the companies. With the foregoing, a 
key and fundamental issue is that large shareholders' interests may not always coincide 
with those of other investors and stakeholders in the firm. As a result of this, 
shareholders' expropriation (which is not necessarily efficient) may affect the 
performance of the firm. This thesis wishes to investigate this phenomenon with respect 
to Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and producing companies where the government has 
a large shareholding. 
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State ownership of firms is sometimes argued to be the best way to provide public 
services and this argument could be extended to state ownership of industrial firms too. 
Though the reality of state ownership is hardly consistent with this efficiency argument, 
as argued by Shliefer and Vishny (1996). A twist in this argument was also contributed by 
Letza (1998), in his findings on the factors that contributed to the failure of public 
services (water) in Yorkshire, in 1995. He attributed the problems to both the state and 
managerial failings in considering little of the interest of the minority stakeholders, like 
consumers, even as the public sector was then associated more with waste and 
inefficiency. Their actions, he posited could have resulted in drought. In this case, the 
bureaucrats, management and shareholders had extremely concentrated control rights. 
State ownership of firms also sometimes results in having to cater for special interests for 
political reasons. Such concerns are not therefore in the interest of other shareholders and 
may be different from profit maximisation (Berle and Means, 1932) and the preservation 
of value (Jensen and Meckling 1976). State ownership with large shareholdings is 
therefore a good example of concentrated control with possibly no profit maximisation 
and with inefficiency inherent, thereby affecting economic performance. The application 
of this to Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production is a key part of this research. 
in conclusion, and given these contrasting approaches and theories, it is difficult to 
generalise the actual impact of equity ownership concentration (and the inherent control 
implications for large share holding) and separation of control on the economic 
performance of firms. 
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This research seeks to contribute empirical evidence to the analysis of the behaviour of 
large shareholdings, particularly through state ownership of petroleum companies 
operating in Nigeria, and its impact on the economic performance of these companies. 
6.4 State owned oil companies (NOC) 
6.4.1 The Birth 
After the discovery of crude oil and the initial ownership by individuals between the two 
world wars, limited liability companies assumed ownership. According to Daniel (1998), 
chief among them was J. D Rockefeller's Standard Oil Corporation of New York and 
Exxon, USA. Others include Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum 
and Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles. These companies grew in size over time, such that 
their operating system was increasingly dependent on massive management structures and 
the ownership of subsidiary companies. 
State owned (or national) oil corporations emerged as a result of the Russian revolution 
when in 1917, the oil industry in Russia was nationalised. When in 1938 Mexico's 
PEMEX was formed, we witnessed the emergence of state owned national oil companies. 
Several others followed after the Second World War. Apart from the big multinationals 
like Exxon, Mobil etc. who were the driving machines (and have continued to be), the 
smaller oil companies called 'the independent' also emerged. In order to gain market 
share, (have access to the oil fields) they associated with various governments through 
different kinds of contractual agreements with the state owned national oil companies. 
Though predominant amongst OPEC member states, some countries in the west also have 
state owned oil companies e. g. Norway's Statoil, Canada's Petrocanada. The UK's 
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British National Oil Corporation (BNOC) was formed but existed for only nine years, 
1976-1985. 
6.4.2 Why State Owned or National Oil Companies? 
Over the years, particularly after the world wars and given the crucial role of BP/SHELL 
in the conquest of Nazi Germany and victory for the Allies, petroleum resources have 
become strategic for nations. 
Considerations centre on: 
* security of supply for military purposes 
* security of supply for commercial and domestic markets 
0 conservation of supply 
0 revenue generation 
0 health, safety and enviromnental considerations 
o development of indigenous technological know-how 
* using own personnel for the resources exploitation rather than foreign involvement. 
As a result of these and other reasons that might not have been stated or inferred from 
their mission statements, state owned or national oil companies exist world-wide both in 
developing countries and in the western world. See Appendix 3. 
Governments without State Owned Petroleum Companies 
Examples abound of countries with petroleum hydrocarbon resources of oil and gas and 
yet do not have national oil companies. The United States of America (USA) and United 
Kingdom (UK) are the best examples. 
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Despite the reasons mentioned as responsible for having state owned oil companies, it 
could be that direct exploration and production by these national companies may be more 
expensive and more financially risky. 
6.4.3 State Owned Oil Companies and Corporate Governance 
The nature of corporate governance in most state owned oil companies could be summed 
up as serving the sole interest of the various governments. The particular structure(s) is 
however dependent on the interests, concerns and local peculiarities of the country. 
Generally, according to Bentham and Smith (1989), most state-owned oil companies are 
created by government decree or statute; they are referred to as parastatals, sometimes 
exempt from certain taxation, and having a particular corporate structure. The choice of 
corporate structure is usually to create them as single corporate, legal entities that make 
any government action through them questionable. It therefore makes it impossible to 
challenge government directly. 
The companies are also formed as joint stock companies, a cornmon corporate structure 
in the petroleum industry worldwide, and for the reason that the government does not 
want to be seen as directly involved in exploitation. Another reason for state ownership is 
that it allows the government to keep an eye on the operations of the industry for security 
of supply and to ensure the acquisition of technical know-how by own nationals. 
Appointments to the Board of Directors, whose decisions are not final, but subject to the 
head of state or presidency is a common feature. The government control is thus found to 
be firmly in control through such powers. Some characteristics of state owned oil 
Companies are: 
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Power to vote or control expenditure and budgets resides with the Head of 
State or his appointee. 
Appropriation of profits is made by the corporations or its 
subsidiaries to the goverment. 
Non-public nature of its share structure, i. e. stock or share 
ownership structure does not allow the public to invest. 
The government or their agency reserves the right to confirm the appointment 
of auditors. 
All of the above characteristics allow govermnents; to exercise control over the operations 
of state owned oil companies, their subsidiaries and partnerships or companies where they 
have substantial equity holding. The impact of such large shareholding is at the heart of 
the corporate govemance aspect of this research. 
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CHAPTER 7 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter seeks to explain how the research was conducted. In particular, the chapter 
explains the research methods adopted, data sources, a description of the data, an 
explanation of the oil industry contract types, the analytical tools employed and the type 
of analysis conducted. It also presents excerpts from the interviews conducted for the 
qualitative part of the research and the statistical methodology. Similarly, this chapter sets 
out the research hypotheses proposition to be tested in chapter 8. 
it is not unusual for research methodology to become problematic, though the intention of 
methodology is to provide a systematic approach to the study and eliminate such 
problems. Research methods assist in conducting investigations into frontiers of 
knowledge, through surveys of people, surveys of records and procedures, literature 
survey or review, interviewing, examination of registers, observations of data, 
observations from experience (though this is subjective), data gathering and data analysis. 
From the above, it is obvious that research methods are now very diverse. The choice of 
which method(s) to use will depend on the particular study in question. Very often, the 
saturation surveying technique is employed, whereby extensive field interviewing is 
embarked upon because it is comprehensive and up-to-date. It is however not always the 
most suitable. Some research methods give rise to qualitative and/or quantitative data 
analysis, which in turn make inductive or deductive analysis pertinent. Generally, it is 
important to recognize which methodology will be appropriate for the research topic. 
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The research methodology intended for this study is anticipated to be capable of 
providing data analysis, which will be relevant to the title of investigation. In business, 
budgets are prepared from sales, other revenue sources, prices, recurrent costs, investment 
or project costs, taxes and other deductions. Projected performance is captured through 
gross margin analysis and cost and profit estimates. In the oil and gas industry, the 
appraisal of field development projects are based on reserve estimates, production 
volumes, tax rates, tax credits, capital or oil allowances, other fiscal incentives and 
operating and capital expenses. 
During the life of oil and gas fields, the fiscal taxation regimes that will prevail are 
dictated by the host country goverment policy and are not totally predictive throughout 
the life of the field. Hence, most research has tended to be probabilistic. This particular 
research intends to add to knowledge through a stochastic approach though with 
deterministic elements. The likely effect of fiscal taxation on profitability using financial 
regression modelling of Nigeria's oil and gas actual figures, as against projected figures 
which other researchers have concentrated upon, is a key part of this research analysis. 
The data will capture actual 1970 - 2002 total national production, royalty, cost, revenue 
and profit figures for all companies operating in the country. 
it needs to be mentioned that this approach is not commonly in use in the oil and gas 
exploration and production industry researches. This is largely due to the sensitivity of 
unit production cost and some other financial figures (such as tax revenue), and the 
extreme reluctance of both host governments and operating companies to make these 
actual figures public. This is particularly the case with the developing economies like 
Nigeria where financial transparency is poor. A study of this nature is desirable because 
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there has not been any other such research on Nigeria, based on actual figures. The 
beauty of this research is that it will likely trigger the comparison of the projected 
outcome at the outset of exploration, development and production, with the actual level of 
profitability in further research. 
At a recent World Bank forum, Johnston, (2002) stated that over-optimism in oil price 
estimates, estimating prospect sizes (i. e. reservoir volumes and therefore production 
volumes), estimates of success probability and cost and timing estimates are the key 
problems facing tax policy design and therefore do not allow correct determination of 
operating companies' profitability. This investigation may corroborate the above 
comments and add empirical evidence to available knowledge in this field. 
it is intended that the methodology will guard against trying to answer the wrong 
questions. That is, involving issues that are not part of the title of investigation; it will 
also avoid making suggested solutions or drawing inferences, just with the aim of fitting 
the available data, when they do not substantiate the result of analysis. 
The methodology adopted for this research, after the initial and extensive literature 
review of relevant academic work, on the different aspects of the title of investigation 
includes the following: 
i. Identification of relevant data 
ii. Identification of data sources 
Design of data collection processes 
iv. Data collection 
v. Data collation, analysis and reporting 
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vi. Proposition of hypotheses 
vii. Hypotheses/model testing 
viii. Conclusion 
For this part of the research, data analysis will be essentially quantitative, including 
descriptive statistics and statistical inferences. It is also intended to be evaluative, 
deductive as well as inductive. It is deductive in that there will be hypothesis formulation 
or propositions. Similarly, it will be inductive because of the qualitative aspect of the 
methodology, which will serve to stimulate or provide direction on the probable 
hypotheses to be proposed. That is, the interpretation of information deduced from the 
interviews will serve to induce hypothesis proposition. 
7.1 Identification of Data 
There are two main aspects to the study. These are: 
1. Separation of Ownership and Control, using an indicative measure such as contract 
types. 
2. Fiscal taxation as a form of government control. 
As earlier discussed in the literature review, the corporate governance aspect is intended 
to look at the structure, policy and framework of corporate governance - the separation of 
ownership and control in Nigeria's oil industry through the two main contract types, and 
its impact on the financial performance of the companies. The aspect on fiscal taxation 
(government control) looks at the fiscal policy framework of taxation, its evolution over 
time and how such regimes affect the economics of the oil and gas exploration and 
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producing companies, with particular reference to the taxation of oil and gas exploration 
and production. 
The Separation of OwnershiR and Control 
The kind of data expected to reveal the overall corporate governance structure, policy 
fi-amework, and therefore its practice will be too unwieldy for a single study. Therefore, 
the aspect that will be employed for the purposes of this research will be indicative of the 
corporate governance structure in the country's upstream petroleum sector. The particular 
area chosen is separation of ownership and control and how it affects economic 
performance, if at all. Data will also be sourced on the following issues: 
a. Equity ownership structure. This data will examine the share ownership and the 
structure of holdings, and it will help to determine the type of control in place in the 
companies. 
b. Companies' financial figures e. g. cost of production, revenue receipts by government 
from oil and gas sales. This data will include revenue, royalty, cost, taxes paid and 
profit levels. They will form the set of variables with which to deduce the economics 
of operating in Nigeria. 
Based on the relationship between corporate equity structure and control, it is apparent 
that control is expected to be vested in those who own larger proportions of a firm's 
equity. Hence, where the contract type chosen by the host government concentrates equity 
holding on a particular joint venture partner or the host country, control will be deemed to 
be vested in such a majority shareholder. A variable such as contract type can therefore be 
used as a proxy for the separation of ownership and control. The study therefore 
examined the economic performance of the oil companies under the contract types chosen 
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by the host government of Nigeria. While the joint venture represents a situation that 
gives the government a portion of the equity, the production sharing contract type make 
one hundred percent equity retention possible for the host government. Given that the 
government is not involved in the daily management of the oil companies, there is 
therefore a separation of ownership and control as the joint venture operator or the 
company/contractor (under a production sharing contract) is solely responsible for the 
management of the company. 
The selection of companies whose data will be employed for the purpose of this research 
is based on contract types under which the companies operate, and on the significance of 
the companies in the overall picture of the entire upstream sector of Nigeria's petroleum 
industry. In Nigeria, there is only one international company in production and operating 
the production sharing contract type. All others operating the production sharing contract 
type are still in the exploration stages. This therefore makes the data from this company 
significant for selection. This producing company will be selected as representative of the 
production sharing contract type. The remaining five international companies are 
operating under the joint venture contract type, and two will be selected as representative 
of the joint venture contract type. These two produce about 60% of Nigeria's annual total 
oil production. All three selected companies are together responsible for about 65% of 
Nigeria's annual total oil production. Though desirable to have figures for other 
companies, the sensitivity of such data has prevented the sourcing of such data. However, 
figures from these three companies, which jointly represent more than half of the 
country's production, and with one of the companies being the largest producer, make the 
data set representative of the industry. 
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Fiscal Taxation 
The definition and scope of fiscal taxation as a form of government control with respect 
to this study, refers to the linking of economic performance with the tax structure, i. e. the 
cost and profitability level of the companies vis-A-vis the tax and royalty rates, both of 
which represent 'Government Take'. 'Cost per barrel' and 'gross margin' are used as the 
key dependent variables for measuring this level of economic performance. 
Data Sources and Data Acquisition 
The required data related to the above is essentially from secondary sources. Secondary 
sources refer to available data in literature, journals, publications and company annual 
reports on any of the areas of interest in measuring the level and structure of ownership 
and control in the companies and country. The impact of fiscal taxation on the 
companies' economic performance will also be assessed using similar secondary data. 
7.2 Data Analysis and Reporting 
This will involve data processing, tabulations, descriptive statistics, interpretation and 
discussion of results. Where data is deficient, there may be a need for estimation. The 
analysis seeks to identify any determinants representing the separation of ownership and 
control and fiscal taxation and upon which the variables (i. e. economic performance 
variables/indicators) depend. The major software for data collation, storage, retrieval and 
reporting is Microsoft Word and EXCEL, while data presentation will employ graphical 
displays of data, tables and other presentation methods including PowerPoint software. 
The econometrics software EViews is also used in the estimation. Data analysis will be 
predicated on both descriptive statistics and regression analysis. 
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7.3 Interviews Conducted In Nigeria on Oil and Gas Fiscal Taxation Policy 
Formulation in Nigeria 
in the proposed methodology, it is important to include a qualitative aspect that provides 
additional information on the background of the Nigerian oil industry, and assist in the 
building of relevant hypotheses. For the purpose of sourcing such information, interviews 
were conducted. Three interviewees were chosen based on their knowledge of and 
involvement in the development and Nigeria's oil and gas fiscal policies. Their 
experiences span the entire history of the industry in Nigeria. While two of them have 
recently retired from service, one of the interviewees (Alli, O. R. ) has about twenty two 
years experience in the management of oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria. 
He is the current Manager, Planning at National Petroleum Investment Management 
Services (NAPIMS), the oil and gas investment management arm of the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). He was promoted General Manager in June 
2004. Adetunji, S. A was chosen as an interviewee because of his involvement with the 
Ministry of Petroleum Resources, where he was at one time the Director of the 
Department of Petroleum Resources. His entire thirty two years career was spent in the 
petroleum industry. He retired as the Group General Manager of NAPIMS in 2002. 
Oladele, O. A. R was chosen as an interviewee because of his experience and global 
knowledge of the industry, having worked with ExxonMobil in the US. For about twenty 
eight years, he worked in various management positions of NNPC, including the Group 
General manager of NAPIMS, and retired in 2001 as Group Executive Director of NNPC. 
out of the five officers intended for interviewing, the three people mentioned above were 
eventually interviewed as they were considered to be most knowledgeable and 
experienced. The other two, though knowledgeable but occupying lower management, 
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they do not have as much industry experience as those interviewed. Eventually they could 
not be interviewed because they were unwilling to grant interviews without official 
consent from the government. When the government's consent was not forthcoming, they 
declined to be interviewed. Though one of those interviewed is still a serving officer, he 
accepted to be interviewed while we awaited the government's consent. It is however 
satisfying that the three interviewees are widely known to be highly knowledgeable and 
to possess vast experiences about the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The interviews were 
arranged through telephone calls and all of them willingly participated. The main 
purposes of the interviews are to provide information on the factors that guided the 
formulation of Nigeria's fiscal policy at various times in the past forty years, and the 
suitability of the policies for the economic performance of the international oil companies 
operating in Nigeria. The interviews were semi structured, and intended to compensate 
for inadequate available literature on the Nigerian oil industry. The interviews were 
conducted at the interviewees' offices in Nigeria, and were all recorded on three mini- 
cassettes. A transcription of the interview recordings are as presented below. 
Factors Influencing the DeveloRment of Oil and Gas Fiscal Policy in Ni&eria 
Interview with Engineer OR Alli (Plarming Manager. Nigerian National Petroleum 
ColRoration (N-NPC-NAPIIMS) held g "La os Nigeria. Al2ril 1.6 2003. 
Q. Before the influence of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
and before independence in 1960, what factors accounted for Nigeria's fiscal policy? 
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A. There was no clear-cut policy then, neither was the policy dynamic in that revenue 
generation was the key factor upon which the policies were based. Britain was 
instrumental to such policy formulation, in that given the presence of British international 
oil companies (IOC) e. g. SHELL, their contributions were not totally in Nigeria's best 
interest. Since 1960, we have been building our fiscal regime and with experience it's 
more dynamic every time it's revised. 
What was OPEC's influence on the fiscal policy formulation? 
A. It was to encourage member states to take more interest in the monitoring of the 
operations of the international oil companies. This is what led to additional equity being 
acquired in ELF and Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) by the government in 1973 
and 1975. 
Why was the initial petroleum profit tax law operated for long before its provisions 
were changed? 
A. Operators do have influence on the policy formulation but Nigerians are the ones 
responsible for changes in the fiscal regime, it was left unchanged until the country saw 
the need for amendments. 
Q. Why were the production sharing contract (PSC) terms very generous initially? 
A. They were generous because government did not want to spend money on very risky 
exploration and production. It is normal to have a more relaxed regime at the outset and it 
is not restricted to PSC only but also noticeable in the initial stages of the joint venture 
(JV). 
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Q. What led to the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)? 
A. It was brought about when the international oil companies refused to lift oil because 
the prices given them by producer governments were higher than the market price. This 
led to the MOU, which was to help Nigeria increase exploration and production, and help 
Nigeria to lift her equity of the production that could not be lifted by the country on her 
OVM. 
What do you think of the North Sea Model? 
A. It is okay for a country with few oil fields, but may be too cumbersome accounting- 
wise e. g. for companies having thousands of fields operated by a single company, we do 
not have the capacity for that yet in Nigeria. It does not allow marginal fields to survive. 
in Nigeria we have consolidated taxation and not field by field taxation (as is the case in 
the North Sea), which is what is keeping the operators to keep operating the small fields. 
The field taxation in the North Sea however generates more government revenue. On 
royalty removal, the UK still makes companies pay other taxes despite the removal of 
royalty. In Nigeria, royalty serves the purpose of revenue generation for the states and 
petroleum profit tax to the federal government. 
Q. In retrospect should Nigeria have used PSC and not JV given the cash call problems 
associated with the joint venture contract type? 
A. Even in PSC, you still have to pay for the cost of operation, though not immediately, 
but you pay later and sometimes with interest. And you may not get profit but only 
royalty and petroleum profit tax e. g. in the case of Ashland, the government did not get 
anything for a very long time. Furthermore, I do not agree with the replacement of joint 
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venture by production sharing contract because we get between $2.0 and $2.7 per bbl. as 
profit margin from government equity oil, in addition to petroleum profit tax and royalty. 
Doesn't cash call delay exploitation? 
A. With this regime this is being addressed, to reduce cash call arrears from $600 million 
in 1999 which is today only $100 million (2001). The genesis of cash call arrears is 
deliberate budget overrun by the operators. The government had always paid up to the 
approved budget limit. To forestall budget overrun, government now insists on taking a 
first charge on next year's budget, with the over run. Cash call paid by international oil 
companies is from their oil share revenue. This is what government is also now trying to 
adopt i. e. separate the cash call (seed money) from the oil proceeds. That way, there will 
no longer be cash call problems. 
Q. Looking back would you have done things differently? 
A. Yes. I would have advocated stricter budget discipline and canvassed for more 
international investment to reduce government financial commitment, particularly by 
employing PSC for the risky frontiers and later converting the concession to JV up to an 
earlier agreed limit and level of production. I would also prefer lease buy back. 
Q. How would you advise a new entrant to the oil business? 
A. Take the example of Agbarni field, before exploration, Famfa sold 40% to Texaco and 
when huge reserves were found by Texaco Nigeria Ltd., we can now buy into it (40%) 
V when commercial reserves was found as previously agreed, leaving Famfa with 2(Y o. This 
is a good fiscal policy that the government should embrace to reduce its cash commitment 
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to a single industry and be able to spread its financial resources to other sectors of the 
economy. 
Q. Should Nigeria have gone into gas exploration and production much earlier? 
A. Nigeria should have started gas exploitation sooner. Gas operation boosts the 
economy. However its exploitation depends on the industrial developmental level of the 
country. Without much local consumption, gas exploitation is difficult. At the same time 
its exploitation provides additional revenue that can accelerate the economic development. 
So, it is Re the case of the chicken and the egg, which one comes first. Penalty for gas 
flaring did not stop flaring, though the monetization of gas led to more exploitation and 
less flaring. 
Q Which of the fiscal taxation systems do you prefer? 
A. The policy depends on the objective of the country. For some countries revenue from 
oil/gas is a substantial part of the gross national product, and for some it is not. This is a 
critical factor in the choice and adoption of fiscal taxation policy for oil and gas 
exploration and production. 
Q. Why has Nigeria retained its state owned (national) oil company, the Nigerian national 
petroleum corporation (NNPQ despite the scmpping of national oil companies by other 
counties? 
A. NNPC ensures the management of government's investment for profit 
maximization, e. g. to ensure true value added as may be claimed by the oil companies, 
which are not as truthful with their stated cost of operation as may be expected. They are 
known to overstate the expenses, which require the continued existence of NNPC- 
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NAPIMS to scrutinize. The political reasons for keeping NNPC, is not dispensable, 
however its benefit is to salvage the cost of production. 
Q. Despite the political instability associated with Nigeria by the international community, 
petroleum operations seem to be largely uninterrupted. What do you think is responsible 
for this? Would you say it has to do with generous fiscal taxation policies? 
A. The reasons include the realization by the international oil companies of the need to 
keep off partisan politics. Secondly, the oil companies are assured of government's 
commitment to the industry and thirdly, the government keeps to its obligations or 
contract terms. 
Q. Should production sharing contract replace the current joint ventures? 
A. No, given that those ventures have gone beyond the risky exploration part that requires 
international risk sharing and investment. 
Q. How did you find yourself in the oil industry? 
A. it was influenced by the country's oil boom of the early 1970s. 
Q. Do you agree that Nigeria lacks the capacity to supervise the activities of the various 
operators in the upstream industry? 
A. Maybe in the previous years, say ten years ago. Not any longer are we handicapped to 
supervise the operators. Most of our staff are trained in the universities both locally and 
foreign. A lot too has been done by the operators, to train our staff through the joint 
venture training programs. For example, Shell and NAOC have schools for retraining 
Nigerian graduate engineers and geo-scientists joining their companies. 
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Q. Has fiscal policy been used to address the improvement of local technical know how? 
A. A 2.5% tax on the oil companies' assessable profit (education tax) has been imposed 
to assist petroleum development through the Nigerian Petroleum Development Fund. This 
is a form of fiscal policy to address the issue. 
Would you agree that the international oil companies have exploited Nigeria's low 
capacity or industry knowledge earlier on, in denying the country some of the economic 
rent due it? 
A. In Nigeria, both the capital expense and operating expense now are about 50% each. 
The capital expense is properly monitored given the World Bank type of procedures in 
place. These include: 
- Open contract advertisements, 
- Technical proposals, 
- Open technical bidding for technical pre-qualification, 
- Price bidding, 
- Selection of the lowest, since technical competence is already assured before the 
bidding. 
For the operating expense, it is slightly more difficult to monitor the operators since it is 
more of internal transactions for the operators. What is done is to audit the costs 
afterwards. With additional staffing the problems will be reduced. 
What is your opinion about the desirability for fiscal policy changes to address the 
problems of leakages in oil revenue, whereby not all the revenue accrues to government, 
given accusations of mismanagement of funds by government officials? 
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A. Today, good. The internal controls are very much in place. This kind of money can 
only come from crude oil sales. Today, every sale is now notified to the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) and the management is not by NNPC but by CBN. Once money is paid 
into this account, NNPC is allowed to withdraw the associated cash call while the balance 
is left for the CBN to manage on behalf of the Nigerian government. 
Q. To what extent has the policy of payment of royalty in kind affected the revenue 
generation? 
A. There is no payment of royalty in kind in Nigeria. 
Q. Currently there is an audit on NNPC account since 1999. Is this on going or ad hoc? 
A. It is a yearly audit, and since 1999, the account is audited and there is more 
transparency since 1999. 
Q. Has there being any change in fiscal policy to increase the local participation in the 
industry? 
A. Not much has been done so far in this respect. There is no legislation in this regard. 
With respect to the marginal fields, the untapped fields have been taken from the 
international oil companies. Their request for performance bonds is to ensure that 
indigenous operators comply with pollution prevention operations such that default 
resulting in pollution, will be taken care of by such perforrnance bonds. 
Q. What fiscal policy measure will ensure increased local capitalization in the industry? 
A. No policy has been formulated, though the government expects the development of 
alliances between local and foreign banks in order to source for international finance. 
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Q. Do you think government should have scrapped the signature bonus for the indigenous 
operators? 
A. Yes and no. Given the purpose of ensuring seriousness among potential lease holders, 
there is need to retain signature bonus. 
Why is Nigeria still borrowing so much despite its huge natural resources? 
A improper allocation of funds is a key factor, contract inflation is another reason. 
Why has Nigeria not had an oil stabilization fund? 
A. This has not been possible due to general poor funds management. 
To what extent has frequent changes in goverment affected the industry with respect 
to investors' confidence? 
A. For truly genuine investors who deal directly with government according to the rule, 
they always have their contracts retained by succeeding governments. 
Q. Tax administration seems to have suffered from poor sta ing, poor staff remunerations, ff 
poorly qualified staff, etc. To what extent has this affected the fiscal policy formulation in 
Nigeria? 
A. It is true the tax administration sector is not properly staffed and this allows the 
international oil companies to take advantage of them. They do not even receive a 
fraction of what tax accountants get in the international Oil companies. E. g. the total 
remuneration of the chairman of Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) is nowhere near 
that of a middle level tax accountant with the international oil companies, who has spent 
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18 years in the industry and earns N600,000 (0000) per month after tax while his 
counterpart of similar years of qualification earns about N60,000 (000) at most. Such a 
situation allows for corruption and creates a situation of leakages in goverment revenue. 
Interview With: 
Engineer S. A-Adetunii (Retired Grout) General Manager. NNPC-NAPIMS) held at Lagos. 
Nigeria on ARr 118.2003. 
Which arm of government was initially responsible for the management of the 
petroleum industry in Nigeria? 
A. Ministry of Finance, Inland Revenue and Ministry of Petroleum Resources were the 
three ministries running the various aspects of the upstream fiscal policies at the 
beginning of the petroleum industry in Nigeria. The royalty aspect was run by Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources, Ministry of Finance was running the Exchange Control and 
Banking Regulation, and so there was no central focus. Hence fiscal policy incentives 
were not centrally coordinated. E. g. the Ministry of Finance wanted the old Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) which modified the petroleum profit tax to be formalized, while 
the Ministry of Petroleum Resources said it was an interim arrangement. 
Q. How did the UK influence the early years of Nigeria's fiscal system? 
A. By the time the industry started, or came on-strearn fully, Nigeria was already a 
republic. The traditional industry operator in Nigeria then SHELL, started as a monopoly. 
Shell's position was however eroded with the influx of the American international oil 
companies into the country. The fiscal arrangement started with borrowing, and the 
policies of OPEC countries influenced the fiscal policy more. Nigeria joined OPEC in 
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1971 and most of the policies were fully implemented. Prior to that the international oil 
companies dictated to the government what they wanted in terms of dictation of price and 
conditions of investment. Since then, crude oil prices, investment parameters etc. were 
formulated and other fiscal policies were managed by government in terms of price, 
capital allowance and investment parameters. 
Did Nigeria have a better fiscal policy, more favourable to the country, before the 
capital was brought in? 
A. The international oil companies came in to maximize their investment but were caught 
up with the OPEC revolution when the producing countries decided to assume control of 
their resource. 
Why was the PPT then left for so long before it was changed for the first time since 
1959? 
A. Though not changed, the oil price was high enough for adequate revenue generation. 
Q. in 1973, Ashland Ltd. signed a production sharing contract despite the existing joint 
ventures whose operations were considered okay. Why was this and why was the 
production sharing contract terms so generous? 
A. At that time production sharing contract was novel and was an attraction for us as a 
non-financial involving option for exploration, so the country was gullible to the investors 
asking. 
Why then was the MOU signed with guaranteed margin to the joint ventures if the 
production sharing contract was attractive? 
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A. At that time, there was oil glut and there was a need to stimulate exploration not only 
on margin but also on reserve addition bonus for new discoveries and for certain levels of 
exploration investment capital. 
Q. Would you then have preferred PSC to JV if you could recall the past and reformulate 
Nigeria's fiscal policy considering that there are no cash calls? 
A. Yes, in that we would not have had any fmancial commitment. Nigeria generated so 
much revenue due to the OPEC revolution. Unfortunately it was not properly allocated, in 
that government did not see why it should not be involved in this critical sector of its 
economy, hence the continuation of joint venture rather than allowing the investors to 
commit their funds to exploration through production sharing contract. 
Q. Why has Nigeria not paid enough attention to gas? Could it be because there was 
enough revenue being generated from oil? 
A. Yes. Precisely, that is why. Though a liquefied natural gas plant was planned in the 
1960s to be established together with SHELL, unfortunately, about that time, the North 
Sea gas was discovered and it dampened the interest. 
The British national oil company (BNOC) has been scrapped. Why is NNpC still in 
existence? 
A. The British can afford to scrap BNOC given that they have other companies that can 
represent their oil interests while all that Nigeria has is the NNPC. Without NNPC all the 
country can have is fiscal revenue without actual involvement in commercial activities in 
the oil industry and its spill over effect on the entire economy. It is proper to retain NNPC 
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as an upstream sector while the downstream sector is scrapped, now that the technology is 
more commonplace with a lot of Nigerians involved. 
Q. Should Nigeria change to production sharing contract totally? 
A. I would have preferred that, but for our limitation in scrutinizing and ascertaining costs, 
given that the PSC operators are totally on their own in terms of management. Also, there 
is the problem of doing away with petroleum products price subsidy because the 
allocation of crude for local refining at prices lower than open market price will have to 
stop. Another problem with PSC is that the government's intention to attract foreign 
investors into the refining sector will be difficult, since you cannot force the producer to 
sell locally to the refiner. This however is a key attraction for the refiner in that they will 
not have to construct terminals for crude receipts. The operators will rather take the crude 
to meet their external commitments than leave it for local refiners even when the refiner 
wants to pay international prices. The issue of reduction of their investment capital is 
therefore the only other likely attraction for them to set up refineries in Nigeria. There is 
no certainty they will be attracted. It is only through the goveniment's share of joint 
venture crude that such guarantee of crude supply can be possible. As government cannot 
sell crude to the foreign refiners at subsidized price as it does to NNPC refineries, there is 
therefore a need to commence selling crude to NNPC at international prices, which is 
why fuel price increases are inevitable in Nigeria. 
Has the predominance of the IOC over technology affected the fiscal policy 
formulation? 
A. Yes. The low activity in fiscal regime planning by Nigeria has been hindered by low 
technological know-how compared to the IOC. 
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Q. To what extent has this technological disadvantage affected the level of supervision of 
the international oil companies by Nigerian officials? 
A. Truly this has affected the supervision. There is also a manpower shortage and poor 
data availability, which in effect hampers policy formulation. This shortcoming is more 
aggravated by rapid labour turnover of trained and experienced personnel and would have 
somehow led to ineffective revenue collection for the government. 
How educationally capable is the country to formulate the right fiscal policy for the 
industry? 
A. There is availability of right educational background but not enough of personnel. 
Q. Are Nigerian Universities doing enough in terms of developing the industry? 
A. They are trying their best given the circumstances, though the industry is not 
cooperating fully as the international oil companies still want to conduct all of their 
research in their home countries. Nigeria has no national petroleum policy and that is 
dangerous. There is no policy on exploitation of this non-renewable resource. e. g. there is 
no national reserve of petroleum resource such tha4 for example, not all proved reserves 
are made available for bidding and immediate production in order not to hastily exhaust 
the available resources of the country. 
Q. 'How has the non-availability of national petroleum policy affected Nigeria's fiscal 
policy formulation? 
A. The availability of such a policy would have allowed the proper coordination of the 
formulation and supervision of the fiscal policies. Though the difference in the geological 
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formations and conditions affect policies, yet there would have been better coordination if 
we had a national petroleum policy. The terms of lease life, exploration period and lease 
sizes etc. would have been better formulated. 
Q. How has the IOC contributed to the industry's development? 
A. They claim that since government takes 85% of profit as tax, then it should be 
responsible for infrastructural provision, therefore they are not interested in any other 
significant contribution socially. 
Q. What kind of fiscal policy would you recommend if you were just starting as a 
producing country today? 
A. Instead of policies meant for revenue generation mainly it should be such a policy that 
will favour backward integration e. g. setting up a refinery as production attains a given 
level. 
Q. How would you think fiscal policy is responsible for revenue loss due to accounted 
crude production or sales? 
A. Payment of royalty in form of crude oil is a leakage in revenue when the right price is 
not used to compute such value of oil. It creates a distortion in the revenue profile. 
How would you rate the internal control in NNPC? 
A. Today things have changed compared to previous years. There is more openness than 
before during the military regimes. 
The issue of resource control will necessitate f1scal Policy reformulation. What is your 
opini '. ) 
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A. This should not be allowed because there will be no end to agitation for resource 
control in the country? 
is there continuity in lease ownership in Nigeria? 
A. There is continuity. 
Why has there been stability in the industry despite political instability? 
A. Because government cannot afford to breach international agreements, even the 
military governments do respect them. 
Has Nigeria been ascertaining national sovereignty in the industry? 
A. To a good extent yes, though the country is hindered by low capacity for supervision. 
Is the country's petroleum potential fully met? 
A. It is increasingly being met. Once the current attention being given to gas utilization 
and commercialization is sustained, then it will be fully met. 
Q. How would you upgrade the current gas fiscal policy? 
A. Gas commercialization is capital intensive hence its utilization is driven by availability 
of funds. The policy is driven by incentives to attract capital inflow into the country and 
industry. 
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Q. What do you think of the current level of revenue being generated? 
A. The machinery for petroleum profit tax administration is poor and inefficient, e. g. the 
ability to independently determine income is poor. Government must deliberately train 
and equip FIRS staff to carry out its functions. There is a need for structured training 
prograrmnes. 
Is the policy for enviromnental protection sufficient? 
A. No and there is room for improvement. 
How long were you in the oil industry? 
A. A total of 32 years. I was party to most of these policies. 
Interview With: 
Engineer O-A-R Oladele Retired Group Executive Director. NNPC-NAPIMS) held at 
Lagos Nigeria on ARril 18.2003. 
Q. What exactly are the factors that influenced Nigeria's fiscal policy formulation in the 
earlier years? 
A. The theory of Resource Exhaustion Pricing is no doubt a key factor in the formulation 
of fiscal policy for Nigeria, which in effect is the foundation of maximum revenue 
generation. Nigeria's PPT is one of the most regressive in the world and the idea is get as 
much as possible from the prevailing prices of oil and gas. This is not unusual with most 
developing producing countries. This was not the case before independence but with 
independence there were adjustments that ensured maximum revenue generation. 
Have the fiscal policies been favourable to operating companies? 
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A. The idea is not really whether they are favourable or not, the idea is to ensure equitable 
share of profit. In practice, what the operators feel they are not making in terms of profit, 
they try to gain through inflated cost of operation. 
Q. Ashland's PSC could be said to be generous, why? 
A. Even if it appears as generous, it was meant to attract the first PSC to the country, 
more so, since there are no guarantees of success. Thereafter, the new PSC were not as 
generous. The deep-water PSC of 1993, had signature bonuses because the risk of 
exploration was not as high compared with Ashland's, and when compared with the 
Brazilian deep water production sharing contract, it had progressive production 
cushioning terms to ensure that the producers recovered their investment, and thereby 
also making the contract attractive. 
Q. How has the formation of OPEC affected Nigeria's fiscal policy? 
A. OPEC actually had an impact on every member state in making adjustments to their 
existing fiscal policy and this led to increased involvement of the host member countries 
in the oil industry. 
Q. Would you suggest a withdrawal of Nigeria from OPEC membership? 
A. Given that oil is now becoming a commodity, whereby there is adequate supply now 
as compared to earlier thinking that it is short. Unfortunately OPEC is yet to come to 
terms with this realization. The UK, Norway and Russia are not member states of OPEC, 
for instance, and are doing fine. For a country like Nigeria with more emphasis on deep 
offshore exploration, the result is high cost oil produced with investment borrowings. 
with such a situation, why would the country constrain its production with an OPEC 
production quota? With the likely production of Iraqi oil after the resolution of the 
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conflict beyond Iraq's current OPEC quota, the price of oil may slump. Furthermore, with 
increasing reduction in Nigeria's low cost oil from production disruptions as a result of 
communal clashes and agitations from producing communities for resource control, it 
may be in the long term interest of the country to withdraw from OPEC. 
Q. How should the government review the existing fiscal policy on the deep offshore? 
A. This is already in existence. If the royalty is abolished, then sovereignty is relinquished. 
However, there will be a need to have a comprehensive fiscal policy that is not counter- 
productive, but sufficiently dynamic to address each operator's need. There is the 
Petroleum Profit Tax Act, the MOU, regulations, production-sharing contract decrees for 
deep-water; amended tax regimes for marginal production sharing contract fields, some 
independent producers do not have a fiscal system that addresses their peculiar situation. 
The gas fiscal system, AGFA. R (Associated Gas Fiscal Incentive) is considered by the 
World Bank as over-generous. Though it was meant to attract more investment into gas, it 
should be formulated such that there is a balance and not a creation of disincentive for the 
competing fuel, that is, crude oil. A more comprehensive Petroleum Profit Tax Act is 
important such that, (a) the stage in the life of the field, (b) adaptation to changing 
international situation, (c) cost measurement and monitoring for exploration or 
development drilling, e. g if it's a dry hole etc., are considered. 
Q. Why was the PPTA not amended for 17 years and why did the government acquire 
additional equity in Elf Petroleum and Agip in 1973? 
A. In 1959, Shell was the only operator in the country and this was changed to remove the 
monopoly. In 1971-73, the Nigerian national oil company (NNOC) was established and 
the staff started acquiring the expertise with which to recover lost revenue based on the 
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existing policy. In addition to this is the influence of OPEC. Between 1973 and 1986, 
there was another review which removed the official selling price and replaced it with the 
offset selling price to ensure adequate profitability for the operators. That is a response to 
the market situation that changed the tax base from a high level to a more realistic level. 
The current situation whereby the MOU is renewed every five years is not ideal. The 
maintenance of the status quo whereby the operators are retaining the large acreages 
should change because with competition, other operators can be brought in. It's a case of 
a changing world. Today some of the big players in the industry are no more, e. g. 
Anadarko, Ocean Energy, BHP, and Lasmo etc. There is a rather unfortunate permanence 
that seems to have been guaranteed for the operators in Nigeria. With respect to operator 
monitoring capacity, the FIRS cannot effectively oversee the operators, to the extent that 
a company like Shell will refuse to provide its data and FIRS cannot independently 
ascertain it nor thoroughly supervise and determine taxable profit of the operators. For 
example, this is one of the reasons why the value for money audit by the government has 
not succeeded. Some examples of unscrupulous cost items are home office overheads for 
procurement, two to three companies maintaining different portions of same pipeline. 
There is therefore the need to restructure the joint operating agreement as part of the 
fiscal policy, particularly the issues of procurement. 
Supervisory capacity is also low in terms of the number of personnel required, and the 
competence in the knowledge and formulation of fiscal policy for the oil industry. 
The incentive, facilities, education and knowledge of concept of the fiscal system of the 
oil industry is lacking and needs to be upgraded. 
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Q. In the UK, the BNOC has been scrapped, but the NNPC is still retained, why? 
A. NNPC can exist but in a modified form. With about 57 % (1.4 million barrels per day) 
of total production (2.0 million barrels per day) to the government and with 450,000 
barrels of that for local refining, when the country's low cost oil from inland production is 
further reduced, there will be dependence on high cost oil from offshore production. This 
will result in an inability to feed the local refineries owned by government. It is only the 
likes of BP, a proper exploration and production company owned by the government that 
should be retained for ensuring security of supply for the country. 
Q. Should there be a change from JV to PSC? 
A. I think the country should adopt the PSC Going by the model in Ecuador, the 
government retained the right to acquire equity after the operator has discovered oil 
without any financial commitment in the risky exploration stage. This is a form of PSC 
that Nigeria should adopt too. 
The fiscal policy should be influenced not only by income generation, but by other factors 
like, not committing fund to exploration stages in production sharing contract fields, and 
having the right to buy into the business at a given production level, having a strong 
taxation and tax supervisory system for revenue generation, value addition in-country 
(competence transfer, internalization of asset generation base, production capacity of 
asset within the country), internal security in order to move the economy forward. These 
should be the factors influencing the country's fiscal policy. 
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Q. What model would you prefer for Nigeria? 
A. Ecuador's model in terms of cost monitoring and technology transfer, combined with 
the Norwegian model in terms of local input terms and a tax rate that maximizes revenue, 
would be the ideal fiscal policy model for Nigeria. 
What are the new policies in the industry? 
A. The government is now placing all the new fields under production sharing contract. 
Q. Why has there been stability in the industry despite political instability? 
A. The stability is not total as perceived. The operators face a lot of problems with the 
producing communities. They are forced to pay compensations to local cornmunities in 
order to remain in production. 
Q. What fiscal policy change would you wish to see in order to address the problem of 
inadequate supervisory capacity in the industry? 
A. Companies can be forced by legislation to undertake personnel exchange; the Nigerian 
University system should be reviewed in terms of facilities and curriculum to assist the 
human capital development for the industry. There is a developing relationship between 
Robert Gordon University and Petroleum Institute, Warri, Nigeria. Local development is 
the best way to go and it is possible to employ fiscal policy to stimulate this. 
What is your opinion of the internal control in NNPC? 
A. With the periodicity of audit exercises and financial reporting currently in place now, 
though at the insistence of the World Bank in its Memorandum of Economic and 
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Financial Policies regarding contract award, the system has improved. Similarly, there is 
compliance with the open system of contract award since the last couple of years. 
Q. What is your opinion about the policy of paying royalty in kind? 
A. This is not to my knowledge. If it is existing, then it is not likely to constitute a leakage 
as you said, since it will only involve the production sharing contract operations and it 
will only be paid to the government. Leakages in oil revenue are not a fiscal policy issue, 
rather a poor supervisory control problem. What is likely is that operators delay payments 
(within the provisions of the regulations) in order to use the government's money through 
delayed payment of royalty or taxes, other than this, it will be difficult to cheat on 
payment. 
Q. With the approval of marginal fields for indigenous operators, what has been the 
driving factors for the fiscal policies formulated, e. g. what do you think of the request for 
the newly licensed operator to pay large sums to the previous lease holders? 
A. The likely problem is that of human capital not adequately developed. It may be waste 
allocating fields to indigenes as operators. Management skills and technological ability is 
very important. 
Q. Shouldn't the policies for local operators be more favourable? 
A. It is reasonable for the former owners to request for guarantees. Even when the 
government provides guarantees, is there any guarantee that the local companies have the 
competence to perform? 
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Why has Nigeria never had a petroleum stabilization fund? 
A. The constitution does not allow it, as it allows the distribution of all revenue that 
accrues to the government. A change of the constitution through the willingness of the 
country will ensure this. 
Q. What is your opinion of oil revenue accounting, do you think the country is being 
cheated by the international oil companies? 
A. The fact is that worldwide, the international oil companies are not known to flout laws. 
The key issue still borders on poor capacity to supervise and control their operations by 
the government. 
Q. is there a tilt in Nigeria towards a prudential governance of the petroleum industry, 
whereby we have fiscal policies that ensure a 'win-win' situation for both parties? 
A. Why is Nigeria still borrowing so much from the IMF? It's a question of indiscipline, 
which tends to portray us as not having the best deals. 
Why do we have operators' licenses revoked by succeeding governments? 
A. The government has always maintained its commitment to the licensee, and there has 
been no international oil company whose license was revoked in the history of the 
country. It has only happened to a few indigenous companies and for specific reasons, 
while the government is being conscious of not sending the wrong signals to the 
intemational community. 
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7.4 Hypotheses Development 
The interviews conducted provide vital information which induced some of the 
hypotheses. The three officers interviewed are some of the highest and most 
knowledgeable about Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production industry. Among 
the three, there is a total of over seventy five years experience, most of which has been 
spent in various management positions, as government officers responsible for policy 
formulation and the supervision of the oil companies. The interviews provide information 
on historical and conceptual perspectives responsible for fiscal policy formulation by 
various governments in Nigeria. Additionally, the interviews fill noticeable gaps in the 
initial literature available on Nigeria's oil industry. Information deduced from the 
interviews was useful in the formulation of the hypotheses. 
in the forty-five years history of Nigeria's petroleum industry, fiscal taxation policy has 
been driven more by the desire to maximise petroleum tax revenue. While the policies 
also attempt to take into consideration the level of apportionment of economic returns to 
the operating companies, the extent to which both of these objectives are achieved forms 
part of this research investigation, and it is expected to assist in the drawing of 
conclusions from the data analysis. 
Similarly, the policy fi-amework operated by the (OPEC) and its relevance to Nigeria's 
economic situation is of relevance, particularly as it is sometimes thought that the 
organisation's aims are no longer relevant in terms of current world economic conditions. 
At inception, OPEC operated a market share policy until 1975 when at $40 per barrel of 
crude oil, a price considered too high, the industrialised countries made deliberate 
attempts to increase local production, and encouraged non-OPEC member producers to 
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increase production in order to force a drop in crude oil price. This move not only forced 
down prices, but OPEC's share of production also fell. (See Table 12). Thereafter, 
OPEC's policies have been driven by price. The organisation attempts to maintain a price 
range of between $18 and $25 per barrel of crude oil. This policy is predicated on 
controlled production volumes which are allocated to individual member states. This 
quota based production policy is being regarded as counteracting free market conditions. 
Also, the capacity of Nigerian government officials to effectively supervise the operating 
companies, and therefore optimize their economic returns with respect to government's 
economic interest, through control of the companies' activities was suggested by the 
interviewees to be lacking, particularly when experienced staffs are retired early or the 
supervisory agencies are short staffed. The inability to adequately exercise such control 
was also possibly a reason for company based fiscal taxation rather than field based tax 
system operated in the United Kingdom. 
7.5 Proposition of Hypotheses/Model Correction 
The above interview excerpts, and in addition my experience in the Nigerian oil industry, 
having worked with ExxonMobil for ten years and Petroconsult Energy company for ten 
years, assisted in the formulation of the research hypotheses. The three hypotheses to be 
tested are: 
Hypothesis 1: Contract Type (CT) is a significant determinant of economic performance 
for oil and gas exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria. 
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Hypothesis 2: The Production Sharing Contract type (PSC) in comparison to the Joint 
Venture (JV) contract type does not optimize the economic performance of oil and gas 
exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria. 
Hypothesis H3: Fiscal taxation has a negative influence on Nigeria's oil and gas operating 
companies' economic performance. 
To test these hypotheses, models of the impact of the separation of ownership and control 
and fiscal taxation as determinants (or not) of economic performance of oil and gas 
producing companies in Nigeria is proposed and estimated. The regression output is 
tested for autocorrelation, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity, using statistical test 
measurements. Corrections to the estimates are made, where necessary. 
The conclusions of this research are derived from the summary of analysis, hypotheses 
and models proposed. They highlight the relationship between the economic performance 
of oil and gas exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria and the 
separation of ownership and control and fiscal taxation. 
7.6 Statistical Methodology 
Some of the key data required for analysis in measuring fiscal taxation as a likely 
determinant of economic performance have to do with financial returns to the companies. 
My research data were therefore financial in outlook and captured the entire country data 
for the upstream sector. 
The specific type of data that were therefore employed for analysis included: 
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1. Production Volumes - These refer to Nigeria's annual production volumes of oil as 
produced by all the oil companies operating in the country as published by the BPAmoco 
2003 Energy Statistical Review. 
2. Oil Prices - These refer to the annual average spot market prices of crude oil as 
published by the BPAmoco 2003 Energy Statistical Review. 
3. Royalty Rates - These refer to the charge on oil produced at well head levied on entire 
production volumes. The rates depend on whether production is onshore or offshore. 
4. Tax Rates - These refer to the rates of taxation on chargeable profit for different years. 
5. Cost Profile - This refers to the computed expenses, as a surnmation of capital and 
operating expenses incurred during exploration and production by all the companies. The 
computation was based on one of the major producers' financial data, as a true 
representation for all other producers in the country. 
6. Revenue - This is computed as income from crude oil sales based on production 
volumes and the spot market annual average prices. It assumes that one hundred percent 
of production is sold. 
7. Taxes Paid - These refer to petroleum profit tax chargeable on the profit income of the 
producing companies. 
8. Profit Before Tax - This refers to total revenue less cost and royalty before tax. 
9. Profit After Tax - This refers to revenue less cost, royalty and chargeable tax. 
DeRen ent, Variables 
The key dependent variables for the financial regression modelling are: 
a. Unit Cost of Production - this refers to the cost of producing one barrel of crude 
oil based on the total cost and total production volume per year. 
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b. Gross Margin - this refers to the ratio of profit margin before tax to revenue and 
expressed in percentages. 
independent Variables 
The key independent variables are 'government take' (tax and royalty), production 
volume and contract type. Government take refers to the summation of the revenue that 
accrues to the host government. In the case of Nigeria and for the purposes of this 
research, it is defined as the summation of royalty and petroleum profit tax. Contract type 
refers to the particular set of terms and conditions chosen by the host government as the 
option preferred to govern the license issued to the oil companies in respect of the 
exploration and production of the oil and gas in the licensed fields. 
Ownership Structure 
The equity structure of Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and producing companies in the 
last ten to fifteen years, depending on available data, was examined to ascertain any 
relevance. In Nigeria's exploration and producing sector, none of the directors or 
employees has any shareholding. The management is representative of the major 
corporate shareholders while no Nigerian employee has any shares in the host country's 
block-shares. Hence, the control classification is purely dominant majority shareholding 
by the Nigerian government with an average of 57 % in all the Joint Venture exploration 
and producing companies. Some of the foreign executives in management or on the Board 
of Directors may own shares in the international parent company, but their proportion in 
the Nigerian entity in terms of equity will be too insignificant for analytical 
considerations. 
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Table 8 gives an example of equity shareholding in two of Nigeria' Joint Venture 
companies See Appendix 4 for detailed equity holding. 
Table 8: SwnRle of Changes in Percentage Eguity Holding in Nigeria's Oil ComRanies 
cgmm % Sharehold 
Host Countrv 
(HC) 
1971 1979-02 
Joint Venture 
ELF 
ENI (AGIP) 
Opm-tor OV) 
1971 1979-02 
35 60 65 40 
33 60 67 40 
In the joint ventures, equity share holding by government enables the government to have 
a participating interest in such companies. A majority shareholding enables representation 
on the board of directors and therefore control. Hence, with the joint venture contract type, 
the government is able to participate by exerting direct influence on the management of 
the companies. In the examples of the two companies in Table 8, government percentage 
share of equity increased from 35% in 1971 to 60% in 1979-2002 for ELF Petroleum 
Company and from 33% in 1971 to 60% in 1979-2002 for ENI (AGIP) Petroleum 
Company. 
All Nigerian JV petroleum companies are state controlled through large and majority 
block share holding while management is left with another block (but minority) 
shareholding. In addition to the possibility of control due to majority shareholding, 
control by governrnent is achieved mainly through committees, such as the Technical 
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Committee (TECOM) and the Joint Operating Committee (OPCOM), to which JV 
operators are responsible and the chairmanship of which is held by NNPC as the senior 
partner on behalf of the government. 
Saml2le Selection 
In the first part of the empirical study concerned with the effect of the separation of 
ownership and control on performance, the sample of firms is limited to the oil and gas 
exploration and producing sector of the petroleum industry. In all, there are seven such 
companies operating in the country, which together produce 98% of Nigeria's total 
annual oil and gas production. The remaining 2% is produced by the government-owned 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDQ and a few indigenous companies. 
As shown in Table 9, of these companies, only one operates a PSC while the others 
operate a JV contract. 
Table 9. International Oil Comvanies Overating in Nigeria* 
CgMany % Eguily % of Total Contract TyRe 
Goverment Int'l. Coy, Production 
Shell 55 45 45 Joint Venture 
ExxonMobil 60 40 14 Joint Venture 
Chevron 60 40 12 Joint Venture 
Texaco 60 40 4 Joint Venture 
TotalFinaElf 60 40 11 Join Venture 
ENI (Agip) 60 40 10 Joint Venture 
Addax 100 0 2 Production Sharing 
Others" 0 100 2 
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** Including Pan Ocean Oil, NPDC and the indigenous companies. 
* Source: Nigerian Oil and Gas Vol. 10 No. I 
In the Nigerian oil industry, there is no competition amongst the international oil 
companies once they have been awarded the oil prospecting licence. The only 
competition is in the bidding stages for the award of the licences. As a result of Nigeria's 
membership of OPEC, there is a production quota beyond which the country cannot 
produce. This quota is in turn shared to the oil companies by the government through the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC). This situation does not allow production 
by the companies up to their full productive capacity, and gives no room for any form of 
competition. 
Complete data were available for just three of the seven companies over the period of 
1988-2002. The period 1988-2002 was chosen as an adequate time interval that captures 
the period of time the company operating a PSC has been in operation. The key objective 
of the statistical analysis is to determine any relationship between government equity 
ownership in each type of contract and the economic performance of companies. 
The key independent variable identified as likely to affect control is Contract Type, 
signifying the level of the government's equity ownership. The effect of this variable on 
the dependent variables is then analyzed using F and West techniques to reveal the 
significance of the relationship. 
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in testing the economic performance, the companies' data on the following are employed. 
Production cost per barrel 
- Gross Profit: Sales (Gross Margin) 
These performance variables were evaluated and presented for the two contract types. 
For analysis, the effects of the measure of control (contract type) on each of the 
performance variables were isolated, on the assumption that other factors remained 
unchangecl, therefore observing the classic 'ceteris paribus' assumption. 
In the second part of the empirical study concerned with the effect of the fiscal taxation 
on performance, aggregate data for the period 1970-2002 were used. Regression analysis 
of the effect of taxes payable/paid by the companies on the level of cost per barrel of oil 
produced is conducted. 
The above highlights that this is a quantitative and analytical method of research, with the 
research interviews conducted representing the qualitative aspect. As much as possible, 
the outcome of the research will be devoid of personal opinions. In essence, it is intended 
as a statistical analysis of economic/financial data, which is referred to as econometrics. 
Unlike the strictly qualitative method that depends mainly on interviews or social 
experiments, the effects of variables (consequent on policies) are inferred from statistical 
analysis of observed outcomes, that is, dependent variables whose values are explained by 
variations in the policy generating independent variables. 
The inclusion of a random error term in the algebraic econometric model is to reflect the 
influences on the dependent variable that are not observable through this research. That 
is, there could be some other independent variables influencing the behaviour of the 
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dependent variable, not captured by this research, nor explained by this model. In the 
econometric analysis, multiple regression analysis is employed, with a view to obtaining 
estimates of the parameters of the 'best fit' or regression equation, which will be a 
geometric representation of the regression model. 
The disadvantage of an econometric analysis is that it assumes that the same geneml 
equation can be used to describe different socio-economic relationships, which may not 
be necessarily true. Also, the behaviour of independent variables may change over time 
and be affected differently by other economic conditions, such that their effects on the 
dependent variable(s) are no longer along the same pattern. Hence, the reality of the 
relationships we are trying to establish using econometric models are always changing. 
Similarly, the methods used to acquire data may affect the behavioural relationship 
between variables. 
in econometrics, problems may be introduced when some significant variables are either 
omitted or are un-measurable, e. g. the measurement of internal political interest or 
attitudes such as tribalism or geo-politics. Such attitudes or variables are not satisfactorily 
quantifiable, and it is such factors that make the research model stochastic, rather than 
deterministic. 
With the above constraints, this analysis, like all financial econometric models cannot be 
hundred percent definitive but provide a structural identification and explanation Of what 
the explanatory or independent variables are. 
The problem of the incidence of simultaneous causation was addressed using appropriate 
econometric tools. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we conduct two empirical studies. In the first, we aim to investigate the 
effect of the separation of ownership and control (as proxied by the contract type) on the 
economic performance of oil and gas exploration and producing companies in Nigeria (as 
proxied by cost per barrel and the gross margin). In the second study, we attempt to 
analyse the effect of the fiscal taxation (as proxied by government take as a proportion of 
the oil and gas companies' total revenue) on economic performance (proxied by cost per 
barrel). In both cases multiple regression analysis is used. The results of the empirical 
studies form the basis of the conclusions presented and discussed in chapter 9. 
8.1 Separation of ownership and control 
The data analysed in this section were obtained from secondary sources, particularly as 
published by the Nigerian Federal Inland Revenue Service, the BP Annual Statistical 
Energy Review, the US Department of Energy and the individual oil companies. In 
addition to investigating the influences of the separation of ownership and control, these 
data were also analysed with a view to investigating economies of scale, and the 
production and cost behaviour of the companies concerned. Regression analysis was 
employed to model the relationship between economic performance and selected 
independent variables. 
Secondary data on three oil and gas exploration and producing companies, tagged 
companies A, B and C, were collected for fifteen years of production (except for 
company A where only fourteen years of data were available). The companies represent 
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two major contract types in the global petroleum industry, and the two types of contract in 
Nigeria. The contract types are: 
i. Joint Venture (JV) 
ii. Production Sharing Contract (PSC) 
8.1.1 Data Set and Software 
For each company, the data set comprises yearly production volume in millions of barrels, 
the average annual price of crude oil in US dollars per barrel (S/Bbl), operating and 
capital expenditure (in millions of dollars). Companies B and C represent large and small 
sized producers operating under a JV contract type in Nigeria. Company A is the only 
company operating under a PSC and already in production in Nigeria. Five IOC and 
twenty two indigenous companies with PSC licences are not yet in production but are in 
various stages of exploration. 
Due to the sensitivity of this type of data, confidentiality will be maintained; hence 
specific names of the companies cannot appear in this research thesis. This research data 
and analysis are contained in tables and Excel files and surnmarised in Appendix 8. The 
data analysis was performed using both Excel and EViews. 
8.1.2 Analysis 
The objective of the corporate governance portion of the research is to investigate the 
relevance of the separation of ownership and control as a determinant of the economic 
performance of oil and gas exploration and producing companies in Nigeria. The analysis, 
therefore, is centred on the link between financial performance, the volume of production 
(PROD) and the contract type (CT), where financial performance is measured, first, by 
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the unit cost of production (COST) and second, by the gross margin per barrel (GMPB). 
The data set used in the analysis is shown in Table 10 with a set of summary descriptive 
statistics in Table 11. 
In order to reduce the impact of inflation, interest and foreign exchange rates on the costs, 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflators were introduced over the fifteen year period. 
Given that 85-90% of all capital costs were not only denominated in US dollars, but also 
sourced from the USA, the US GDP deflator year-on-year was employed and computed 
based on World Bank base data (1993). The extent of the dollar input was also recognised 
after discussions with the company officials (see Appendix 9). 
8.1.3 Descriptive Statistics 
For this empirical study, Table II shows summary statistics for the three companies 
investigated over the fifteen year period (1988-2002). In examining this table, it is 
noteworthy to remember that company A is the only oil and gas exploration and 
producing company operating a PSC in Nigeria. Companies B and C represent two levels 
of production in Nigeria under the JV contract type. 
Four main variables are considered in this analysis, namely COST (the unit cost of oil 
production) and GMPB (the gross margin per barrel) as the dependent variables, PROD 
(oil production volume) and CT (contract type) as the main independent variables. 
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TablelO: Data Set for CoManies A. B and C Used in the Regression Analysis 
Log 
COST PROD GMPB COST Log PROD Log GMPB CT 
8.6 7320 4.12 0.94 3.86 0.61 1 
10.2 7398 8.34 1.01 3.87 0.92 1 
13.8 7410 6.37 1.14 3.87 0.80 1 
12.0 7425 6.82 1.08 3.87 0.83 1 
12.6 7576 -1.47 1.10 3.88 0.00 1 
14.8 4015 -2.08 1.17 3.60 0.00 1 
11.9 4163 -3.13 1.07 3.62 0.00 1 
12.4 3901 -4.38 1.09 3.59 0.00 1 
15.8 3652 -5.03 1.20 3.56 0.00 1 
13.1 3597 -8.55 1.12 3.56 0.00 1 
13.8 4458 -1.20 1.14 3.65 0.00 1 
21.3 5584 5.96 1.33 3.75 0.78 1 
17.9 B859 16.52 1.25 3.95 1.22 1 
17.6 11501 17.83 1.25 4.06 1.25 1 
3.8 43643 0.00 0.58 4.64 0.00 0 
3.8 44530 9.34 0.58 4.65 0.97 0 
4.0 45625 9.16 0.60 4.66 0.96 0 
4.2 46902 11.73 0.63 4,67 1.07 0 
4.4 47450 16.19 0.65 4.68 1.21 0 
4.8 49092 13.00 0.68 4.69 1.11 0 
5.0 48180 11.98 0.70 4.68 1.08 0 
5.5 48910 10.45 0.74 4.69 1.02 0 
5.9 49640 8.59 0.77 4.70 0.93 0 
6.3 50233 9.10 0.80 4.70 0.96 0 
6.7 48494 12.11 0.83 4.69 1.08 0 
8.1 48333 8.43 0.91 4.68 0.93 0 
6.8 57037 1.62 0.83 4.76 0.21 0 
5.2 59719 5.98 0.71 4.78 0.78 0 
3.6 49441 16.92 0.55 4.69 1.23 0 
6.0 2985 19.34 0.78 3.47 1.29 0 
6.0 3197 7.16 0.78 3.50 0.85 0 
6.1 3386 10.00 0.79 3.53 1.00 0 
7.1 3152 14.73 0.85 3.50 1.17 0 
8.0 3059 10.45 0.90 3.49 1.02 0 
8.3 3187 9.18 0.92 3.50 0.96 0 
8.2 3464 6.97 0.92 3.54 0.84 0 
8.2 3766 5.98 0.91 3.58 0.78 0 
8.2 4094 6.89 0.91 3.61 0.84 0 
7.5 4837 10.34 0.88 3.68 1.01 0 
6.9 3155 7.70 0.84 3.50 0.89 0 
9.4 3807 2.39 0.97 3.58 0.38 0 
5.8 2956 5.80 0.76 3.47 0.76 0 
7.4 2893 16.63 0.87 3.46 1.22 0 
15.2 1724 12.55 1.18 3.24 1.10 0 
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Table 11: SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE STATIST 
Cost/Unit 
Production Volume Production 
(MBbi) (PROD) ($/Bbl) (COST) 
Company A B C AB 
Mean 5941 49149 3311 14 5.2 
Median 5581 48494 3189 13.4 5 
Std. Deviation 2510 4222 681 3.3 1.3 
Minimum 2255 43643 1724 8.6 3.6 
Maximum 11501 59719 4837 21.6 8.1 
Sample 
Size (Yrs. ) 14 15 15 14 15 
i. PROD (Production Volume) 
Gross 
Margin 
Q A a 9. 
7.9 31 56 43 
7.5 29 62 47 
2.3 8.6 15 13 
5.8 15 13 18 
15.1 44 70 62 
15 14 15 15 
From the descriptive statistics, company Bs average production for the fifteen years 
examined was eight times more than that recorded for company A: 49,148,676 Bbl 
(company B) compared to 5,940,903 BbI (company A). Company C had the lowest 
production average of 3,310,789 Bbl. The standard deviations for the three companies' 
production are 2,509,520 BbI (company A), 4,222,026 BbI (company B) and 680,894 BbI 
(company C), which for company A may appear excessive given the standard deviation of 
company B with eight times its production and company C with 79% of its production. 
The high standard deviation indicates a high degree of variation in the production data 
over the fourteen-year period. 
COS '_LUnit Cost of Productionj 
Company A recorded the highest mean cost at $14/ Bbl compared to averages of $5.2/Bbl 
and $7.9/Bbl for companies B and C respectively. Company A also recorded a much 
higher standard deviation of $3.30/Bbl than those of companies B ($1.3/Bbi) and C 
($2.3/Bbl). For all the companies, operations are from onshore and offshore. Also, the 
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quality of crude oil produced by all the companies is the same. The lowest cost for 
company A ($8.6/Bbl) is higher than the highest cost for company B ($8.1 /Bbl) and about 
50% more than the lowest cost for company C ($5.8/Bbi) whose production volume is 
79% that of company A. 
iii. GMPB (Gross Margin Per Barrel in Percentages) 
Company A recorded the lowest average minimum and maximum gross margin per barrel 
while company B recorded the highest. The standard deviations of the companies' gross 
margins per barrel are 8.6%, 15% and 13% for each of companies A, B and C 
respectively. 
iv. Inferences from Descrintive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics suggest a number of conclusions, among which are: 
a. Company B is the largest producer and has the lowest unit cost of production. 
This suggests that there may be economies of scale in the industry. 
b. Company A has a higher production volume than company C, but recorded a 
higher unit cost and lower gross margin than company C. This may suggest a less 
efficient management in company A than in company C. 
c. For the three companies examined, cost-production functions are shown in 
Figures 1-3 and clearly do not conform to the shape of a typical long-run average 
cost curve (see Hardwick et al, 1999, p. 175), as represented in Figure 4. This 
suggests the occurrence of diseconomies of scale, particularly for companies A 
and C. For company B, costs started to fall only after achieving 59.7 million Bbl. 
Cost continued to rise before and after 50 million Bbl. 
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Company A: Cost-Volume Curve (1998-2002) 
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Figure 4: Long Run Average Cost (LRAC) Curve 
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8.1.4 Regression Modelling, Assessment and AnalN, sis I 
Essentially, this research is more about establishing whether a relationship exists among 
variables that describe econornic performance and a variable that describes the separation 
of ownership and control, that is, the type of, or an indication of the type of management 
control in place. Therefore, it will seek to establish if a relationship exists between the 
unit cost of production and the gross margin (variables for measuring economic 
performance) and the contract type. As discussed above, the contract type indicates the 
extent of separation of ownership and control within the two types of organisation -- JV 
and PSC. The contract type also indicates the kind of management disposition to othcr 
shareholders and the organisation. 
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Regression Modelling 
In order to examine if these relationships exist, numerous and different mathematical 
models could be proposed. However, I will use a standard probabilistic model. Though 
this piece of research is not primarily intended for prediction of the dependent variable 
per se, it could still serve forecasting purposes if the research were to be extended to 
include such. 
The general multiple linear regression model, is represented by: 
--ýfio +, 
#IXI +j#2X2 +J33X3 . 
......... 
#MXM 
where Y is dependent variable, flo is intercept of Y and p/, fl2 are the coefficients of 
the independent variables. E is an error term, assumed to be normally distributed with a 
zero mean and constant variance. 
The objective of the data analysis is to establish if a linear relationship exists between the 
dependent variable, Y, and the independent variables, X., using regression analysis for 
modelling such a relationship. 
if we assume that m independent variables are potentially related to the dependent 
variable, the multiple regression models can be represented as shown above. In a multiple 
regression model, the error term represents the variations between predicted and actual 
values of the dependent variable Y that will inadvertently still occur. The residuals will be 
computed as observations of the error term to find the extent of the minimization of the 
sum of squared residuals. 
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Before the proposed multiple regression, a simple linear regression of LogCOST on 
LogPROD (where Log represents the natural logarithm) was run to examine the elasticity 
of unit cost with respect to production. For the three companies, it can be observed from 
Figures 5-7 that the plots of LogCOST against LogPROD do not suggest strong evidence 
of elasticities consistent with the existence of economies of scale. 
The regression of LogCOST on LogPROD will give a negative estimated coefficient of 
LogPROD if there are economies of scale, and a positive coefficient if there are 
diseconornies of scale. The regression equations are of the forrn: 
LogCOST =a+b LogPROD +c 
where c is assumed to have a zero mean and constant variance. The coefficient of b, 
which can be interpreted as the elasticity of unit cost with respect to production, is given 
by: 
ALogCOST 
ALogPROD 
The estimates of the coefficients of LogPROD for the separate regressions for the three 
companies and the coefficients of determination, (R) are as shown below. 
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Company B: Log COST-LogPROD 
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3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8' 
LogPROD 
Company A: Log COST = 1.036 + 0.026Log PROD 
(1.549) (0.149) 
R2=0.002 
Company B: Log COST = -6-0153 + 1.4324 Log PROD 
(-1.736) (1.940) 
R2 = 0.22 
Company C: Log COST = 2.5350 - 0.4704 Log PROD 
(2.713) (-1.768) 
R2 = 0.19 
All the three companies together: 
Log COST = 1.88 - 0.2268 Log PROD 
(9.255) (-4.677) 
R2=0.34 
(t-statistics in brackets) 
For companies A and B, the regression results suggest that there are no economics of 
scale as the coefficients of LqgPROD are positive, but for company C the coefficient for 
LogPROD is negative suggesting the presence of economies of scale. It is therefore likely 
that there are significant economies of scale available to the smallest company in the 
sample. This model suggests that the unit cost of production is largely negatively related 
to production volume when all the three companies are considered together. From the 
regression statistics, the sample correlation coefficient is 0.59 while R-squared is 0.34. 
These results show that only 34% of the variations in LogCOST are explained or 
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attributable to changes in the volume of production LogPROD. The estimated coefficient 
of LogPROD (-0.2268) is significantly less than zero at the 5% level of significance. 
To pursue this analysis, and to capture the impact of the contract type (CT) that dictates 
the management set-up, whereby the presence and/or extent of separation of ownership 
and control can be investigated, a dummy variable was introduced, set equal to 0 for the 
JV contract type and I for the PSC type. This development therefore gives rise to a 
multiple regression model. 
Multiple Regression 
Using EViews software to run the multiple regressions, the data input is assembled as shown in 
Table 10 above. The multiple regression is designed to investigate the influence of PROD, CT 
and time (7) on COST and GMPB. Time is included as an explanatory variable to capture the 
effects of any upward or downward trends in the data over the fifteen-year period. As above, the 
natural logarithms of COST, GWB and PROD are taken. Taking logarithms helps to reduce 
skew in the data and may reduce the likelihood of heteroskedasticity. The equations to be 
estimated may be written as: 
Log COST = al + fil Log PROD +. #2 CT + fli T+ El 
Log GMPB = a2 +J32, Log PROD +fl22 CT +fl23 T+ C2 
where cl and C2 are assumed to have zero means and constant variances. The estimated regression 
equations are: 
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Log COST = 1.20 - 0.13 Log PROD + 0.31 CT + 0.0 13 T 
(11.67) (-5.3) (11.23) (4.48) 
Adj. R2 :-0.86 
Standard Error of Regression = 0.079 
F Statistic = 77.6 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.29 
Sample Size = 44 
Log GMPB = 0.74 + 0.04Log PROD - 0.45 CT + 0.002 T (1.54) (0.36) (-3.52) (0.12) 
Adj. R2 = 0.21 
Standard Error of Regression = 0.375 
F Statistic = 4.9 
Durbin-Watson Statistic = 1.34 
Sample Size = 44 
ft-statistics in brackets) 
Assessment and Analysis 
In the cost equation, the estimated coefficient of LogPROD is negative, suggesting the 
existence of overall economies of scale, while the estimated coe icients of CT and T are ff 
both positive. The associated t-statistics are all above the critical value at the 0.05 
significance level; hence the three independent variables are all significant influences on 
cost per barrel. 
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In the GMPB equation, the estimated coefficients of LogPROD and T are both positive 
but insignificant. The estimated coefficient of CT, however, is negative and significant at 
the 0.05 level. Hence CT is seen to have a significant influence on the oil companies' 
profits, as well as their costs. 
In both equations, the coefficients of CT have their expected signs. So the evidence 
suggests that the PSC company has significantly higher costs and a significantly lower 
gross margin than the JV companies over the fifteen-year period of the study. 
However, before the above model can be accepted, it should be tested for autocorrelation, 
multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. If these are found to be present, then the model 
should be subjected to the necessary statistical adjustments for their correction in order to 
arrive at the best fit model. 
Durbin-Watson Test 
The results of the Durbin-Watson tests for first-order autocorrclation are inconclusive in 
both models. The Durbin-Watson statistic is equal to 1.29 in the cost equation and 1.34 in 
the GMPB equation. These values both lie between the lower and upper critical values 
given in the Durbin-Watson tables (1.20 and 1.47 respectively at the 0.01 level of 
significance). So we cannot reject the hypothesis of 'no autocorrelation' in either model. 
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Correlation Matrix 
For the purposes of testing for multicollinearity and obtaining indicative strengths and 
direction of association between the dependent variable and each of the independent 
variables, a correlation matrix was produced, as shown in Table 12. 
Table12 
Correlation Matdx: LogCOST. Loq GMPB. 
LoqPROD. CT and TIME 
Log COST Log PROD CT TIME 
Log COST I 
Log PROD -0.59 1 
CT 0.79 -0.30 1 
TIME 0.27 0.02 -0.06 1 
Loa GMPB --- 0.20 -0.52 0.04 
A high degree of correlation between the independent variables would indicate 
multicollinearity that could render the model unreliable. From Table 12, we see that none 
of correlation coefficients between the independent variables exceeds 10.31, so it is 
reasonable to conclude that there is no multicollinearity in the model. The correlation 
between LogCOST and LogPROD is negative (458) while that between LogCOST and 
CT is positive (0-79). Similarly, the correlation between LogGMPB and LogPROD is 
positive, but weak (0.20), while that between LogGAPB and CT is negative (-0.52). 
Heteroskedastigiýy 
Heteroskedasticity refers to the situation where the error variance is not constant. While 
its occurrence does not bias parameter estimates, it could make them inefficient relative to 
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alternative estimates. From the range of data analysed, it was expected that there could be 
heteroskedasticity. Some of the reasons for this suspicion are: 
a. The large range of observations - the production volumes range from 2.9 million 
to 60 million barrels. 
b. The cross sectional nature of the petroleum industry (in terms of size) - the 
revenue showed a large variation in firm sizes among companies A, B and C 
c. The data involved fifteen years during which there could be wide variation in 
crude oil prices, volume of production and the cost profile. 
For these reasons, in the estimation presented above, the method of ordinary least 
squares with White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors was used in order to 
remove any possible bias from the standard errors and t-statistics. 
AdLusted R--S-qu--ared 
Adjusted R2 is the coefficient of determination and it measures the ratio of the explained 
variation in the dependent variable (by the independent variables) to the total variation in 
the dependent variable. 
In the regression, the value of adjusted RI is 0.86 in the cost equation and 0.21 in the GMPB 
equation. This means that 86% of the variation in LogCOST is explained by variations in Log 
pROD, CT and T, but only 21% of the variation in LogGWB is explained by the variations in 
these variables. 
F-Statistics 
The F-statistics test the overall significance Of the regression equation. If the calculated F- 
value is greater than the critical value in the F-statistic table, we can reject the null 
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hypothesis (which says there is no relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables), and accept the alternative hypothesis that says they are linearly related. The F- 
statistics in the cost and GMPB equations are 77.6 and 4.9 respectively, both of which are 
higher than the critical value of 3.23, and therefore allow us to reject the null hypothesis 
of 'no relationship'. This allows us infer that the regression models both have sufficient 
statistical resilience to be adopted for interpretation. 
8.1.5 Interpretation 
From the outcome of the above data analysis, the type of contract appears to significantly 
determine the unit cost of production and the gross margin per barrel. This therefore 
allows us to appreciate the linkage between the extent of the separation of ownership and 
control in the Nigerian oil and gas exploration and producing industry and the economic 
performance of the operations. With the JV contract type, the host government that owns 
majority shares (an average of 55%) is probably able to control the management of such 
companies through representation and majority voting rights on the Board of Directors. 
Such controls are essentially with respect to cost and financial policy, financial control 
systems, manpower / equipment productivity and general management policy. Under the 
JV contract type, management consists essentially of the representatives of the minority 
shareholders (that is, the international oil companies) under the supervision of the Board 
of Directors. 
Under the PSC, the host countrys control of management is contained in the contract, 
with the vetting of work programmes and cost of oil as the main Objectives, though the 
host country has no representation, nor voting rights on the Board of Directors. In 
addition, under PSC, the host country retains 100% ownership of oil and gas reserveS 
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discovered, and only allows the international oil company (contractor/agent) ownership of 
a percentage of the oil and gas produced. Also, the contractor is required to provide 100% 
of funds required for both exploration and production and all other funding requirements 
and activities. If exploration turns out to be negative, i. e. neither oil nor gas is found in 
commercial quantities, the entire loss is solely that of the contractor. The implication of 
this is that the contractor bears 100% of the finance and 100% of the exploration risks in 
such a high risk venture as petroleum exploration. With the best of scrutiny and control, 
management as represented by the contractor is not likely to act in a manner that 
maximises the wealth of the owner of 100% of the reserve asset, given this scenario. 
This therefore should explain the basis for the research results whereby the unit cost of 
production for company A (PSC) is the highest compared to those of companies B and C, 
which operate under a different contract type (JV), and the gross margin per barrel is 
lowest in company A compared to those of companies B and C. Similarly, it also 
suggests why the operations of Company A are the least likely of the three companies to 
conform to economies of scale in its production profile, while company C exhibits some 
degree of economies of scale. 
in the classical theory of separation of ownership and control, whereby control is held by 
the majority shareholders, management is not expected to be able to act against the 
maximization of wealth of the owners of the business. These research results suggest that 
this may not be the case in the Nigerian oil and gas exploration and producing industry as 
the PSC contract type has been shown to negatively affect the performance or cost 
efficiency of the company that operates it, relative to those companies operating under the 
jV contract type despite the host country's 100% ownership and its retention of control. 
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The problem may not entirely be a lack of statutory provisions for control by the majority 
shareholder, but in its inactive utilization of such provisions giving rise to latent control. 
This research result confirms the null hypothesis that there is a significant linear 
relationship between contract types (JV and PSQ and the variables for measuring 
economic performance (unit cost of production and gross margin per barrel). CT is 
therefore one of the independent variables that determine an operating companies' 
economic performance. 
In this study, the PSC contract type resulted in a negation of maximization of 
shareholders' wealth as a result of the perceived reason of not giving consideration to the 
behaviour of the agent as represented by contractor/management. Contract type was also 
shown to have influenced the gross margin per barrel, and the PSC does not appear to 
have contributed to the maximisation of shareholders' wealth. 
This is a negation of the neo-classical theory of the firm, which regards the sole objective 
of the firm as profit maximisation without consideration for the behaviour of the 
participants (owners and agents) in the firm. In the neO-classical theory, there is a failure 
to mirror the behavioural pattern of both principals and their agents (particularly that of 
the agent) but an assumption that their objectives, and therefore their utility functions are 
common or similar. 
Given that people, such as contractors or operators of a PSC company, are naturally 
inclined to pursue their own objectives, which tend to maximise their individual interests. 
it is arguable that when ownership is diffused, control diminishes and mmmgers may tend 
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to pursue objectives that satisfy their own interests, which are not necessarily profit 
maximization or preservation of value, but possibly detrimental to the interests of other 
shareholders (Short, 1994). 
In the case investigated, ownership has not been diffused, yet the agent's behaviour has 
been detrimental to the interest of the owners. This could be as a result of the absence of 
the representation of the owners in management, which is necessary if the agent is not to 
behave against the interest of the owners, as proposed by Berle and Means (1932) 
Again, as stated in the literature review, there have been departures from equity-based, 
control, which are as a result of substantial percentage shareholding. An example of such 
departure is the conclusion by McEachern (1975) that classified owner-controlled firms 
into two groups. He made a distinction between outside owners that are not actively 
involved in management as 'externally controlled' firms, and owners who are managers 
as I owner managed' firms. 
The arrangement of the production sharing contract in Nigeria appears to fit the 
description of an externally controlled firm. The research result adds this to the body of 
knowledge (amongst other contributions), that in the oil and gas exploitation PSC type of 
contract, externally managed companies are not likely to maximize shareholders' wealth. 
Generally, there is no consensus on the level of ownership and control classification. This 
has affected the interpretation of research results on ownership and control separation and 
its impact on the firm (Short, 1994). However, I have based my conclusions on the results 
of this research which has exposed contract type as a key contributory variable to 
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economic performance (in the field of separation of ownership and control) under 
corporate governance with respect to oil and gas exploitation in a developing country, 
such as Nigeria. 
8.2 Data Analysis on Fiscal Taxation 
The data analysis for the second part of this research is based on secondary data on 
Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production for thirty-three years, which were 
sourced from public statistics, published by reputable international organisations, and 
unpublished statistics sourced from the producing companies and the country's Inland 
Revenue Service. 
The sources include: 
US Energy Information Agency (EIA) - one of the units in the US Department of 
Energy. 
2. BP Statistical Review of World Energy -a major publication of BP-Amoco. 
World Bank 
4. Nigerian Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS) 
5. OPEC Annual Statistical Review 
8.2.1 Data Set 
The data set spans the period 1970-2002 and comprises the Yearly production volume 
(measured in millions of barrels), average annual price of crude oil in US dollars per 
barrel ($Bbl), operating and capital expenditure in millions of dollars for the entire 
Nigerian oil and gas exploration and producing sector. Due to the sensitive nature Of 
some of the figures, (the unpublished portion), confidentiality will be maintained, 
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particularly with respect to the cost profile. The names of the specific companies cannot 
therefore be revealed. All computations were performed using Microsoft Excel and 
EViews computer software. 
8.2.2 Analysis 
The research for this part of the study is centred on investigating whether fiscal taxation is 
a significant instrument in actualising the Nigerian government's control and if so, the 
extent of its impact on the economic performance of the operating companies. Hence, the 
study employs a regression analysis to develop a financial model of the determinants of 
economic performance. 
The study investigates the effect of the proportion of government take in revenue on cost 
per barrel. While we could consider other components of cost, they are arguably less 
appropriate. However, such cost items include investment tax credits; value added tax, 
excise duty and import tariff exemptions or refunds after a certain level of investment 
spending. [Note that the gross margin per barrel is not used as a measure of financial 
performance in this part of the study because of the potentially distorting effects of 
changes in the price of oil on both the gross margin and 'government take'. ) 
in the case of Nigeria's oil industry, the above issues of tax are not significant compared 
to direct fiscal taxation, the components of which are referred to as 'Government Take' 
(GT). In its full sense and meaning, GT in a country like NigcTia includes: 
a. Royalty Payments 
b. Petroleum Profit Tax (PPT) 
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c. Percentage share of PAT (depending on the government's equity in the company's 
ownership structure) 
For the purpose of this research, however, GT is taken to be the sum of royalty payments 
and PPT. This is because the percentage share of PAT is not related to fiscal taxation 
affecting the companies' economic performance in that whatever the host country, s 
percentage holding, it is not tax related, though related to final profit. if the host country's 
equity had been zero or X percent, the same tax and royalty rates would have applied. 
Rather, equity is a component of the entire fiscal regime/contract governing oil and gas 
operations. 
Actual costs formed the basis for computing the cost profile from the raw data sourced 
from the oil companies. In order to minimize the impact of interest and foreign exchange 
rates on the costs, a combination of the US GDP deflator and inflation rates was 
employed. 
Fixed operating costs as an apportionment of operating expenditure (OPEX) is based on 
figures for a combination of big and small sized fields. Where there are gaps in the 
number of fields during the period in review, data for known years were used to apportion 
the fields using known total production volumes for those years, in order to deten-nine the 
field numbers with respect to size. This assumption also formed the basis for variable 
operating costs. 
Also, given the country's onshore-offshore production profile, of about 90% and 10% 
respectively, and with 80% of total production by the 44 big fields, and 20% from the 166 
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small fields, the computation of total OPEX was based on these assumptions in that 
company figures sourced were field sizes and onshore/offshore related. Similarly, onshore 
capital expenditure (CAPEX) is considered at 75% of offshore CAPEX per barrel of oil 
produced. This assumption was obtained from the company officials contacted. 
All figures are related to oil exploration and production. Though Nigeria is now a major 
gas producer, before 1999 when it exported its first gas, associated gas produced 
alongside oil was flared. 
8.2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The full set of data used in the study is shown in Table 13, and a set of descriptive 
statistics is given in Table 14. Table 15 shows a comparison of GT and PAT as 
percentages of total revenue and these statistics are also illustrated graphically in Figures 
8 and 9. 
From the summary of the descriptive statistics, the range of prices is $38.2/Bbl with the 
mean at $I 9.18/Bbl. The mean GT of $9 billion is a significant amount, 
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Table 13. 
Nigerian Oil and Gas Revenue. Tax Yield an Cornimnfes'Profit Profile (1970.20021* 
Total 
Year Production Oil Revenue. Cost Royalty Profit PPT Govt. Profit 
Price B/Tax Take A/Tax 
(mBbl) (s) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) 
1970 394 2 710 361 142 206 103 245 103 
1971 558 2 1189 520 238 431 216 454 216 
1972 664 2 1634 590 327 717 395 721 323 
1973 748 3 2350 630 470 1250 687 1157 562 
1974 825 12 10262 844 2052 7366 4477 6529 2889 
1975 650 14 9018 2633 1804 4581 3894 5697 687 
1976 756 12 9422 3057 1884 4481 3808 5693 672 
1977 763 15 11084 3082 2217 5786 4918 7135 868 
1978 694 15 10097 2792 2019 5286 4493 6513 793 
1979 840 22 18083 3436 3617 11030 9375 12992 1654 
1980 752 30 22534 2812 4507 15216 12933 17440 2282 
1981 522 40 20878 1952 4176 14750 12538 16713 2213 
1982 475 37 17319 1775 3464 12081 10269 13733 1812 
1983 453 36 16067 1693 3213 11161 9487 12700 1674 
1984 507 30 15221 1897 3044 10279 8737 11781 1542 
1985 548 28 15330 2048 3066 10216 8684 11750 1532 
1986 537 29 15372 2007 3074 10291 8747 11822 1544 
1987 489 17 8378 1829 1676 4873 4142 5818 731 
1988 529 19 10013 1979 2003 6031 5127 7129 905 
1989 628 15 9448 2348 1890 5211 4429 6319 782 
1990 661 21 14006 2471 2801 8734 7424 10225 1310 
1991 690 28 19178 2580 3836 12762 10848 14684 1914 
1992 708 18 12887 2662 2577 7648 6501 9078 1147 
1993 715 19 13235 2710 2647 7878 6697 9344 1182 
1994 704 14 9510 2714 1902 4894 4160 6062 734 
1995 729 16 11778 2727 2356 6695 5691 8(96 1004 
1996 780 20 15373 2919 3075 9380 7973 11048 1407 
1997 841 25 20721 3144 4144 13433 11418 15562 2015 
1998 789 17 13027 2953 2605 7469 6348 8954 1120 
1999 740 11 7846 2768 1569 3509 2982 4552 526 
2000 768 26 19612 2871 3922 12819 10896 14818 1923 
2001 784 22 17248 2932 3450 10867 9237 12686 1630 
2002 726 20 14425 2714 2885 8827 7503 10388 1324 
*1970-2002 Petroleum Profit Tax Payments Based On Varying Tax Rates: 
1970-71: (50%), 1972-73: (55%), 1974: (60.78%), 1975-2002: (85%) 
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Table 14. Summary Descri Wive Statis tics 
Total 
Production Oil Revenue. Cost Royalty Profit PPT Govt. Profit 
Price B/Tax Take A/Tax 
(mBbl) ($) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) (M$) 
Mean 666 19.2 12523 2256 2505 7762 6519 9024 1243 
Median 704 18.5 13027 2633 2605 7648 6501 9078 1182 
Std. Dev. 123 9.68 5723 840 1145 4110 3555 4691 649 
minimum 394 1.8 710 361 142 206 103 245 103 
maximum 841 40 22534 3436 4507 15216 12933 17440 2889 
Sample 
Size(Yrs) 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
representing 72% of revenue, compared to mean profit after tax at 10% of revenue. This 
may be a pointer to the significance of GT in the economic analysis. 
An examination of these statistics also shows that mean petroleum profit tax is about 84% 
of profit before tax. When examined in relation to total sales revenue, mean petroleum 
profit tax is 52% of revenue, again suggesting its significance. 
Because the royalty is revenue based, when added to petroleum profit tax as the second 
component in governrnent take, the impact of government take on revenue becomes very 
significant at 72%. Moreover, government take is observed to exceed the profit before tax 
for all years examined but two. 
A further observation of the descriptive statistics includes the relatively low level of profit 
after tax given the revenue generated. An average of 10% profit after tax is achieved in 
relation to revenue for the thirty-three year period investigated, whereas 
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Table 15. 
Comparison of GT and PAT 
As Percentages of Revenue 
Year GT PAT 
%Rev. %Rev 
1970 35 15 
1971 38 18 
1972 44 20 
1973 49 24 
1974 64 28 
1975 63 8 
1976 60 7 
1977 64 8 
1978 64 8 
1979 72 9 
1980 77 10 
1981 80 11 
1982 79 10 
1983 79 10 
1984 77 10 
1985 77 10 
1986 77 10 
1987 69 9 
1988 71 9 
1989 67 8 
1990 73 9 
1991 77 10 
1992 70 9 
1993 71 9 
1994 64 8 
1995 68 9 
1996 72 9 
1997 75 10 
1998 69 9 
1999 58 7 
2000 76 10 
2001 74 9 
2002 72 9 
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the average govermnent take recorded for the same period is 72%. The significant 
increases in government take as a percentage of revenue from 34.5% and 38% in 1970 
and 1971 respectively to 64% (1974) and 80% (1981) are due to the substantial increases 
in oil prices from $1.8Bbl in 1970 to $12.44/Bbl in 1974 and S40/Bbl in 1981, as well as 
significant increases in tax rates. 
The descriptive statistics finther suggest that government take is a possible determinant of 
company economic performance. This will be investigated further in the proposed 
regression analysis of the financial figures in order to determine the extent of its impact 
on cost per barrel. However it is generally known that the imposition of tax could 
constitute a disincentive for corporate organisations particularly when there is no 
provision for loss offset with future profits. Companies engaged in risky ventures such as 
mineral extraction, are likely to have lower returns on their investments when taxes are 
levied, particularly when such tax rates are considered high (James and Nobes, 2001). 
8.2.4 Financial Regression Modelling, Assessment and Analysis 11 
For a more precise investigation of relationships and lin"ges among variables, statistical 
regression analysis is conducted. This is with a view to establishing if a relationship exists 
between the dependent and independent variables. In respect of this investigation, the 
dependent variable chosen as the main measure of economic performance is cost per 
barrel. 
Given the objective of the data analysis, which is to establish if a relationship exists 
between economic performance and fiscal taxation, as measured by government take as a 
proportion of revenue, the following multiple financial regression model is adopted: 
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Log COST = flo +j3lLog PROD +, #2 Log GTIR +flj T+ 
where: 
LogCOST is the natural logarithm of cost per barrel produced (as before). 
LogPROD is the natural logarithm of production volume (as before). 
LogGTIR is the natural logarithm of government take as a ratio of revenue, i. e. ((royalty + 
petroleum profit tax) / revenue). 
T represents time and is a variable which takes the values 1,2,3 . ....... 33 for the period 
1972-2002. 
e is the error term assumed to have a zero mean and a constant variation. 
A correlation matrix is shown in Table 16. The highest correlation coefficient between 
pairs of independent variables is 0.53, so multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in 
the regression. The dependent variable, LogCOST, is positively correlated with LogGTIR, 
LogPROD and T, the highest correlation being with LogGTIR (equal to 0.78). 
Table16 
Correlation Matrix of LogCOST-LogGTIR. LOOPROD and TIME 
LogCOST 
LogCOST 
IL- 6^2 
TIR LogPROD TIME 
LogGTIR 0.78 1 
L09PROD 0.13 0.06 1 
TIME 0.57 0.53 0.33 
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A multiple regression of LogCOST on LogGTIR, LogPROD and T was run, and the result 
is as follows: 
Log COST = 1.07 + 1.79LogGTIR - 0.126LogPROD + 0.0053T 
(1.38) (5.80) (-0.45) (1.79) 
Adjusted R2 = 0.67 
F Statistic = 22.80 
Durbin-Watson Statistics =IA 
Standard Error of Regression = 0.129 
Sample size = 33 years 
Anal ysis and Assessment of the Model 
From the estimated cost equation, the adjusted R2 value of 0.67 suggests that 67% of 
variations in cost per barrel produced are attributable to variations in the following 
independent variables, government take as a ratio of revenue, production volume and time. 
The value of the Durbin-Watson statistics for the regression is I-1, which is less than 1.26, 
the lower boundary of the critical range for three independent variables and thirty-three 
observations. This suggests the possibility of positive first-order autocorrelation. 
However, the coefficients and t-statistics are significant enough in providing a reasonable 
model of the relationship between the dependent variable of cost per barrel, and the 
independent variables of government take as a ratio of revenue, production volume and 
time. 
The regression coefficients suggest that of these variables, government take as a 
percentage of revenue explains more of the variations in cost per barrel produced than the 
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volume produced and time. In fact, LogGTIR is the only independent variable that has a 
significant influence on LogCOST at the 0.05 level. Also, as expected, the estimated 
coefficient on LogGTIR is positive, indicating that increases in govenu-nent take have led 
to increases in the cost per barrel. 
8.2.5 Interpretation 
Government take as a proportion of revenue increased from 35% in 1970 to 63% in 1975, 
and averaged 72% between 1970 and 2002. Given that the royalty is a price-based 
element of fiscal taxation and that petroleum profit tax alone represented 52 percentage 
points of the 72% government take as a ratio of revenue, it can be suggested that fiscal 
taxation through direct imposition of taxes is a significant factor that affects economic 
performance. Therefore both components of government take - that is, royalty and 
petroleum profit tax - are significant factors of fiscal taxation with which government 
controls the oil and gas exploration and production in Nigeria, and both determine the 
economic performance of the oil and gas companies. 
Generally, the price of oil is expected to be significant in the determination of economic 
performance of the companies. The changes in oil prices during the period 1970-2002 are 
summarised in Figure 10. Without an oil price increase between 1970 and 1972 ($2.0 per 
bbI for both years), but with a 68% increase in production, it was observed that cost per 
barrel decreased only slightly from $0.92 in 1970 to $0.89 in 1972 (3.3%). Government 
take as a proportion of revenue (GTIR), however, increased from 35% to 44% for same 
period. This could not be attributable to the price increase, but was possibly due to a 5% 
increase in the petroleum profit tax rate from 50% in 1970 to 55% 1972. 
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When the oil price increased from $2/BbI in 1972 to $3 /BbI in 1973 (50% increase) and 
by 17% in 1974 compared to the 1973 price, GTIR increased from 44% in 1972 to 64% in 
1974 and from 49% in 1973 to 64% in 1974. For these periods in review it is observable 
that petroleum profit tax rates increased significantly - that is, from 55% in 1973 to 
60.78% in 1974. 
If GTIR for 1974 were calculated based on the 55% tax rate of 1972/1973, for the same 
production volumes, total cost and oil price in 1974, the GTIR for 1974 would have been 
59% and not the 64% recorded. Similarly, if for the same production volume, oil price 
and total cost in 1974, the 1970 tax rate of 50% is applied, the GTIR for 1974 would have 
been 56% and not 64%. 
When the same type of calculation is made for 1975 volumes, oil price and total cost, but 
with 1974 tax rate of 60.78%, the GTIR for 1975 would have been 51%, as against 63% 
recorded for 1975 based on the increased tax rate of 85% in 1975. All of these suggest 
that the GTIR has negatively impacted on cost per barrel, or the economics of the 
operation. 
The implication of such fiscal taxation policy is that it constitutes a disincentive effect for 
economic performance by operating companies. This is much more evident with high risk 
operations like oil and gas exploitation where the operating companies are uncertain 
about their exploration activities. Therefore with high tax rates, companies tend to be less 
cost conscious making use of their multinational operations to engage in transfer pricing, 
in order to negate the effects of such tax policies on their operations. 
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Fig. 10 
Graph of Crude oil vrices 1970 to 2002 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusions of this research are based primarily on the outcomes of the qualitative 
and quantitative data analysis carried out in the course of the investigation. The research 
therefore does not claim to be an extension of any previous work but draws parallels and 
similarities from related academic research, where applicable, and from information 
sourced from the various interviews conducted, as well as my previous understanding of 
the economics of the industry. 
The research results have provided bases from which conclusions can be drawn, such that 
the conclusions are both inductive and deductive. Since there are two aspects to this 
research topic, the conclusions are divided into two parts. Both parts address the initial 
questions of the identification of the determinants of the economic performance of oil and 
gas exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria. 
In order to draw conclusions, we first reconsider the hypotheses set out in chapter 7. 
9.1 Conclusions on the separation of ownership and control 
I-lypothesis Hi: Contract Type (CT) is a significant determinant of economic performance 
for oil and gas exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria. 
Evidence: From the multiple regression models, CT, as an independent variable, is seen to 
have a significant effect (based upon the sample) on both of the chosen measures of 
financial performance (cost per barrel and gross margin per barrel). Thus, the evidence 
supports Hypothesis Hi. 
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Hypothesis H2: The Production Sharing Contract type (PSC) in comparison to the Joint 
Venture (JV) contract type does not optimize the economic performance of oil and gas 
exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria. 
Evidence: From the results of the analysis, Company A (PSC) recorded the highest unit 
cost of production and the lowest gross margin per barrel compared with companies B 
and C which operated under the JV contract type. Also, the regression results indicate that 
CT has a positive influence on the cost per barrel and a negative influence on the gross 
margin per barrel. Thus the evidence supports Hypothesis H2. 
Given the argument of Morck et al (1988), and some other scholars, that there is no 
evidence confkming any relationship between owner controlled groups of fIrms and 
performance, this research result differs from this argument in providing empirical 
evidence that owner control of Nigeria's oil producing companies operating under a PSC 
does have an impact on economic performance. In particular, the results suggest that a 
PSC results in poorer economic performance compared with JV contract type companies, 
where ownership is diffused, thereby suggesting a more efficient allocation / utilization of 
resources, unlike under the PSC, where despite 100% equity ownership by the 
government, control is less effective. 
Also, this study shows that, contrary to the fmdings of Shleifer and Vishny (1996), large 
shareholders (particularly those with 51% or more) have significant control where 
ownership and control are not separated because they are capable of addressing the 
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agency problem. In the case investigated, it has been shown that this may not be the 
situation in the Nigerian oil producing industry. 
Although the government has 100% ownership and the contract makes provisions for the 
exercise of control over management/agent/contractor, such an arrangement has 
reinforced the incidence of the agency problem, which is evident from the poorer 
economic performance of PSC companies compared with JV companies. 
Another angle to this research is that it corroborates the findings of Letza (1998), 
according to which, when majority shareholders like the government have little interest of 
the minority stakeholders (in this case, the contractor), it contributes to failure (of public 
services). In this instance, the government's exhibition of little interest of the 
contractor/agent could be said to have resulted in lower economic performance for PSC 
than jV contract type companies in Nigeria's oil producing industry. 
While the JV contract type allows more control by the host government, in that it 
provides for its representation on the Board of Directors (despite 55% average ownership), 
the PSC does not allow adequate control as the country has no representation on the 
Board of Directors despite 100% ownership. 
While it is truly difficult to generalise on the actual impact of equity ownership 
concentration (and the inherent control implications for large shareholding) and 
separation of control on the economic performance of firms, the commercial arrangement 
between country and country, terms of contract and licences, external control over 
internal financial systems and voting participation and control (which is absent in the 
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Nigerian PSC) are critical in the case examined. This research opens the floodgate for 
fin-ther investigations of the financial control systems of multinational oil companies' 
affiliate operations, particularly with respect to their corporate governance practices. 
The following conclusions are deducible from this section of the research and are pointers 
to fin-ther research in this field of study: 
(a) While it has been shown by this study that contract type influences economic 
performance, the claim of maximization of shareholder/owners' wealth as a result of the 
separation of ownership and control cannot be said to be universal as this research result 
has shown. 
(b) This study also shows that the JV contract type enables the maximization of 
shareholders' wealth more than the PSC. 
(c) The result contributes to the theory that the separation of ownership and control 
creates and perpetuates the agency problem (Monsen and Downs 1965) and that it applies 
to the oil exploration and producing industry, as in the investigated case where control is 
latent. It fiuther adds the dimension of contract type. That is, the choice of contract type is 
a factor determining the extent of the agency problem. 
(d) This study also concludes that the host country's intention to maximise its wealth 
from petroleum exploitation by owning 1001% of the reservoir asset and without bearing 
any part of the finance and exploration risks through employment of PSC contract type is 
unrealisable. 
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Though this study buttresses some of the existing theories concerned with separation of 
ownership and control in the field of corporate governance, it has provided additional 
knowledge on the economic implication of the adoption of PSC (as sub-optimal, at least 
in comparison to JV) as the preferred contract type by developing petroleum producing 
countries like Nigeria. The preference for PSC (in the first place) is due to the zero-level 
capital commitment requirement, and its no-risk nature for the host country. 
This is an example of developing economies' fiscal policy rationalization bome out of 
persistent liquidity and balance of payment problems. (World Bank Report, 2002). 
Consequently, the optimization of economic returns desired by the host country becomes 
doubtful. The contract types have, however, proved to be key determinants of economic 
performance of oil producing companies in Nigeria as the research results show. 
9.1.1 Areas of Further Research 
It is believed that this study could lead to additional areas of investigation in order to 
reinforce the current research outcomes. Such areas of study include: 
What aspects of control are lacking in the PSC contract type being employed 
by petroleum producing developing countries? 
ii. If the host countries are to effectively control the agents/contractors, what is 
the nature of transaction cost economics involved, particularly in comparison 
to the transaction cost economics for the JV contract type? 
iii. How universal is the problem of the sub-optimization of shareholders' wealth 
through PSC compared to JV in the petroleum industry and in any industry for 
that matter? 
iv. Is this problem peculiar to the developing oil producing countries? 
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9.2 Conclusions on Fiscal Taxation 
Hypothesis H3: Fiscal taxation has a negative influence on Nigeria's oil and gas operating 
companies' economic performance. 
Evidence: From the regression model, the evidence supports HYPothesis H3 since the 
coefficient of government take as a ratio of revenue in the estimated cost equation is 
positive and significant. Hence government take is a significant variable in explaining 
variations in cost per barrel of production. Fiscal taxation is therefore a determinant of 
economic performance. 
This research results lead to a number of conclusions among which are: 
(a) Fiscal taxation as represented by petroleum profit tax and royalty and as measured 
through government take as a ratio of revenue is a determinant of operating companies' 
economic performance in Nigeria. 
(b) There is evidence too that production and time are relevant independent variables in 
the suggested model, as determinants of economic performance. Given that Nigeria's 
crude oil production is restricted under OPEC's production quota system, the limitation of 
production has probably diminished the impact of production volume on cost per barrel as 
seen in the regression output. 
(c) The limitation Of Production volume is a form of supply control by OPEC. This has 
contributed to the significant increases in crude oil prices over the years. 
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(d) This limitation of production, in turn, possibly contributes to a higher cost per barrel 
of production, an indication of lower economic performance of the producing companies. 
With such restricted production, the companies would still be profitable (as highlighted 
by the level of profit after tax in Table 11). With certain fixed costs (which are 
independent of the level of activity, and only recoverable over a longer time frame), if 
production was not restricted but left to the free market, it is possible that the unit 
production cost per barrel would fall. It is then possible that it would offset the impact of 
the 72% average government take as a ratio of revenue which appears to have increased 
the cost per barrel when tax rates were increased in 1972,1974 and 1975. 
Arguably, what OPEC's quota has achieved is to ensure price increases without 
commensurate increases in profit after tax for the companies, while ensuring increased 
revenue for the host country, through increased amounts of government take. 
(e) it is evident from this result that the bedrock of OPEC's policy is the production 
quota system, that is, the creation of artificial production volumes through rationing. 
(f) For non-OPEC producing countries like the UK., rather than supporting a cartel's 
policy (against free market conditions), or adopting a regressive tax rate as Nigeria's 85% 
petroleum profit tax, in addition to royalty, it is preferable to diversify the petroleum tax 
base to include petroleum revenue tax (PRT) and a lower corporation tax (CT) as it is the 
case in the UK according to Kemp and Cohen (1980). While petroleum revenue tax 
captures the advantages of price increases, and improves the UK's government take 
through the combination of PRT and CT, the abolition of the royalty for fields licensed 
after 1974, and in January 2003 for all fields in the country, shows the intention to reduce 
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the negative impact of fiscal taxation through a revenue based tax like PRT on the 
economic performance of companies operating in the UK. 
According to Kemp and Rose (1981), tax changes influence the behaviour of operating 
companies. For example, tax rates when not favourable could cause the postponement of 
marginal field development. Also, premature abandonment of fields could result from 
increasing tax rates. When there is no restriction on production volumes, a favourable 
fiscal taxation could bring forward in time, field development as well as increases in 
capital expenditure for exploration and production, whereas when the fiscal taxation is 
not favourable, or with restricted production, as it is the case in Nigeria, the cost per 
barrel produced could rise, more so with the attendant fixed overheads. 
Given that when oil prices decline some fields become uneconomical, price increases 
therefore could enhance profitability. However, with significant tax rates or tax rate 
increases, increases in price may not necessarily create significant economic advantages 
for the operating companies as they only substantially increase government take. The 
efficiency of the companies in terms of the average cost per barrel and gross margin is 
therefore likely to be adversely affected, which is what is observed in this study. The cost 
per barrel is observed to decrease from $0.92 in 1970 to $0.84 in 1973 when oil prices 
were $2.0 per barrel in 1970 and $3.0 per barrel in 1973, yet GTIR increased from 35% 
to 49% as the tax rate increased from 50% to 55% for the same period. When oil prices 
increased significantly from $3.0 per barrel in 1973 to $12.0 per barrel in 1974, despite a 
production volume increase of 103%, the cost per barrel which would have been 
expected to decrease, increased by 21%. GTIR increased from 49% to 64%, indicating 
that rather than profits improving with a higher oil price and higher production volume, it 
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was GTIR that increased. It seems therefore that GTIR is an important contributory factor 
in determining the economic performance of oil companies in Nigeria. 
9.2.1 Areas of Further Research 
This part of the research has opened additional areas for further investigation, including 
the following: 
1. The impact of Nigeria's oil and gas fiscal taxation system on the flow of 
investment capital to the country's oil and gas sector. This could be viewed in a 
comparative study with other developing oil and gas producing economies, which 
are desirous of attracting critical exploration capital from the international oil and 
gas petroleum companies. 
2. A similar research into the level of revenue loss or gain by OPEC member 
countries as a result of the production quota. In addition to this, the study could 
include the potential impact of artificial oil prices on the world economy and the 
threat they pose for developed countries' energy supply security. 
3. The future of OPEC in terms of its ability to retain its production quota policy and 
the rationale for member states' continued membership. 
4. The determination of the extent of the impact of other variables such as price, 
inflation, exchange rate fluctuations and labour cost on the economics of oil and 
gas exploration and production in Nigeria, UK and other OPEC member countries. 
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9.3 Overall Conclusion 
In concluding this research, the highlights include the relationship among classical and 
modem theories of the firm with respect to the concept of the separation of ownership and 
control, the choice of contract types governing business transactions in the oil and gas 
exploration and producing industry, the fiscal taxation policy of the host government and 
the economic performance of the international oil companies operating in Nigeria. The 
research results have shown that contract types not only affect economic performance but 
that the production sharing contract type does not maximize shareholders' wealth as the 
joint venture contract type would. They also show that the retention of large block shares 
by a single shareholder (like the Nigerian government) does not guarantee maximization 
of shareholder wealth, contrary to the claim of Shliefer and Vishny (1996) that large 
shareholders (particularly those with 51% or more) have significant control because they 
are capable of addressing the 'agency problem'. 
Similarly, the research findings tend to corroborate the views of Monsen et al (1968) and 
Morck et al (1988) that there is a relationship between the separation of ownership and 
control and the economic performance of firms. The present study adds to this debate by 
demonstrating that there could be a negation of the maximization of shareholders' wealth 
even when ownership is not separated from control, but control is latent. 
Also, this research has shown through empirical evidence that there is a relationship 
between contract type, fiscal taxation and economic performance. The results showed that 
for oil and gas exploration and producing companies operating in Nigeria under the joint 
venture contract type, even though the companies operate at a higher petroleum profit tax 
rate (85%) than the companies under the production sharing contract type (57.5%), and 
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oespite the government's ownership of 100% of the assets, the cost of production per 
barrel of oil is lower, and the gross margin per barrel higher than in the production 
sharing company. It was also observed through empirical evidence that the cost per barrel 
of oil produced increased despite increasing oil prices. The ratio of government take 
(petroleum profit tax and royalty) in revenue also increased significantly with tax rates. 
This may have been due to the negative effects of increasing tax rates and the artificial 
production volumes (as a result of the OPEC quota) despite increasing prices. This 
therefore makes Nigeria's oil and gas exploration and production fiscal taxation policy 
regressive, confirming the view of Kemp A. G (1992), in his work on the effects of fiscal 
terms on new oil and gas fields development projects in Nigeria, using net present value 
(NPV) estimations. In the final analysis, this research has provided through the use of 
econometric modelling, a link between contract type, fiscal taxation and the economic 
performance of international oil and gas exploration and producing companies in Nigeria. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
MULTINATIONAL OIL COMPANIES HOME COUNTRY 
1. EXXONMOBIL OIL CORPORATION USA 
2. ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PETROLEUM Co. NETHERLANDS/UK 
3. BP-AMOCO UK / USA 
4. CHEVRONTEXACO USA 
5. TOTALFINAELF FRANCE 
6. ENI - AGIP ITALY 
7. CONOCOPHILLIPS PETROLEUM USA 
8. BG PLC UK 
9. REPSOL - YPF SPAIN 
10. LUKOIL RUSSIA 
11. AMERADA HESS UK 
12. YUKOS RUSSIA 
13. MARATHON OIL USA 
14. DEVON ENERGY USA 
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APPENDIX 2 
OPEC MIENIBER STATES 
1. ALGERIA 
2. INDONESIA 
3. IRAN 
4. IRAQ 
5. KUWAIT 
6. LIBYA 
7. NIGERIA 
8. QATAR 
9. SAUDI ARABIA 
10. UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
IL VENEZUELA 
MAJOR NON-OPEC PRODUCING COUNTRIES* 
1. USA 
2. RUSSIA 
3. MEXICO 
4. NORWAY 
5. CHINA 
6. BRAZIL 
7. CANADA 
8. UNITED KINGDOM 
* Individual producers of 2% (minimum) of total world production in 2003. 
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APPENDIX 3 
100 % STATE OV^ED OIL COMPANIES 
COMPANY COUNTRY 
STATOIL NORWAY 
PERTAMINA INDONESIA 
ARAMCO SAUDI ARABIA 
IRAN NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION IRAN 
IRAQ NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION IRAQ 
SONATRAC ALGERIA 
NIGERIAN NATIONAL PETROLEUM CORP. NIGERIA 
PEMEX 
PETROBRAS 
ECOPETROL 
PVDSA 
PETRONAS 
MEXICO 
BRAZIL 
COLOMBIA 
VENEZUELA 
MALAYSIA 
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APPENDIX 4 
MAJOR NIGERIAN OIL AND GAS PRODUCING JOINT VENTURES (2003)* 
OPERATOR OTHER PARTNERS NNPC SOME MAJOR 
(% INTEREST) (% INTEREST) (% INTEREST) MAJOR FIELDS 
SHELL (30%) TOTAL FINAELF 55% Nembe, Ekulama 
(10%) Imo Rver, Yorki 
AGIP (5%) Jones Creek, 
Egwa, Adibawa 
Olomoro, Odidi 
ExxonMobil None 60% Edop, Ubit, Oso 
(40%) Unam, Asasa 
ChevronTexaco None 60% Meren, Okan, (40%) 
Meji, Robertkiri, 
Inda, Middleton 
Funiwa, Sengana 
Benin River, N. Apol 
AGIP/ENI Phillips (20%) (60%) Obama, Oblafu, 
(20%) Agara, M'Bede 
TotalFinaElf None (60%) Obagi, Ukpomam 
(40%) Obodo-Jatuml, 
* www. eia. doe. gov Okpoko, Aghigo 
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APPENDIX 5 
MAJOR NIGERLAA PRODUCING OIL FIELDS RESERVE LEVEL (2003)* 
Operator Fields Reserves 
SHELL Bonga 600 
Bonga South West 600 
Bomu 875 
Cawthorne Channel 750 
Forcados-Yokri 1235 
Imo River 875 
Jones Creek 900 
Nembe Creek 950 
ExxonMobil Eclop 733 
Erha 1200 
Ubit 945 
ChavronTexaco Agbami 1000 
Delta 300 
Meren 1100 
Apoi-North-Funiwa 500 
Okan 800 
Agip/ENI Ebegoro, 160 
TotaFinaElf Amenem-Kpono 500 
Akpo 200 
Obagi 670 
* www. nip. erianoil-Las. com 
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APPENDIX 6 
Chronological List of Legislation Affecting Petroleum Operations 
and Fiscal Regime in Nigeria* 
1958 NHnerals Act 
Nfineral Oils Act 
Oil Pipelines Act 
1959 Nfinerals Amendment Act 
Petroleum Profit Tax Act 
1965 Oil Pipelines Act 
1966 Income Tax (Amendment) Decree 
1967 Petroleum Profit Tax (Amendment) Decree 
1969 Petroleum Acts 
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations 
1970 Petroleum Profits Tax (amendment) Decree 
1971 Offshore Oil Revenues Decree 
1972 Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree 
1973 Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree 
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations Amendment 
1977 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation Decree 
1977 Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree 
1978 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Amendment) Decree 
1979 Associated Gas Re-injection Decree 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Amendment) Decree 
Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree No. 2 
Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree No. 3 
Companies Income Tax Act (Exemption from Corporation Tax) 
1985 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree 
1988 Acquisition of Assets (British Petroleum Co, Ltd) Act 
1999 Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Decree 
www. niaeriabusinessinfo. com, (2002) 
Oremade B. T (1986) 
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APPENDIX 7 
Malor Dates in the History of Nigeria's Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Producing Industr-v* 
1908 Germany's Nigerian Bitumen Co. and British Colonial Petroleum Started 
Operation n Western Nigeria 
1938 Shell Petroleum Granted License 
1951 Shell Drilled First Exploration Well: Iho-1 
1953 Mobil Oil Started Operation 
1956 Shell Strikes First Oil at Oloibiri First 
1958 First Oil Shipment Out of Nigeria 
1961 Texaco and Gulf Oil Start Operations, Agip (ENI) Started 1962. 
1963 Gulf Makes Nigeria's First Offshore Discovery at Okan 
1965 First Offshore Production from Okan 
1969 Government Started Dept. of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
1971 Nigeria Joins OPEC 
1973 Government Signed First Joint Venture Participation Agreement 
1974 Government Takes 55% Equity in Joint Ventures 
1975 DPR Upgraded to Mnistry of Petroleum and Energy 
1986 Government Signs First MOU with Operating Companies 
1987 First Indigenous Oil Company Dubri Oil Started Operations 
1991 New MOUs Signed 
1993 SHELL Drills First Deep Offshore Well 
1996 SHELL Discovers Bonga Field 
1997 First LPG Shipment By Chevron and First NGLs By Mobil 
2000 First LNG Project On-stream 
2001 Third Round OF Bidding for Onshore & Offshore Fields 
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2003 SHELL's Giant Bonga Field On-stream 
* www. imEorg 
APPENDIX 8 
USA GDP Deflator %Change 
Year 
1988 3.9 
1989 3.5 
1990 3.2 
1991 2.8 
1992 2.4 
1993 2.4 
1994 2.2 
1995 2.0 
1996 2.0 
1997 1.8 
1998 1.4 
1999 1.5 
2000 2.5 
2001 2.3 
2002 1.2 
229 
APPENDIX 9 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS THAT AFFECTED WORLD CRUDE OIL PRICES 
(1973 -2002) 
1. OPEC. begins to assert power; raises tax rate & posted prices 
2. OPEC begins nationalization process; raises prices in response to falling US dollar. 
3. Negotiations for gradual transfer of ownership of western assets in OPEC countries 
4. Oil embargo begins (October 19-20,1973) 
5. OPEC freezes posted prices; US begins mandatory oil allocation 
6. Oil embargo ends (March 18,1974) 
7. Saudis increase tax rates and royalties 
8. US crude oil entitlements program begins 
9. OPEC announces 15% revenue increase effective October 1,1975 
10. Official Saudi Light price held constant for 1976 
11. Iranian oil production hits a 27-year low 
12. OPEC decides on 14.5% price increase for 1979 
13. Iranian revolution; Shah deposed 
14. OPEC raises prices 14.5% on April 1,1979 
15. US phased price decontrol begins 
16. OPEC raises prices IS% 
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17. Iran takes hostages; President Carter halts imports from Iran; Iran cancels US 
contracts; Non-OPEC output hits 17.0 million b/d 
18. Saudis raise marker crude price from 19$/bbl to 26$/bbl 
19. Windfall Profits Tax enacted 
20. Kuwait, Iran, and Libya production cuts drop OPEC oil production to 27 million b/d 
21. Saudi Light raised to $28/bbl 
22. Saudi Light raised to S34/bbl 
23. First major fighting in Iran-Iraq War 
24. President Reagan abolishes remaining price and allocation controls 
25. Spot prices dominate official OPEC prices 
26. US boycotts Libyan crude; OPEC plans 18 million b/d output 
27. Syria cuts off Iraqi pipeline 
28. Libya initiates discounts; Non-OPEC output reaches 20 million b/d; OPEC output 
drops to 15 million b/d 
29. OPEC cuts prices by $5/bbl and agrees to 17.5 million b/d output 
30. Norway, United Kingdom, and Nigeria cut prices 
3 1. OPEC accord cuts Saudi Light price to $28/bbl 
32. OPEC output falls to 13.7 million b/d 
33. Saudis link to spot price and begin to raise output 
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34. OPEC output reaches 18 million b/d 
35. Wide use of netback pricing 
36. Wide use of Exed prices 
37. Wide use of fonnula pricing 
38. OPECNon-OPEC meeting failure 
39. OPEC production accord; Fulmar/Brent production outages in the North Sea 
40. Exxon's Valdez tanker spills II million gallons of crude oil 
41. OPEC raises production ceiling to 19.5 million b/d 
42. Iraq invades Kuwait 
43. Operation Desert Storm begins; 17.3 million barrels of SPR crude oil sales is awarded 
44. Persian Gulf war ends 
45. Dissolution of Soviet Union; Last Kuwaiti oil fire is extinguished on November 6, 
1991 
46. UN sanctions threatened against Libya 
47. Saudi Arabia agrees to support OPEC price increase 
48. OPEC production reaches 25.3 million b/d, the highest in over a decade 
49. Kuwait boosts production by 560,000 b/d in defiance of OPEC quota 
50. Nigerian oil workers' strike 
5 1. Extremely cold weather in the US and Europe 
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52. U. S. launches cruise missile attacks into southern Iraq following an Iraqi-supported 
invasion of Kurdish safe haven areas in northern Iraq. 
53. Iraq begins exporting oil under United Nations Security Council Resolution 986. 
54. Prices rise as Iraq's refusal to allow United Nations weapons inspectors into 
f1sensitive" sites raises tensions in the oil-rich Middle East. 
55. OPEC raises its production ceiling by 2.5 million barrels per day to 27.5 million 
barrels per day. This is the first increase in 4 years. 
56. World oil supply increases by 2.25 million barrels per day in 1997, the largest annual 
increase since 1988. 
57. Oil prices continue to plummet as increased production from Iraq coincides with no 
growth in Asian oil demand due to the Asian economic crisis and increases in world 
oil inventories following two unusually warm winters. 
58. OPEC pledges additional production cuts for the third time since March 1998. Total 
pledged cuts amount to about 4.3 million barrels per day. 
59. Oil prices triple between January 1999 and September 2000 due to strong world oil 
demand, OPEC oil production cutbacks, and other factors, including weather and low 
oil stock levels. 
60. President Clinton authorizes the release of 30 million barrels of oil from the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR) over 30 days to bolster oil supplies, particularly heating oil 
in the Northeast. 
61. Oil prices fall due to weak world demand (largely as a result of economic recession in 
the United States) and OPEC overproduction. 
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62. Oil prices decline sharply following the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States, largely on increased fears of a sharper worldwide economic downturn 
(and therefore sharply lower oil demand). Prices then increase on oil production cuts 
by OPEC and non-OPEC at the beginning of 2002, plus unrest in the Middle East and 
the possibility of renewed conflict with Iraq. 
63. OPEC oil production cuts, unrest in Venezuela, and rising tension in the Middle East 
contribute to a significant increase in oil prices between January and June. 
64. A general strike in Venezuela, concern over a possible military conflict in Iraq, and 
cold winter weather all contribute to a sharp decline in U. S. oil inventories and cause 
oil prices to escalate further at the end of the year. 
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